Source: French to English Tester Published on: 2026-04-28
Source: The Conversation – in French– By Maxime Lassalle-Han, Associate Professor of Law, University of Burgundy Europe
The 1erIn April last, the deputies voted for an amendment aimed at abolishing the regime of judicial agreements of public interest, a negotiated justice procedure open to companies. Rather welcomed at the time, they are more criticized now. Wouldn’t it have been better to amend them rather than abolish them? Perhaps this is the task that the joint committee meeting on Tuesday, April 28 will devote itself to.
In 2016, theSapin 2 lawestablish in France a negotiated justice system applicable to legal entities, inspired by American law: the judicial public interest agreement (CJIP). It is notably about addressing the characterrelatively rareinvestigations, prosecutions, and convictions in matters of corruption and financial crime. The traditional criminal justice model, based on a judicial investigation followed by a trial, is not considered effective enough.
“Justice Deals”
Another model of justice is then considered, that of negotiated justice, inspired by American law and its“justice deals”. It has the advantage of allowing to avoid long and costly investigations and trials. This form of justice also has the interest of encouraging companies to self-report and to implement internal mechanisms aimed at preventing criminal activities. This explains why CJIPs, initially designed as a way to address corruption within companies, have been extended to the fight againsttax offensesand theenvironmental crime.
Also read:
France in the fight against corruption: American solutions
However, the CJIPs, inspired by the American model of negotiated justice, have raised numerous questions since their inception. The Council of State has highlighted as early as 2016 the risk that the intervention of justice may lose“its value as an example” and above all its objective of “seeking the truth”. Likewise, the low“Clarity of the prosecution’s criminal policy regarding the implementation of the public interest judicial agreement”is criticized in a parliamentary report in 2019.
As the Sapin II law is about to celebrate its tenth anniversary, the National Assembly adopted, on the 1steerTo April, oneamendment aiming to suppress the regime of CJIP. This has led to strong reactions (general press,specialized publications, or even positionsforwhereagainstin civil society). It is an opportunity to once again examine the issues of this particular form of justice
Sanctions too weak?
The summary presentation of the amendment voted by the National Assembly to eliminate the CJIP regime makes explicit reference toCumex Files, a casepolitically sensitive, sometimes presented as the“heist of the century”. The National Financial Prosecutor’s Office, seized since 2018 under the angle of tax fraud and money laundering, has already signed two CJIPs in this case: the first with theAgricultural Creditend of 2025, and the second withHSBCearly 2026. It is this second agreement that is considered excessively favorable to the bank by the deputies. The amount of the fine – approximately 270 million euros – is indeed relatively low, if one considers that theimposed fines can be much heavierwhen traditional criminal justice is involved with banks in cases of tax fraud.
This is not the first time that such criticism has been directed at the CJIP. This had already been the case, following the famousLVMH case, notably criticized for thelack of consideration for the interests of the victims. This had also been the case inthe Nestlé case. Onesenatorial inquiry commissionhad then criticized the appropriateness of the convention and especially the low amount of the fine. However, this commission had only recommended the adoption of clearer rules aimed at regulating the CJIP in environmental matters, and not their elimination.
A favor or an incentive to cooperate?
The criticism directed at CJIPs by the deputies is implicitly based on the idea that the penalties incurred would have been more severe if a normal procedure had been followed. However, it is necessary to nuance this and recall the purpose of these agreements. The use of CJIPs is indeed a favor towards companies, but it aims to encourage them to cooperate with justice, notably by self-reporting and implementing effective procedures to detect and prevent criminal acts within their organization.
The use of CJIP is thus conditioned (viacircularsandguidelines). The prosecutor’s office must, in principle, note the absence of prior records of the legal entity, a certain degree of cooperation from the company and its executives, and finally the proactive provision of information allowing the identification of the natural persons responsible for the criminal offenses in question.
If the facts are serious or if the companies do not cooperate, another route must be followed, potentially leading to referral to a criminal court. In the Cumex Files case, the use of CJIPs and the leniency of fines concerning Crédit Agricole and HSBC can probably be explained by the greater cooperation of these banks compared to the other banks involved in this case, which could, for their part, face heavier sanctions.
Despite this, the prosecution has significant leeway to decide to resort to a CJIP. The judge responsible for validatinga posterioriThe agreement made between the public prosecutor’s office and the company does not carry out an in-depth review of the appropriateness of this procedure, even though it can notably control“the proportionality of the measures provided to the benefits derived from the breaches”. The scope of this control seems less extensive than that which applies to other forms of negotiated justice, notably the prior guilty plea appearance procedure (CRPC), which can be rejected especially if the interests of society justify it“Ordinary criminal court”.
Franco-American case?
The CJIPs primarily aimed to respond to criticisms directed at France regarding the low number of prosecutions and convictions of French companies for corruption. A negotiated mechanism-based response was intended to allow French companies to find a solution in France rather than being pursued solely in the United States.
The so-called scopeextraterritorialof American criminal law, backed by significant activism from American authorities, had indeed led many French companies having committed acts of corruption of foreign public officials to be sanctioned in the United States and not in France. From this point of view, CJIPs are a success.
The CJIP have allowedsanction moreof companies. The CJIP signed inthe Airbus casealso showed that the United States were no longer the world’s only policemen: the company certainly paid fines in the United States but, also benefiting from a CJIP, the bulk of the fine was paid in France.
Conditions to be reviewed?
These occasional successes do not mean that this form of negotiated justice, and the sanctions that come with it, are unquestionably the most effective tools in the fight against all forms of economic crime. Also in American lawthe opportunity of resorting to negotiated justice in criminal business law is discussed.
Next to the amount of the sanctions, ofother issues are important. Abroad as in France,the relationship between the criminal liability of the legal entity and that of the natural personsparticularly poses a problem. Another question is that of taking third parties into account in negotiations between prosecutors and companies. Thus, it may not be so much the principle of negotiated justice that poses a problem as the ways in which it is implemented.
Maxime Lassalle-Han does not work for, does not advise, does not own shares in, does not receive funds from any organization that could benefit from this article, and has declared no other affiliation than his research institution.
–ref. The uncertain future of negotiated justice applied to companies: CJIPs in question –https://theconversation.com/the-uncertain-future-of-negotiated-justice-applied-to-companies-the-cjip-in-question-281267