Source: French to English Tester Published on: 2026-05-03
Source: The Conversation – France in French (3)– By Marwan Sinaceur, Professor of Organizational Behavior, ESSEC
Research in behavioral sciences reveals the mistakes made by the Trump administration during the first negotiation session with Iran, held in Islamabad on April 11 and 12.
Negotiations between the United States and Iran are stalling. The second scheduled negotiation meeting between the belligerents ultimately did not take place. President Trump has just canceledthe sending of a delegation to Pakistan, while Iran seems to be setting preconditions prior to any resumption of talks. In this uncertain context, it seems useful to look back at the first meeting between Washington and Tehran, held on April 11 and 12, 2026 in Pakistan, and to understand why it failed.
To explain the failure of this first negotiation session, the American Vice President J. D Vance, who had attended in person, stated that the United States had proposed to Iran“their best and final offer”regarding the nuclear issue. This offer having been rejected, he had ended the talks in Islamabad and, along with the entire American delegation, abruptly left the Pakistani capital afterBarely a dayof negotiations.
This statement about the “best and final offer” illustrates a profound misunderstanding of the dynamics and psychology of negotiations. It would be laughable if the stakes were not so important for world peace and the global economy.
Making an early offer is counterproductive for resolving a conflict
Putting an offer on the table from the very beginning of negotiations is completely counterproductive for resolving a conflict. Empirical research on negotiations indeed shows that thetimingoffers are crucial:Making an offer too early reduces the exchange of information between negotiators and accentuates the competitive aspect of the negotiation. This often results in a war of positions: the negotiators become tense and seek nothing more than to defend their position rather thanunderstand the motivations of the opposing party. On the contrary, making an offer late in the negotiation allows each party to understand the interests, needs, and fears (sometimes not openly expressed) of the parties involved. When the offer is made late, the negotiators have more opportunityto exchange informationand explore creative solutions before entering competitive bargaining. Moreover, effectiveness in negotiation critically depends on the ability tosearch for informationon the opposing team and from himto ask questions, rather than simply stating demands.
Even when both parties are willing to make compromises, exploring underlying interests, discussing thorny issues, revealing sensitive information, and developing mutually acceptable solutions take time. Indeed, research has shown that discussingmultiple simultaneous offersis more effective than offering aunilateral offer.
Contrary to what Vance claimed, the first offer is rarely the best if one truly wishes to reach an agreement and resolve a conflict. Negotiators are indeed often influenced bycognitive biases in the way they perceive the opposing party, which leads them to make numerous mistakes when interpreting the information they have about him or when trying to understand his interests and preferences. This is all the more the case when the conflict does not only involvepragmatic interests, but also sacralized values. In this case, offering symbolic concessions (the symbolic recognition of certain claims of the other party) is effective in bringing the othergrant something in return. In this specific case, the Trump administration seems for example to clearly underestimatethe issue of national pride and symbolic recognitionwhat the issue of uranium enrichment means for Iran.
It’s all a question of “timing”
Moreover, putting an offer on the table at the start of the negotiation means making an offer at a time when the other party is not yet ready to make concessions. Indeed, thepeople are more inclined to make concessions at the end than at the beginning of negotiations. For two reasons.
At the start, theconfidenceis absent. It takes time to build and, in the first sentences, each party tends to interpret the other’s behaviors withmistrust. Thus, it is not uncommon for people to reject an offer coming from the other party… simply because it comes from the opposing side: they then evaluate it based on its origin rather than its intrinsic merits. This phenomenon, characteristic of negotiations and called the“devaluation reaction”A: we judge that the offer from the other party must be determined by their interests, and we perceive our interests as necessarily antagonistic (zero-sum game perception).
On the other hand, the psychological cost of leaving the negotiation changes over time. At the beginning, withdrawing and reaching a deadlock is relatively inexpensive: the investment in time and effort remains limited. However, at the end of the negotiation, a breakdown becomes much harder to accept. This is an application of a well-known bias, escalation of commitment (orescalation of commitment)Â : The more time you invest in an action, the more you want it to succeed. And vice versa.
In fact, the tactics aimed at making the other give in aremore effective at the end than at the beginning of the negotiations. Expressing a threat or getting angry is more effective later rather than earlier, because at the beginning of the negotiation, these tactics convey an explicitly negative intention, whereas at the end they are perceived as more acceptable — since by that time, the human relationship is already established.
These empirical research results support theories that view negotiation as amulti-phase gameA: open discussions first; haggling at the end. Starting with aggressive tactics ruins the chances of finding cooperative solutions. The capacity toremain cognitively open throughout the interactionand Ãnot to finalize things too earlyis crucial. That is why patience is a key quality in negotiations.
Analyzing signs of amateurism
These empirical studies on negotiation are, it should be noted, published predominantly in American academic journals of behavioral sciences. They are well known in the United States.
J. D. Vance’s proclamation of the “best and final offer” put forward by Washington at the outset thus revealed a certain amateurism. And this is all the more so because the negotiations between the United States and Iran are highly complex and encompass multiple variables: reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, control of the nuclear program, ballistic weapons, access to civilian nuclear energy, lifting of sanctions, guarantees that the war will not resume, etc.
Wanting to reach an agreement on such difficult issues in such a short time reveals an astonishing inexperience in negotiations. The negotiations that led to the Iranian nuclear agreement under President Obama took 20 months; those of Vice President Vance took 21 hours.
Experts, likeFederica Mogheriniwho was in charge of negotiations with Iran for the European side, moreover highlight thelack of knowledge or misunderstanding of the technical aspects of negotiationfrom the American team.
The failure of negotiations between Americans and Iranians during their first meeting in Pakistan was therefore not surprising. It is completely consistent with empirical research on the psychology of negotiations. By the way, this same mistake explainsthe failure of the Camp David negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians in 2000— with the disastrous consequences that are well known. As reported byRobert Malley, then Bill Clinton’s advisor for the Middle East, an offer had been put on the table far too early, at a time when “neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians had prepared themselves to fully understand the fears and needs of the other side.”
Negotiating does not mean imposing unilateral conditions on the opposing party. Nor does it mean making the other accept an unconditional surrender. This approach can work in negotiations concerning a single competitive variable (price), or when one is in a position of strength, like a wealthy property owner in New York. But it proves ineffective in negotiations thatconcern several variables and require a trial-and-error approach towards mutually acceptable solutions, or when the balance of power is uncertain.
To paraphrase a phrase from another American president, Dwight Eisenhower: negotiation is “the art of getting someone to do something you want done because they want to do it.”
In every respect, what happened between Americans and Iranians during their first meeting in Pakistan does not resemble a negotiation.
Marwan Sinaceur received funding from ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Foundation, INSEAD Foundation, Stanford University.
–ref. Why the first meeting between Washington and Tehran failed: understanding the psychology of negotiations –https://theconversation.com/why-the-first-meeting-between-washington-and-tehran-failed-understanding-the-psychology-of-negotiations-281823