Source: French to English Tester Published on: 2026-05-19
Source: The Conversation – France in French (3)– By Philippe Gervais-Lambony, Emeritus Professor of Geography, specialist in South Africa, University Paris Nanterre Since 2008, South Africa has experienced recurring waves of xenophobic violence targeting migrants, in a context of poverty, massive unemployment, and distrust towards the state.
Nationalist movements amplified by social networks accuse foreigners of being responsible for crime and the deterioration of public services, with the implicit or explicit support of many political actors. In 1974, Hugh Masekela, the famous South African jazz musician, recorded what became his most popular song, a true anthem of the struggle against apartheid:Stimela (coal train).
It recounts the suffering of workers forcibly recruited by the Pretoria regime: “There is a train that comes from Namibia and Malawi, there is a train that comes from Zambia and Zimbabwe, there is a train that comes from Angola and Mozambique, from Lesotho, from Botswana, from Swaziland, from all the hinterland of Southern and Central Africa.
This train carries young and old, African men who are conscripted to come and work on contract in the golden mineral mines of Johannesburg…” (“There is a train coming from Namibia and Malawi, there is a train coming from Zambia and Zimbabwe, there is a train coming from Angola and Mozambique, from Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland, from all the hinterlands of southern and central Africa.
This train carries young and old, African men forcibly enlisted to come work under contract in the gold mines of Johannesburg…”) This tribute to the oppressed is also one to migrants uprooted by the racist system, and reminds us how intrinsic migrations are to the history of South Africa.
How, then, did it come to pass that, in April 2026, the streets of South African metropolises wereinvaded by crowds calling for the expulsion of foreigners, pointing the finger at other black Africans as the cause of all their troubles?
How can the country whose1996 Constitution, a model of inclusion, protected the rights of all refugees, has it become the scene of recurring xenophobic violence?
2008-2019, successive waves of xenophobic violence In May 2008, an unprecedented wave of violence (more than 50 deaths and 60,000 displaced) tarnished the image of the “rainbow nation”: scenes of attacks against foreigners, pursued even into their homes, sometimes burned alive, dominated the world’s media and led to a military intervention in thetownships and the slums of big cities.
Violence of this type occurred again later: in 2013, in Cape Town, against merchants from the Horn of Africa; in 2015, in Durban, shortly after the Zulu king (one of the most powerful and influential so-called “traditional” authorities, instrumentalized by the apartheid regime and officially maintained after 1994) called for the departure of “foreigners”; in 2017, anti-immigrant remarks by the mayor of Johannesburg Herman Mashaba shortly preceded a new wave of violence; in 2019, in Durban and Gauteng, Nigerians and Ghanaians were systematically targeted.
In all cases, it is always an urban phenomenon, and the attacks occurred mainly in townships and informal settlements. The stigmatization of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa appears to have become a characteristic feature of South African democracy.
None of the main political parties can claim to be innocent of this, and certainly not the African National Congress (ANC), in power since 1994, which, during each electoral campaign, sees some of its candidates play the “xenophobic card” and has also implemented increasingly restrictive and repressive legislation on immigration, indeeddistant from the ideals of the 1990sand which practically ends up legitimizing the rejection of migrants.
The approach of the November 2026 municipal elections is not unrelated to the current protests. However, these protests have new characteristics: they present themselves as led by “citizen movements” and their leaders uphold a seemingly legalistic discourse, openly manifesting themselves even in the public spaces of city centers.
They often come from the media world, or even from influencers — which explains why social networks play a major role in these xenophobic mobilizations.
The new faces of hatred Thus was born in 2021, in Soweto, theDudula operationUmkhonto – which literally means “to force” or “to beat down” in IsiZulu (the Zulu language) – a nationalist organization that claims to “fight against crime and the degradation of public services.” Blocking the entrances to schools or health services to deny access to foreigners, violent attacks on the premises of companies accused of employing foreigners; all of these modes of action are widely publicized on social media.
Zandile Dabula, 36 years old, president of the movement, tells the press: “Most of the problems we encounter are caused by the influx of foreign nationals. Our country is in disorder.” Another young woman leads the movementMarch and March, the organizer of the current demonstrations.
Born in Durban in 2025, this collective is represented by Jacinta Ngobese-Zuma, a former radio star, 39 years old, born in Kwamashu, one of the large townships of Durban. She calls for the expulsion of illegal migrants and denounces the « inaction » of the State in the face of criminals and traffickers.
She specifically targets migrants from Nigeria and Ghana – which has also officially triggered responses from the governments of these two countries – and refuses the label of « xenophobic », stating she has nothing against « legal » foreigners.
In early April 2026, his movement protests violently in the city of East London (KuGompo City in the Eastern Cape) to denounce the alleged coronation of an Igbo king (ethnic group from Nigeria) in the region.
At the end of the month, March and March protests in Johannesburg. Herman Mashaba, former mayor and candidate in the upcoming municipal elections for the ActionSA party, comes to show his support.
These xenophobic movements also circulate figures validating the feeling of an invasion ofamaKwerekwere(“Barbarians”), a common and pejorative designation for foreigners in IsiZulu, whereas there would actually be between 3 million and 4 million immigrants in a total population of nearly 63 million – a proportion similar to that of many countries around the world.
The main change since 1994 is that while the majority of foreigners still come from Southern Africa (nearly 70% according to the national statistics service), migration flows now also come from West Africa and the Horn of Africa.
These “new” arrivals are very present in the informal trade sector (making them visible and easy targets), but many among them are also skilled workers – doctors, engineers, teachers – whom South Africa desperately needs. Certainly, the number of migrants has increased.
Nevertheless, relative to the total population of the country, the proportion of foreigners remains relatively modest. The anger of the “relative frustrated”? It is therefore rather the failure of post-apartheid governments to reduce poverty and inequalities and to curb crime that is most often pointed out ascause of xenophobia.
In South Africa today, the unemployment rate exceeds 30% (and is much higher in the most impoverished areas) and more than half of the population lives below the poverty line, while the enrichment of the elites has been extreme.
Inequalities, and especially poverty, are factors of “relative frustration”(relative deprivation).
Their registration in the heritage space geographically concentrates the feeling of injustice in the townships and even more so in the informal neighborhoods –that is to say the areas where under apartheid the black populations were confined.
Under the presidency of Jacob Zuma (2009-2018), inequalities exploded and corruption massively generalized at all levels of the state. The Ministry of the Interior was not spared: in February 2026, an investigation commissioned by President Ramaphosa (head of the country since 2018) revealed that many officials accepted bribes to issue visas.
It was also during this period that the daily lives of South Africans deteriorated: water and electricity cuts, dilapidated infrastructure, public services in agony, endemic crime… Distrust of the law enforcement forces has also increased.
The police, largely corrupt and violent,systematically represses and harasses foreignerswhile his tolerance towards “vigilante” groups or even criminal gangs, notably those linked to drug trafficking, is well known. The fracturing of society is also a consequence of the multiplication of identity mobilizations.
The apartheid regime was already based on ethnic segregation, beyond just racial segregation (The entire bantustan system was an implementation of this double segregation, racial and ethnic, which allowed dividing the black population in order to better control it.).
Jacob Zuma, in turn, widely exploited the Zulu ethnic identity (one of the nine major South African ethnic groups, numerically the largest as it comprises nearly 25% of the country’s total population), notably during his 2006 rape trial (at the end of which he was acquitted) when his supporters protested wearing “Real Zulu Boy».
It is therefore not surprising that the March and March movement was born in Durban (a city where, as in the entire province of KwaZulu-Natal, the black population is overwhelmingly Zulu) and that at the head of its processions often come men in traditional Zulu attire.
This particular form of ethnicization accompanies and fuels the rise ofnationalist and populist movements. In South Africa, the modalities of the processes linked to the increase in inequalities and nationalist identity withdrawal are particularly violent in asociety “alive”.
But the anti-migrant sentiment is indeed carried by political and social actors.
In a context where distrust towards the State continues to grow (this being further aggravated by allegations of corruption against the head of state, risking leading to an impeachment procedure in 2026) and where political participation is declining, it is the South African democracy itself that is cause for concern.
Philippe Gervais-Lambony does not work for, advise, hold shares in, receive funds from any organization that could benefit from this article, and has declared no other affiliation than his research institution. –ref.
Understanding xenophobic violence in South Africa –https://theconversation.com/understanding-xenophobic-violence-in-south-africa-282570