Source: French to English Tester Published on: 2026-03-30
Source: The Conversation – France in French (3)– By Elizabeth Sheppard Sellam, Head of the “Policies and International Relations” program at the Faculty of Foreign Languages, University of Tours
Nearly 80% of Israelis support the military operations targeting Iran. This cohesion, which is based on a widely shared perception of the existential nature of the Iranian threat to the country’s survival and which somewhat extends the rallying around the flag observed after October 7, 2023, does not tell the whole story of the political situation. The Netanyahu government remains unpopular, the exemption of ultra-Orthodox from conscription is causing increasing tensions, and fundamentally, more and more citizens are questioning the outcome of the endless wars in which their country is engaged.
The shift from the war in Gaza to an open confrontation with Iran marks a major strategic turning point for Israel. From a series of repeated, sometimes lengthy but contained operations on identified fronts, the country is moving towards a more diffuse regional conflict, involving more actors and spreading over a wider area. This evolution not only corresponds to an intensification of the conflict, but to a real change in nature. It places Israel in a lasting confrontation, where security issues become a structuring framework ofpublic and political debate.
In this context, several questions arise. How does a society faced with enduring insecurity evolve politically? To what extent does the perception of a major threat produce a form of cohesion without erasing internal divisions? And how is this tension expressed in a context of prolonged war and impending elections?
Rallying around the flag
Unlike much of Western Europe, where threats are often perceived as distant, this experience in Israel is immediate and concrete. The attacks of October 7, the massive population displacements first in the south then in the north, the repeated shootings and human losses have deeply transformed collective perceptions. This direct experience of war brings Israel closer to certain Eastern European countries, notably the Baltic States or Ukraine, where security concerns shape political choices. It also constitutes a fault line within Europe itself.
In this context, the rise of Iran as a central actor in the conflict is decisive. The image of the octopus illustrates this strategic reading. Iran constitutes the head, while its proxies – the Houthis in Yemen, the Lebanese Hezbollah, the Shiite militias in Iraq… – represent its extensions. The Gaza war is thus part of a larger framework, which explains the shift towards a regional confrontation.
The central question then becomes that of a tension between strategic unity and political fragmentation. October 7 sparked areflex of “rallying around the flag”faced with the security shock, but this phenomenon occurred in a society already marked by deep political divisions. The war does not suspend these divides. It shifts them, reconfigures them, and reveals new ones.
Understanding this tension first requires revisiting the transformation of the conflict itself and the forms of cohesion it produces.
A war that is long-lasting
One year after October 7, 2024, a large majority of Israelisconfided that their feeling of personal security had deteriorated. While the situation has evolved since then, this data sheds light on the depth of the initial shock and its lasting effects on collective perceptions.
Opinion polls also show a strong rallying effect since the start of the war in Iran, on February 28, 2026. According to asurvey by the Institute of National Security Studies of Tel Aviv University conducted on March 19, Israelis support Israeli-American strikes against Iran at 78.5% and declare themselves satisfied with the military results obtained (this ratio reaches 91.5% among Jewish Israelis, compared to only 25.5% among Arab Israelis, where opposition to the war is majority at 65.5%).
This support, which is based on a widely shared perception of the Iranian threat, has its limits. Support for continuing the conflict to maximalist objectives is waning as concerns related to the duration, costs, and outcomes of the war are rising.
The cohesion of Israeli society on the question of the attitude to adopt towards Iran is nevertheless by no means evident. It contrasts with the divisions observed on other fronts.
During the war in Gaza, Israeli society was marked by significant tensions, notablyaround the issue of hostages and the objectives of the conflict. These debates have left lasting marks andcontinue to influence perceptions of the confrontation with Gaza.
On the Lebanese front, opinion polls show a much more uncertain perception of the war’s outcomes, with a significant portion of the population doubting that the current operations will lead to lasting calm.
This contrast highlights the existence of a hierarchy of threats in public opinion. The level of consensus observed regarding Iran appears specific and does not automatically extend to other theaters of conflict. In other words, even in a state of war, national cohesion is neither constant nor homogeneous. It depends on threat perceptions, pursued objectives, and anticipated costs. It thus appears as a variable of the conflict, and not as a given.
Finally, the society’s capacity to sustain a prolonged conflict appears uncertain. A significant portion of the population expresses doubts about the possibility of maintaining a long-term war effort, which highlights the internal constraints of a prolonged war.
A strategic unit without a political unit
Despite a relatively broad consensus on the need to deal with Iran, this does not translate into equivalent support for the government. Opposition figures have expressed their support for military action while maintainingstrong criticism against the executive.
Polls confirm this dissociation. A relative majority of the population expresses low confidence in the government, in a context of strong political and social polarization. These divisions are not limited to the assessment of the conflict. They also concern the upcoming political choices. The question of Gaza’s future constitutes a major dividing point, between different visions of governance, security, and regional relations.
Among the most sensitive issues is that of the conscription of ultra-Orthodox Jews. In a country at war, participation in the defense effort becomes acentral question of legitimacy and national cohesion. The exemption of certain groups is increasingly being challenged andcrystallizes major political tensions.
Also to read:
Ultra-Orthodox Jews in Israel: the military service exemption put to the test by war
As the electoral deadlines approach – the next Israeli legislative elections are, in principle, scheduled to take place no later than October 2026 (end of the current legislature, barring early dissolution) – these tensions are expected to intensify. Support for the military action does not neutralize political rivalries. It reconfigures them and gives them new objects.
A deeply divided society
The current development highlights a unique political configuration. Israel, whose many cities are being bombed, faces a direct threat, which produces a high level of strategic cohesion, particularly towards Iran, without however erasing internal divisions.
In the context of a prolonged war and rapidly approaching legislative elections, the maintenance of a real political competition and active public debate demonstrates the strength of Israeli democratic functioning. War does not suspend political life. It redefines its priorities and intensifies its stakes.
On the electoral horizon, this tension between security imperative and political fragmentationconstitutes one of the main uncertainties. It reveals a lasting dynamic where strategic unity and political division coexist without neutralizing each other.
In other words, the permanent war does not erase the fractures. It inscribes them in the long timeline of Israeli political life without resolving them.
Elizabeth Sheppard Sellam does not work for, advise, hold shares in, or receive funds from any organization that could benefit from this article, and has declared no affiliation other than her research institution.
–ref. From Gaza to Iran: Israeli public opinion facing the war –https://theconversation.com/from-gaza-to-iran-the-israeli-public-opinion-facing-war-279169