Source: French to English Tester Published on: 2026-04-26
Source: The Conversation – in French– By Imad Khillo, Lecturer in Public Law at Sciences Po Grenoble / University of Grenoble Alpes. Researcher at the Center for Studies and Research on Diplomacy, Public Administration and Politics (CERDAP²). Co-director of the research seminar “National Construction and Religions in the Mediterranean” at the Collège des Bernardins, Sciences Po Grenoble – University of Grenoble Alpes
In Iraq, since the adoption of the new Personal Status Code in 2025, the condition of women has deteriorated. Between early marriages and automatic transfers of child custody to the father, the effects of the reform are increasingly visible in Iraqi society. The death of Yanar Mohammed, a women’s rights activist, in March 2026, symbolizes this repression of women’s voices.
The Iraqi activist and president of theOrganization of Women’s Freedom in Iraq(OWFI), Yanar Mohammed, wasshot down on March 2, 2026in front of his home in Baghdad. This assassination occurs in a climate of heightened tensions, marked by attempts to silence voices advocating for women’s rights.
One year after hisadoption by the Iraqi Parliament, on January 21, 2025, and its entry into force on the following April 17, the new Personal Status Code begins to take effect, while generating significant controversies. This text, which breaks with the legal balance established by the1959 law, frames essential dimensions of private life – marriage, divorce, filiation, child custody, and also inheritances – within a particularly sensitive political context. Since the 2000s, Iraq has been undergoing a gradual reorganization of its institutions, marked by the strengthening of sectarian logics and by an increased role of religious authorities in the organization of social life. In this environment, women’s rights, already weakened by persistent patriarchal structures, are all the more exposed.
The reform adopted in 2025 goes far beyond a simple adjustment of family law. It reflects a deeper shift in the way the State structures its relationship with religion and the diversity of Iraqi society. While its supporters see it as a recognition of religious identities, its detractors highlight the risks it poses to the coherence of the legal system and, even more so, to the protection of women’s rights.
A profound transformation of family law: towards a confessional pluralization of the legal system
To measure the impact of this reform, it is essential to recall that the personal status law in Iraq was historically based on Law No. 188 of 1959. At the time, this text was considered one of the most progressive legal frameworks in the Arab world, despite some unequal provisions. Its main objective was to unify the rules relating to marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance, regardless of confessional distinctions.
Drawing inspiration both from Islamic Sharia and modern civil law, it introduced certain protections for women, while maintaining discriminatory provisions. Polygamy, for example, remained possible but subject to a judge’s authorization (article 3). Repudiation was not completely abolished, even though article 40 allowed a woman to request a divorce for harm. Article 7 also set a minimum marriage age of 18 years, under judicial supervision. Despite these advances, structural inequalities persisted, notably in matters of inheritance, where Sharia rules continued to apply.
The 1990 reform introduced certain procedural adjustments – notably in matters of divorce and recognition of spousal consent – without challenging the patriarchal foundations of the system. From 2003 onwards, in a context of political reconfiguration following the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, more ambitious projects sought to establish distinct legal regimes based on religious affiliations.
Resolution No. 137of December 29, 2003, adopted by the Iraqi Council of Ministers, proposed to entrust each community with the management of its own family law. However, it was quickly suspended, then abandoned. Civil society, women’s rights organizations, and the international community opposed it, denouncing the risks of legal fragmentation and the potential violations of women’s rights, notably through the recognition of practices such as early marriage or unilateral child custody (custody granted exclusively to the father).
The 2025 reform is part of these developments, while making a major change. It completely breaks with the logic of unification by establishing a plurality of legal systems and placing religious courts at the heart of the system. The ritesjafaritesShiites are now explicitly recognized as a legal reference in matters of personal status, alongside other confessional traditions. Citizens can thus choose the system applicable to their situation, introducing an unprecedented diversification of family law.
This choice is made at the time of the marriage registration or during a dispute before the competent jurisdiction. The parties can determine the applicable religious framework either by mutual agreement or at the initiative of one of them. In practice, this choice may also depend on the declared religious affiliation or the jurisdiction seized. Once the chosen framework is selected, all the rules (marriage, divorce, child custody) are applied according to the corresponding religious interpretation, resulting in notable differences in the rights and obligations of individuals.
This reform represents a major normative decentralization. From then on, the State no longer imposes a single framework but organizes the coexistence of several parallel systems, in which the conditions of marriage, divorce, the rights of spouses, child custody, and inheritance may vary according to the chosen religious tradition. Presented as a recognition of diversity and an extension of freedom of choice, this flexibility actually creates increased legal uncertainty, complicates access to the law, makes judicial decisions less predictable, and undermines the principle of equality before the law.
More broadly, the new Code marks a shift towards a pluralistic and confessional model of family law, where religion becomes a central criterion of social regulation. The consequences are profound: a complexification of the legal system, weakening of the guarantees offered to individuals — especially towomenand tochildren– and strengthening of social fragmentation dynamics. Far from being a simple legislative adjustment, this reform constitutes a structural reorganization of the relationship between the State, the law, and religion in Iraq.
A controversial reform: risks of fragmentation and regressions for women’s rights
Criticism of the new Personal Status Code focuses mainly on fundamental rights, and more particularly on women’s rights. Many NGOs, as well as lawyers and civil society actors, warn against a significant regression, and recent examples concretely illustrate these dangers.
In October 2025,Human Rights Watchreports the case of Ghazal H., a woman taken to court after her ex-husband requested the retroactive application to their marriage of the new Jafaria code, without her consent, in order to take away custody of their 10-year-old son from her. This case illustrates how the reform can become an instrument of control over the lives of women and children.
Under the 1959 law, custody of the children in the event of divorce was in principle entrusted to the mother, based on a logic of protecting the child’s best interests, with judicial oversight to assess the concrete conditions of care. This system allowed, at least in theory, for maternal custody to be maintained beyond a certain age if it corresponded to the child’s well-being.
With the new Code, certain interpretations now allow for an automatic transfer of custody to the father from a set age (generally around 7 years old), without an individualized judicial examination of the situation. Thus, a mother who had until now held daily custody may lose it to the father, even if his living conditions are less favorable. This change reduces the role of the judge and relegates the criterion of the child’s best interest to a secondary position, in favor of rigid norms based on paternal authority.
On this subject,Sarah Sanbar, researcher on Iraq for Human Rights Watch, states:
“The new Personal Status Code further institutionalizes discrimination against women, legally relegating them to the status of second-class citizens. It deprives women and girls of their ability to decide about their lives and transfers this power to men. It should be repealed immediately.”
Several feminist organizations have called for the repeal of these provisions, denouncing their deleterious impact on women’s rights and child protection. TheWorld March of Women(international feminist organization) published on January 27, 2025 (shortly after the adoption of the new Code), a declaration condemning these changes and warning about the threats they pose to fundamental human rights. On its part,Amnesty Internationalhad already urged in2024the Iraqi Parliament to reject these amendments even before their adoption.
Despite these warnings, in September 2025, theFederal Supreme Court of Iraqrejected an action brought by women’s rights and human rights organizations contesting the validity of the amendments adopted by Parliament. The Supreme Court considered that the legislative procedure complied with the Iraqi Constitution, guaranteeing citizens the freedom to choose the religious law applicable to their personal status. It validated the amendments, including those recognizing the application of Ja’fari jurisprudence, thereby consolidating their implementation and putting an end to the main judicial appeals. This decision strengthens the position of Parliament and supporters of this reform, showing that, despite thereviews, it remains within constitutional limits.
The first concrete effects of the reform manifested as early as February 2026. A court in Baghdad had approved the marriage of a 17-year-old girl to a 20-year-old man, without examining the consent or welfare of the bride. While the new Code in principle maintains 18 years as the minimum age for marriage, it allows the possibility of derogation according to the chosen religious framework. Thus, within the Jafari rites, the legal marriage age can be below 18 years and drop to 9 years for girls (while it is set at 14 years for boys). These situations show how a reform that appears neutral can in reality lead to significant social regressions.
Yanar Mohammed, until her assassination, were at the forefront of mobilizations against these legislative changes. Lawyers, doctors, and civil society experts also expressed their opposition, considering that the amended law “victimizes” children and “undermines women’s rights.” Some legal experts warned that the automatic granting of custody to the father and the restriction of women’s access to property or inheritance risk deeply destabilizing families. Experts from theUnited Nationshave denounced the amendments. Criticizing the lack of transparent and inclusive debate before adoption, they stated that they could “undermine the rights of women and children.”
Beyond individual effects, the reform raises a structural question: by instituting differentiated regimes based on religious affiliations, it exacerbates the legal and political fragmentation of Iraq. This gradual shift from a unified model governed by the state to a fragmented and confessional organization of law undermines national cohesion and complicates access to law for citizens.
Supporters of the reform emphasize the recognition of religious identities and the freedom of choice it offers. However, the concrete cases ofearly marriages, unilateral changes in the law and automatic transfers of custody show that these arguments struggle to convince. The risks to the equality of rights and the protection of women and children are now evident.
A debate that reflects the questions of Iraqi society
The adoption of the new Personal Status Code in Iraq marks a major milestone in the legal and institutional evolution of the country. While it reflects a willingness to recognize confessional identities, it raises serious questions regarding equality, national cohesion, and respect for fundamental rights.
The risks of legal fragmentation and setbacks for women’s rights are the main sources of tension. They illustrate the dilemmas that Iraq faces today in building its modern legal order. In a changing regional context, marked by wars, this evolution raises questions about the Iraqi state’s ability to reconcile religious pluralism and the effective protection of individual freedoms, particularly those of women.
As in the rest of the Arab world, Iraqi women progress along a path filled with obstacles, where each right gained results from an incessant struggle…
Imad Khillo does not work for, advise, hold shares in, receive funds from any organization that could benefit from this article, and has declared no affiliation other than his research institution.
–ref. The new Personal Status Code in Iraq: threats to women’s rights –https://theconversation.com/the-new-personal-status-code-in-iraq-threats-to-women’s-rights-280318