PM Edition: Top 10 Business Articles on LiveNews.co.nz for April 21, 2026 – Full Text

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) [3]   Published on: 2026-04-13

The minibus taxi is ubiquitous in southern Africa. These vehicles are the backbone of the urban economy, providing affordable mobility for millions. In Cape Town, South Africa’s second most populous city, they are central to the transport landscape.

Around two-thirds of the city’s public transport users rely on paratransit services (which respond flexibly to demand), carrying about 830,000 daily passengers across 1,466 routes, and run by private individuals or associations rather than the state.

But because these vehicles run on petrol and diesel, they also contribute to greenhouse gas emissions, poor urban air quality and rising fuel costs.

The global shift away from internal combustion engines is accelerating, and public transport must be part of it. Bringing the electric vehicle transition to this sector, however, is not simply a matter of replacing one vehicle with another. In African paratransit systems, electrification raises a harder question: how do you change the vehicle without undermining the service on which so many people depend?

Electric minibuses would change how these vehicles operate, where and when they stop, how they interact with the grid, and driver decision making. They also require charging infrastructure that fits into the rhythms of taxi ranks, neighbourhoods and routes without disrupting service.

With Cape Town expected to launch its first few fully electric minibus taxi routes in Century City later in 2026, electrification is no longer a distant possibility. It is now urgent to understand whether it can work in practice for operators, passengers and the electricity grid.

We are a team of engineering researchers studying transport electrification in sub-Saharan Africa. In a series of studies, we have examined environmental and financial viability of electric vehicles under current mobility patterns, including charger placement, access, and adapted driving and charging behaviour.

Our new research found that electrifying minibus taxis is both necessary and possible. But it is also a complex challenge, with environmental trade-offs, grid constraints, operator costs and equity questions. Although our work focuses on Cape Town, the lessons are relevant to other African cities where paratransit dominates daily mobility.

Environmental perspective

The global narrative around electric vehicles often assumes they are a simple win for the climate. But this does not hold everywhere, especially where electricity still comes largely from fossil fuels. In South Africa, coal accounts for approximately 83% of electricity generation.

Using real minibus taxi mobility patterns in Cape Town, our research compared the energy use, emissions and costs of electric and conventional minibuses. It found a counter-intuitive result: under current grid conditions, an electric minibus taxi has about a 14% higher carbon dioxide equivalent footprint than a standard diesel minibus. In other words, charging an electric taxi on a coal-heavy grid can currently produce more greenhouse gas emissions than running a diesel vehicle.

That is not the end of the story. Electric minibuses still offer major environmental and health benefits. They eliminate tailpipe particulate pollution, reduce brake wear, and cut noise. These local benefits matter in dense urban areas where people live close to busy roads. As South Africa’s electricity system shifts towards more renewable energy, the climate case for electric minibus taxis will strengthen too.

So the real conclusion is not that electric taxis are a bad idea. Rather, they are a long-term climate solution whose immediate value lies especially in cleaner air, lower noise and better urban health.

Energy perspective

Electrifying Cape Town’s minibus taxi fleet would add substantial new electricity demand. In one study, the typical vehicle required about 50.8 kWh per day, scaling to roughly 460 MWh a day across a fleet of about 9,000 vehicles, or the equivalent of about 65,700 homes. The key issue is not just how much energy is needed but where and when vehicles charge.

Here, the newer work changes the story. It is tempting to think the answer is simply to install faster chargers at taxi ranks. But our modelling suggests that access to charging matters more than charging speed alone. Home or secure neighbourhood charging has the biggest effect on whether current mobility patterns can be sustained and on how well the system performs when driver behaviour adapts.

A typical daily charge of around 50 kWh might take roughly two to three hours on a 22 kW charger, or just over an hour on a 50 kW charger, though real charging times vary. But faster charging does not solve the real problem: drivers still need reliable places and enough stationary time to charge without undermining service or losing income.

The studies also show that chargers should not be planned only for formal taxi ranks. Infrastructure stops and informal stops matter too, because that is how paratransit actually works.

Nor will the effects be shared equally. Because apartheid-era geography still shapes where people live and work, operators in historically marginalised areas are more vulnerable when home charging is unavailable. Charging infrastructure is therefore not only a technical issue, but also an equity one.

There is also a grid challenge. Depot-only charging creates early-morning and daytime peaks, while home charging shifts demand into the evening residential peak. Unmanaged charging could therefore worsen stress on an already fragile electricity system. But time-of-use tariffs, managed charging, and better alignment with solar and other renewables could integrate electric taxis far more intelligently.

Operators’ perspective

For taxi operators, the economics of switching to electric vehicles are complicated. In one comparison, the electric option cost about 1.5 times as much as the diesel Toyota Ses’fikile – a 16-seater minibus – that currently dominates the market. Many operators already work on thin margins and face expensive finance.

There are also financing costs: typically a 10% deposit and a 20% interest rate over a 72-month repayment period. Many operators may also be seen as high-risk by lenders, making finance difficult to access.

At the same time, the running-cost case for electric minibuses is much stronger. Energy costs are generally 33% to 57% lower than diesel fuel costs, and electric motors require less maintenance. For operators, then, this is a story of higher upfront cost set against lower operating cost, with the outcome depending heavily on electricity tariffs, finance terms and access to affordable charging.

Preparing for electrification

Careful planning and simulation are needed to roll out electric minibus taxis at scale. Policymakers need to understand the interactions between vehicle energy demand, charging infrastructure, grid capacity, driver behaviour and passenger service.

That is why we modelled driver behaviour in an electrified paratransit system. Unlike formal bus services, minibus taxi drivers adapt routes, stops and charging to passenger demand and competition. Our simulations show that constrained depot charging increases waiting times and reduces trips served. But with home charging, depot congestion falls sharply and service quality is largely maintained.

This matters because electrification is not just about vehicles and chargers, but about how informal transport systems actually work. If planners treat taxi operations like centrally controlled bus fleets, they will design the wrong interventions. The better approach is to plan around real mobility patterns, charging behaviour and neighbourhood inequality.

It is therefore crucial to bring taxi operators, municipalities, energy providers and communities together. Cleaner air and lower noise must be weighed against the grid’s current emissions profile. Operator economics must improve through better tariffs and financing. And charging infrastructure must be placed not only at depots and ranks, but also in the neighbourhoods and informal stops that shape paratransit every day.

With targeted subsidies, better overnight charging access, investment in renewable energy and clear policy support, Cape Town can begin building a public transport transition that is cleaner, more realistic and more just. If it gets this right, it could offer a blueprint for cities across Africa.

MJ (Thinus) Booysen as Director of the Electric Mobility Lab at Stellenbosch receives funding from the Western Cape Government and the Transport Education and Training Authority (TETA). The Electric Mobility Lab and Centre for Renewable and Sustainable Energy Studies (CRSES) have partnered with flxEV (GoMetro), Powerfleet (MiX Telematics), HSV and ACDC on the importation of South Africa’s first new electric minibus taxi, the eKamva.

Joshua Sello receives funding from the Global Strategic Communications Council (GSCC) and the DW Ackermann Bursary Scheme.

Source: French to English Tester   Published on: 2026-04-20

Source: The Conversation – France (in French)– By Thomas Blonski, Assistant Professor in Strategy and Entrepreneurship, ICN Business School

Long considered an investment or a branding tool, art now occupies a more strategic place within companies. From collecting to residency, the artist is gradually becoming a full organizational partner. This is how a new collaborative economy is taking shape.

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At the turn of the 2000s, many Western companies began buying works of art. Tax incentives, image improvement, asset diversification: “art as an investment” seemed natural. Twenty years later, a more discreet evolution is underway. Companies no longer invest only in works, but also in artists.

From aSurvey based on 23 interviewsconducted with leaders, artists, and intermediaries (galleries, specialized organizations), we sought to understand this gradual shift: how does one move from purchasing a work to organizing an artist residency, and then to creativity training programs?

From the work to the partnership

The sponsorship laws adopted at the beginning of the 21st century^eThe century played a triggering role. In France, it is theAillagon law of 2003, with equivalents atUnited Kingdom(2000), inGermany(2000), but also inItaly(2000) and other European countries. The tax benefits encouraged companies that had no direct connection with the art world to build collections, support exhibitions, or finance institutions.

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Also to read:
Contemporary art, a language and a method for thinking about an improbable future

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In this context, artistic investment is conceived according to a dual logic. On one hand, it is an asset: some studies show that art can serve as a tool for asset diversification for a company, even if some researchers, such asMandelas well asLindenberg and Oosterlinck, show that returns are uncertain and difficult to anticipate. On the other hand, the work produces a symbolic effect, as it strengthens the brand image, signals a cultural commitment, and positions the company in a universe of prestige.

But very quickly, a realization becomes clear to the leaders interviewed: buying a work and hanging it in an entrance hall is not enough. “Level zero is putting a work on the wall,” sums up an intermediary. “If we do that, we might as well go further.”

A logic of “while we’re at it”

This “might as well go further” is at the heart of the observed dynamic. We have called it the logic of “while we’re at it” (might as well). Since the company invests in art, it might as well exploit all its potential opportunistically.

After its initial investment in sponsorship, the company indeed discovers that it now has access to a network: artists, gallery owners, exhibition curators, collectors. The relationships formed around the purchase of an artwork open up other possibilities. Why not create a contemporary art prize? Why not organize an artist residency within the headquarters?

Beyond heritage

This is how they multiply, including in sectors far removed from the cultural world, such as, for example,the automobile,real estate,or even wines and spirits), business awards, partnerships with museum institutions, or residency programs.

The objective is no longer solely patrimonial. It becomes relational and symbolic: gaining legitimacy in the “art worlds,” according to the sociologist’s expressionHoward Becker, and strengthen the brand’s cultural credibility.

Art as an organizational experience

A second shift then takes place. In contact with the artists, companies discover something other than artworks: ways of working. Residencies, initially designed as image or sponsorship operations, become spaces of interaction between artists and employees. Workshops are organized, collaborative projects are born. Teams are confronted with uncertainty, experimentation, with forms of creation that escape managerial routines.

Some leaders explicitly describe this shift. The artist is no longer just the one who produces a work, but the one who can convey an approach to work, creativity, or problem-solving.

At this stage, new forms of intermediation are emerging. To the traditional galleries are added hybrid structures, for exampleMona Lisa FactorywhereViarte, capable of translating artistic language into organizational objectives, such as creativity, team cohesion, or innovation. The initial investment in art then transforms into an organizational investment in the artist.

From buyer to actor

What this trajectory reveals is a sequence of rationalities. Initially, the logic is primarily financial: benefiting from a favorable tax framework and, possibly, from an asset appreciation. Very quickly, a symbolic rationality is added, since art confers prestige, distinction, a form of symbolic capital. Finally, an organizational rationality emerges: the aesthetic experience is converted into collective learning, managerial resource, and an internal transformation tool.

This process is neither linear nor planned from the outset. It is progressive and cumulative. Each step paves the way for the next. Because the company bought a work, it met an artist; because it met an artist, it imagined a residency; because it organized a residency, it considered a training program.

Build reputation

This evolution is not neutral for artists. Receiving a corporate award, undertaking a residency, or participating in a training program adds an additional line to a résumé. Companies thus become full-fledged actors in artistic trajectories, alongside galleries, museums, and public institutions.

They contribute to the construction of reputation and the circulation of artists. In some cases, contractual collaborations with companies are even perceived as more transparent and more financially secure than certain relationships within the art world.

Less an achievement, the “art as investment” appears as an entry point into this universe. What begins as an asset purchase is transformed, through successive adjustments, into an organizational partnership.

A new collaborative economy

This dynamic contributes to the emergence of a specific collaborative economy, linking artists, companies, and specialized intermediaries. It blurs the traditional boundaries between patronage, the art market, and management.

One question remains open: how far can this logic go? By constantly integrating the artist into the organization, does the risk of reducing art to a mere managerial tool really exist? Or, conversely, do these collaborations genuinely help to redefine the relationships between creation and business?

Far from the image of simple instrumentalization, this research shows that the relationship between companies and artists has become denser, more reflective, and more structuring than it was at the beginning of the 2000s. The artwork is no longer just hung on the wall. It opens the door to another way of thinking about the organization.

The authors do not work for, do not advise, do not hold shares, do not receive funds from any organization that could benefit from this article, and have declared no other affiliation than their research institution.

–ref. Investing in art… then in artists: the new collaborations of companies –https://theconversation.com/investing-in-art-then-in-artists-the-new-collaborations-of-companies-277303

Source: MIL-OSI-Submissions-English

Source: The Conversation – USA (2) – By Matthew E. Oliver, Associate Professor of Economics, Georgia Institute of Technology

The oil industry is all about the Benjamins. Diy / iStock / Getty Images PlusThe market for oil is global, which is why events like the war in Iran affect oil prices – and prices of the wide range of products made from oil – literally everywhere. Federal data shows that the price at the primary crude oil hub in the U.S. was US$66 a barrel in late February 2026 – before the U.S. and Israel attacked Iran – and $101 a barrel on April 13. Similar price increases have reverberated around the globe.

As an energy economist and an international trade economist, we field a lot of questions during such episodes, because when oil prices go up, manufacturers, businesses and ultimately consumers pay more.

Some basic economics

Crude oil may be the most important commodity in the global economic system.

It’s a literal fuel for the industrial economy. It powers the engines that drive transportation and paves the roads vehicles drive on. It’s a source for plastics from which the world’s products get made and packaged, and a key ingredient at some point in almost every supply chain. Even fertilizers that boost the food supply are made from it. In short, it is difficult to imagine modern life without oil and its derivatives.

And when its supply changes, its price changes. Economists explain this using a fundamental model of our field: the supply-demand diagram. When there’s less of something to go around, competition among consumers who want it and companies that need it can drive the price up.

Sometimes this process can play out over time, allowing people to adjust their purchasing or activities to dampen price shocks. But when a significant source of the world’s oil is effectively blocked without much advance notice, such as when the the U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz, prices can rise sharply in a short period of time.

A natural question many people ask when oil prices spike is: Where does all that additional money go, and who benefits from it?

Some people have written entire books dissecting all the places that money goes when it leaves consumers’ pockets. But ultimately, the bulk of the money heads in the direction of the source of the oil itself – the oil companies.

What they do with the money varies widely, depending on where in the world an oil company is operating and who owns it. What also matters is the business environment – the set of laws and regulations – in which the company operates.

Middle East faces danger

Oil producers in the Middle East face significant new risk because of the war in Iran, including threats to production, processing locations and shipping routes. These risks raise their costs for insurance, security and transportation.

But production costs in the region are relatively low, so higher global oil prices typically still translate into strong profits.

For a major exporter such as Saudi Arabia, the government owns and controls nearly all oil production, so high prices generally benefit the government’s finances and investments, even during a war. In Saudi Arabia, oil revenue has historically been used to fund public spending.

West Texas gets a windfall

The Permian Basin, the largest oil field in the U.S., is a long way from the Persian Gulf. When global oil prices rise because of the war in Iran, oil companies operating in West Texas effectively get a windfall gain: Prices rise more quickly than costs, at least in the short run.

The immediate effect is more income from higher prices. The money largely goes to company owners – meaning shareholders – through dividends, debt reduction, company-backed purchases of its own stock, and reinvestment in drilling and production. Over time, companies may decide to spend some of that windfall on building more production capacity or pipelines to get more oil and gas to market.

North Sea boosts government revenue

In the North Sea, between the island of Great Britain and Scandinavia, a mix of multinational and government-owned companies produce most of the oil.

In the U.K., private shareholders are the primary beneficiaries of higher profits from increased oil prices, though an additional tax on oil and gas companies’ profits means the government also collects a significant share of the money, which it uses to help pay public expenses.

In Norway, oil revenues flow into the Government Pension Fund Global, the world’s largest sovereign wealth fund, valued at over $2 trillion. Laws govern how much, and for what purposes, money can be withdrawn from the fund, supporting public spending and preserving wealth for future generations. This is a similar model to Alaska’s state-owned program, funded by oil revenue, that pays for government services and sends an annual dividend to every permanent resident.

Russian oligarchs get rich

Russian oil is subject to stringent economic sanctions imposed by major industrial countries as a response to the Russian invasion and occupation of parts of Ukraine. While the U.S. cannot control how much Russia charges for its oil, it can control services needed to move Russian oil around the world. Under current price sanctions, Western shipping, insurance and financing can be used to ship and sell Russian crude oil only if the price is below $60 per barrel.

Russia’s oil industry is dominated by government-controlled companies whose leaders maintain close ties to President Vladimir Putin. The dealings of those shadowy figures are often shrouded in secrecy, but it is likely that they and Putin’s military-industrial complex – not the Russian people – are the main beneficiaries of high oil prices.

What this means for you

Everyday U.S. consumers may not like the idea of their hard-earned cash going into the already deep pockets of any of these groups. But in the short run, there’s not much to do but pay the price. For the long run, however, people around the world are already thinking and talking about, and opting for, sources of energy that don’t depend on fossil fuels.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. When oil prices spike, where does the money go? – https://theconversation.com/when-oil-prices-spike-where-does-the-money-go-280763

Source: French to English Tester   Published on: 2026-04-20

Source: The Conversation – France (in French)– By Pierre-Jean Benghozi, Professor of Economics and Management, École Polytechnique

A company is said to be performing, profitable… and sometimes that it is toxic or dangerous. But it is rarer to make an aesthetic judgment. And yet, some companies are “more beautiful” than others.

This article is published as part of a partnership withFrench Management Review,who celebrated his 50th birthday in 2025.

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How not to be struck by the seduction and the feeling of “formal beauty” exerted today—on analysts, economists, managers, and observers—by new technologies, unprecedented business models of platforms, the extended organizational forms of certain NGOs or mission-driven companies, rapidly growing companies or those able to reinvent themselves, and Open Innovation ecosystems built with stakeholders and by mobilizing consumers’ own production?

Recalling that these organizations are seen from an aesthetic perspective captures a dimension usually poorly taken into account by management studies. This is because the rise of rationalization starting from the industrial revolutions has created a decoupling that now seems natural between beauty on one side, and performance and rationality on the other.

The divide is not self-evident, however. This is proven in one of the sciences that appears to be the coldest and most logical: mathematics. No one is surprised that the quality of a proof is judged not only by its correctness, but also by its simplicity, brilliance, and “elegance.”

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Also to read:
The crisis forces every company to reinvent its business model

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An aesthetic question

For nearly half a century, the aesthetics of organizations has thus been a rapidly expanding field of research, which has been the subject, worldwide, of numerous articles and several special issues of major management journals. This work quickly went beyond merely highlighting a neglected aspect – the perceived beauty and/or ugliness of a company – by broadening and enriching the way organizations are accounted for.

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Also to read:
These start-ups that “play pinball” to refine their business model

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Beyond their mere performance, these constitute complex and formal structures, which must be analyzed as a set of elements (resources, actors, skills, etc.) connected by multiple relationships (management procedures, hierarchy, evaluation, financial dependence, commercial exchanges, technical dependence…) between different groups of actors.

In this perspective, the same objective leads everywhere to infinitely varied production structures: from large bureaucratic organizations to small structures formed in a mannerad hocfor the realization of a project. In this context, the organizational forms that appear in companies as well as in markets can be very different, both in their efficiency and performance, of course, but also in the vision, understanding — or even the appeal — through which they spontaneously present themselves.

A stylistic evolution

Beyond the characterization of this or that organization, the aesthetic approach also encourages questioning the succession of their forms. Reading a stylistic evolution highlights their different hidden dimensions. For organizations, like works of art, articulate with all the sociopolitical and cultural registers of social reality: emotion and the sensitive character of the reception of productions and engagement in work (as in the visual arts), simplicity and impact of shaping a creation in cooperation (as in architecture and cinema), importance of expressiveness in interpersonal interactions (as shown by theater and live performance).

At a time of fascination with artificial intelligence, the detour through aesthetics allows, beyond that, to question the interaction between technology and modes of production, by comparing the formal appeal of technical solutions with their structural and economic impacts.

While creativity and innovation now have an omnipresent place and role in organizational strategies (they were, moreover, the subject of the latest Nobel Prize in Economics), the detour through aesthetic theories allows for a better understanding of the tensions they generate: on the one hand, a vision of creativity involving the questioning of existing solutions, and on the other hand, the necessity, in order to impose itself and be recognized, to largely conform to the standards, norms, or practices in place.

A double movement

There is thus a double movement: the pioneering companies in the adoption of new management methods (think of the Gafam, Airbnb, and companieslow costsuch as EasyJet or Ryanair) rely on existing markets and frameworks, but then themselves become managerial models influencing emerging forms of organizations or ecosystems, just as avant-garde artists inspire currents or artistic schools.

Such movements are impossible to explain with a purely descriptive and classificatory approach. In artistic matters, the capacity for renewing aesthetic forms is decisive: the beautiful and the modern explicitly arise from this novelty. In terms of management, thinking about the evolution of managerial styles also involves considering how certain fundamentals, such as performance or optimization ofprocess, regularly redefine themselves in new forms of organization or action that appeal under the influence of entrepreneurs, researchers, or consultants.

No form can be given as beautiful outside the exercise of each individual’s subjectivity… just as judgments of performance, profitability, and cost evaluation do not exist in absolute terms, but are always linked to the position and objectives of the actors who carry them. The judgment of beauty lies both in the eyes of the artists who produce and in the eyes of the spectators or consumers who receive it.

The question of aesthetics thus makes it possible to reconsider, in the approach to organizations, an alternative between contingent subjectivity and intrinsic objectivity that crosses the issues of management but goes back to the origins of aesthetic philosophies, and which Kant himself had encountered.

The authors do not work for, do not advise, do not hold shares in, do not receive funds from an organization that could benefit from this article, and have declared no affiliations other than their research institution.

–ref. Talking about the beauty of companies? Not so absurd after all! –https://theconversation.com/talking-about-the-beauty-of-businesses-not-so-absurd-after-all-280177

Source: MIL-OSI-Submissions-English

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Marta Khomyn, Senior Lecturer, Finance and Data Analytics, Adelaide University

Elon Musk’s space exploration company SpaceX has filed confidential papers ahead of a planned public company listing on the US NASDAQ stock exchange.

The initial public offering (IPO) for the company controlled by the world’s richest man is targeting a total valuation of US$2 trillion. Musk plans to list only a small fraction of the company to raise US$75 billion from public investors, which would still make it the largest IPO in history.

So, why is SpaceX planning to go public? And what does the IPO mean for investors who might want a tiny slice of the action?

The backstory

SpaceX says it aims to “make humanity multiplanetary”. You would expect no less from Musk, who founded SpaceX in 2002.

His company’s breakthrough was to re-use as much of the rocket and launcher vehicle as possible. This slashed launch costs to as little as 5% of the costs in the early 2000s, and turned commercial space flight from science fiction into reality. The company says it has now completed about 600 successful rocket landings.

Yet, for all its space ambitions, SpaceX still derives 50–80% of its revenue from Starlink, a communications business, which provides satellite internet to over 10 million users around the world.

In February 2026, SpaceX merged with xAI, the loss-making AI company behind the Grok chatbot, in what was the largest private merger transaction on record. The deal valued xAI at US$250 billion and SpaceX at US$1 trillion, creating a combined entity worth US$1.25 trillion.

The merger has helped to set the stage for the SpaceX IPO.

Musk suggested the IPO proceeds will be used for launching up to one million data centre satellites into space. The idea is that space-based data centres would be powered by abundant solar energy, and therefore bypass the constraints of electricity and water usage on Earth.

Bending the rules for the IPO

SpaceX may be the first of three mega-IPOs this year, ahead of potential listings of AI companies Anthropic and OpenAI.

If it goes ahead with plans to raise US$75 billion, that would represent just 3.75% of the company’s total value. It means the vast majority of SpaceX would remain in private hands, owned by Musk himself and a handful of early private investors. In stock market terms, this is called a low “free float”.

Normally, companies that only list such a small percentage of their total value would not qualify for inclusion in major stock market indices like the S&P 500 or the NASDAQ 100.

The NASDAQ normally requires at least a 10% free float of shares in a given company. But to allow a potential listing of SpaceX to be included in the index, the exchange has introduced a special adjustment to the weighting of shares and removed the 10% minimum.

NASDAQ also reduced the normal “seasoning period” before a newly listed company can join the index from three months to just 15 trading days. Again, this is to accommodate the SpaceX listing.

For investors in passive funds, including exchange-trade funds (ETFs), this matters a lot. Currently, more than US$600 billion of investors’ money is with passive funds that track the NASDAQ 100 index. As soon as SpaceX joins the index, these investors will automatically be buying in. The concern is that allowing giant companies such as SpaceX to enter the index too quickly could lead to big price swings, which would expose millions of investors to high volatility.

SpaceX wants investors to value it at US$2 trillion, but it only earned US$15 billion in revenue last year. At that rate, it would take 133 years of revenue just to match its current asking price.

Tesla, one of the most expensive stocks in the world, would take just 13 years — making SpaceX’s price tag ten times higher.

Other leading market indices, such as S&P 500 and FTSE Russell, are also bending their rules to fast-track the inclusion of very large, newly listed companies.

Many more investors have their money in funds that track S&P indices compared to Nasdaq 100 – more than US$16 trillion in passive funds track the S&P. If the S&P 500 follows NASDAQ’s lead and changes its own rules to accommodate SpaceX, the wave of automatic buying would be even larger.

What does this mean for investors?

Musk’s companies have long been the darlings of non-professional, retail investors, and SpaceX would be no exception. In fact, the company said it aims to sell up to 30% of its shares to non-institutional, individual investors.

With SpaceX’s sky-high valuation, investors need to stop and think before buying in. But when powerful companies can rewrite the rules in their own favour, thinking carefully becomes a luxury. Markets only work when everyone plays by the same rules, and right now, not everyone is.

Marta Khomyn does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Musk’s SpaceX is shaping up as the biggest IPO on record. It’s also bending the rules to do so – https://theconversation.com/musks-spacex-is-shaping-up-as-the-biggest-ipo-on-record-its-also-bending-the-rules-to-do-so-280271

Source: MIL-OSI-Submissions-French

Source: The Conversation – France (in French) – By Pierre-Jean Benghozi, Professeur économie-gestion, École polytechnique

On dit d’une entreprise qu’elle est performante, rentable… et parfois qu’elle est toxique ou dangereuse. Mais il est plus rare que l’on porte un jugement esthétique. Et pourtant, certaines entreprises sont plus « belles » que d’autres.

Cet article est publié dans le cadre d’un partenariat avec la Revue française de gestion, qui a fêté ses 50 ans en 2025.

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Comment ne pas être frappé par la séduction et le sentiment de « beauté formelle » qu’opèrent aujourd’hui – sur les analystes, les économistes, les managers et les observateurs – les nouvelles technologies, les modèles d’affaires inédits des plates-formes, les formes d’organisation étendues de certaines ONG ou entreprises à mission, les entreprises à la croissance fulgurante ou sachant se reconstruire, les écosystèmes d’Open innovation construits avec les parties prenantes et en mobilisant la production des consommateurs eux-mêmes ?

Rappeler que ces organisations sont vues sous un angle esthétique capte une dimension habituellement mal prise en compte par les travaux de gestion. C’est que la montée en puissance de la rationalisation à partir des révolutions industrielles a opéré un découplage qui semble aujourd’hui naturel entre beauté d’un côté, performance et rationalité de l’autre.

La coupure ne va pourtant pas de soi. Preuve en est donnée dans une des sciences pourtant apparemment la plus froide et logique : les mathématiques. Personne ne s’étonne qu’on y juge la qualité d’une démonstration non pas simplement à sa justesse, mais aussi à sa simplicité, sa brillance et son « élégance ».

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La crise impose à chaque entreprise de réinventer son business model

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Une question esthétique

Depuis près d’un demi-siècle, l’esthétique des organisations est ainsi un domaine de recherche en pleine expansion, qui a fait l’objet, partout dans le monde, de nombreux articles et de plusieurs numéros spéciaux des grandes revues de gestion. Ces travaux ont vite été au-delà de la seule mise en avant d’un aspect négligé – la beauté et/ou la laideur perçue d’une entreprise – en élargissant et en enrichissant la manière de rendre compte des organisations.

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Ces start-up qui « jouent au flipper » pour affiner leur business model

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Au-delà de leur seule performance, ces dernières constituent des structures complexes et formelles, qu’il faut analyser comme un ensemble d’éléments (ressources, acteurs, compétences, etc.) connectés par de multiples relations (procédures de gestion, hiérarchie, évaluation, dépendance financière, échanges marchands, dépendance technique…) entre groupes d’acteurs différents.

Dans cette perspective, un même objectif donne lieu partout à des structures de production infiniment variées : des grandes organisations bureaucratiques aux petites structures constituées de manière ad hoc pour la réalisation d’un projet. À ce titre, les formes organisationnelles qui se manifestent dans les entreprises comme sur les marchés peuvent être très différentes, à la fois dans leur efficience et leur performance, bien sûr, mais aussi par la vision, la compréhension – voire la séduction – par lesquelles elles se donnent spontanément à voir.

Une évolution stylistique

Au-delà de la caractérisation de telle ou telle organisation, l’approche par l’esthétique incite en outre à s’interroger sur la succession de leurs formes. Y lire une évolution stylistique en souligne les différentes dimensions cachées. Car les organisations, comme les œuvres d’art, s’articulent avec tous les registres sociopolitiques et culturels de la réalité sociale : émotion et caractère sensible de la réception des productions et de l’engagement dans le travail (comme dans les arts plastiques), simplicité et impact de la mise en forme d’une création en coopération (à l’image de l’architecture et du cinéma), importance de l’expressivité dans les interactions interpersonnelles (ce que montrent le théâtre et le spectacle vivant).

À l’heure de la fascination opérée par l’intelligence artificielle, le détour par l’esthétique permet, au-delà, d’interroger l’interaction entre technologie et modalités de production, en mettant en regard la séduction formelle des solutions techniques avec leurs impacts structurels et économiques.

Alors que la créativité et l’innovation ont aujourd’hui une place et un rôle omniprésents dans les stratégies organisationnelles (elles ont, d’ailleurs, fait l’objet du dernier Nobel d’économie), le détour par les théories esthétiques permet de mieux penser les tensions qu’elles génèrent : entre, d’une part, une vision de la créativité relevant de la remise en cause des solutions existantes et, d’autre part, la nécessité, pour s’imposer et être reconnue, de s’inscrire en grande partie dans les standards, normes ou pratiques en place.

Un double mouvement

Il s’opère ainsi un double mouvement : les entreprises pionnières dans l’adoption de nouveaux modes de gestion (pensons aux Gafam, à Airbnb, à des entreprises low cost telles qu’EasyJet ou Ryanair) s’appuient sur des marchés et des cadres existants, mais deviennent ensuite elles-mêmes des modèles managériaux influençant les formes émergentes d’organisations ou d’écosystèmes, tout comme les artistes de l’avant-garde suscitent des courants ou des écoles artistiques.

De tels mouvements sont impossibles à expliquer avec une approche purement descriptive et classificatoire. En matière artistique, la capacité de renouvellement des formes esthétiques est déterminante : le beau et le moderne naissent explicitement de cette nouveauté. En matière de gestion, penser l’évolution des modes managériales revient aussi à penser la manière dont certains fondamentaux, tels que la performance ou l’optimisation des process, se redéfinissent régulièrement dans de nouvelles modalités d’organisation ou d’action qui séduisent sous l’action d’entrepreneurs, de chercheurs ou de consultants.

Nulle forme ne peut être donnée comme belle hors de l’exercice de la subjectivité de chacun… tout comme les jugements de performance, de rentabilité et d’évaluation des coûts n’existent pas dans l’absolu, mais se rattachent toujours à la position et aux objectifs des acteurs qui les portent. Le jugement de beauté est à la fois dans l’œil des artistes qui produisent et dans les yeux des spectateurs ou des consommateurs qui reçoivent.

La question de l’esthétique permet donc de repenser, dans l’approche des organisations, une alternative entre subjectivité contingente et objectivité intrinsèque qui traverse les enjeux de la gestion mais remonte aux origines des philosophies esthétiques, et à laquelle Kant lui-même s’était heurté.

Les auteurs ne travaillent pas, ne conseillent pas, ne possèdent pas de parts, ne reçoivent pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’ont déclaré aucune autre affiliation que leur organisme de recherche.

– ref. Parler de la beauté des entreprises ? Pas si absurde que cela ! – https://theconversation.com/parler-de-la-beaute-des-entreprises-pas-si-absurde-que-cela-280177

Source: French to English Tester   Published on: 2026-04-20

Source: The Conversation – in French– By Hugo Spring-Ragain, PhD student in economics / mathematical economics, Center for Diplomatic and Strategic Studies (CEDS)

Artificial intelligence does not so much destroy jobs as it profoundly changes the skills required to perform them. From this confusion between jobs and skills, errors may arise in policies supporting ongoing transformations.

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Each major technological wave has produced its share of contradictory predictions about employment. Artificial intelligence (AI) is no exception. But before knowing how many jobs AI will create or destroy, we need to agree on what it actually automates. The answer requires distinguishing three notions that public debate regularly confuses: employment, skill, and task.

The great waves of automation have followed a remarkably stable logic over two centuries: steam, electricity, and industrial robotics have displaced repetitive physical tasks and spared non-routine cognitive work. This empirical regularity has beenformalized by Autor, Levy, and Murnanesince 2003 under the name “task polarization hypothesis.”

A persistent illusion

Automation erodes intermediate jobs, those of skilled blue-collar workers and office employees performing routine tasks, but spares the two extremes. On one hand, non-routine manual tasks, such as plumbing or caregiving, on the other, non-routine cognitive tasks, such as analysis, consulting, or expert writing. The latter constituted the core of skilled tertiary professions, and the conviction was firmly established that they would remain out of reach.

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Also to read:
Why AI is forcing companies to rethink the value of work

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This conviction was based on a conceptual confusion that must be cleared up first and foremost. It was not the job of a lawyer or financial analyst that was protected, but a set of specific tasks that made up this job and which had until now resisted automation. The distinction between these three levels is fundamental.

A job designates a position held within an organization, with a contract, a salary, and a job description. A skill is a cognitive or technical ability that can be applied in various professional contexts. A task is a specific, definable action, for which it is possible to assess whether or not it can be automated at a given cost. It is at this third level that the ongoing transformation truly takes place, and it is precisely this level that the public debate ignores.

Rupture in the long history of industrial capitalism

Generative AI represents a breakthrough in this long history. For the first time since industrialization, qualified cognitive tasks such as writing, document analysis, synthesis, and production of first drafts are directly exposed.Eloundou, Manning, Mishkin and Rockestimate that about 80% of the active U.S. workforce could see at least 10% of their tasks affected by large language models, and that this exposure increases with salary level. This is the exact opposite pattern observed in all previous waves.

The analytical framework developed byAcemoglu and Restrepoallows to go further. Their model distinguishes two opposing effects produced by any wave of automation:

• The displacement effect, first: workers lose tasks to the benefit of the machine, which mechanically reduces the demand for labor and weighs on the wages of the affected groups;
• The reintegration effect, then: automation produces new tasks where human value is decisive, generating compensatory demand.

The long history of industrial capitalism can be read as a succession of these two effects, the second generally ending up compensating for the first.

The case of translation allows us to see very concretely how displacement and reintegration combine. Generative AI can produce a first draft in another language in a few seconds, which shifts part of the work previously done by human translators to the machine. But this automation simultaneously reintegrates other tasks or enhances their importance, such as checking for misunderstandings, adapting to the cultural context, harmonizing terminology, quality control, and final validation.

Potential imbalance

What is worrying with generative AI is the potential imbalance between these two dynamics. The shift is happening at a speed that labor markets and training institutions struggle to absorb, while reintegration still largely remains to be built.

However, the most important phenomenon is not sectoral, but it is internal to the professions themselves. In its“Employment Outlook”, the OECDhighlights that the professions most exposed to generative AI are precisely those with a high cognitive density: finance, law, consulting, higher education. Unlike previous waves that affected rural areas and industrial regions, the exposure is now stronger in large metropolitan areas and among highly skilled workers, an unprecedented geographical and social reversal.

Redistribute tasks

This reversal concretely takes place at the level of the task.

In the same position of financial analyst or legal advisor, some tasks are shifting to AI (producing an executive summary, generating an initial contract analysis, synthesizing a literature review), while others are mechanically gaining value: defining the relevant analytical framework, assessing the quality of automated reasoning, detecting factual errors in an output, assuming legal or ethical responsibility for a decision. These are not jobs that disappear. They are bundles of tasks that are redistributed between humans and machines, transforming from within what an employer expects from a qualified employee.

This redistribution of tasks has a direct impact on the skills that will truly be valued in the coming years, and it overturns some of the usual assumptions about professional training.

Train workers to use AI instrumentally, to master a tool, to writepromptsEffective, mastering an interface is useful in the short term, but it is insufficient if the skill truly required tomorrow is not to produce with AI, but to supervise and critique what it produces.

A training challenge

However, effectively supervising an AI output requires exactly what short and technical trainings struggle to develop: a solid general knowledge that allows detecting a fundamental error, an argumentative ability to evaluate the coherence of a reasoning, a knowledge of cognitive biases to identify the blind spots of an automated analysis. These are skills thateducational sciences group under the term metacompetencesTo learn to learn, to exercise critical judgment, to mobilize knowledge in unprecedented situations.

The paradox then becomes the following. As AI automates routine knowledge tasks, it precisely values what generalist training and humanities courses have long cultivated and what debates on employability have tended to disregard in favor of more immediately measurable technical skills.

Not out of nostalgia for the humanities, but out of pure economic logic. If the machine produces the text, the analysis and the synthesis, the marginal value of the human lies in their ability to judge whether this text is true, whether this analysis is relevant in light of the real context, whether this synthesis serves the pursued objective.

Hugo Spring-Ragain does not work for, advise, own shares in, or receive funds from any organization that could benefit from this article, and has declared no other affiliations than his research institution.

–ref. Generative AI, the first cognitive revolution in the history of work –https://theconversation.com/lia-generative-premiere-revolution-cognitive-de-lhistoire-du-travail-279911

Source: MIL-OSI-Submissions-English

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Michael von Massow, Professor, Food Economics, University of Guelph

Does Canada need public grocery stores? The debate has moved into the mainstream since Avi Lewis became the new leader of the NDP after campaigning on a plan for government-run grocery stores.

The premise is relatively straightforward: governments would build and run grocery stores that offer pricing at levels well below those of traditional stores.

Similar ideas are gaining traction at the municipal level. Toronto city council has advanced a pilot project for four city-run grocery stores, and New York Mayor Zohran Mamdani has announced plans for five municipal grocery stores.

With food prices still elevated, the proposal for public grocery stores sounds appealing. Lewis and his advisers have suggested that government-run store prices would be 35 to 40 per cent lower than those Canadians are currently paying.

The real question is whether public grocery stores are feasible and, if so, whether they’re the most effective way to deliver relief to consumers. The evidence suggests otherwise.

Scale is everything in grocery retail

Successful food retailing requires significant distribution infrastructure to efficiently bring products to the retail location. Loblaws, Canada’s largest food retailer, has more than 2,400 stores. Empire Group, which includes brands such as Sobeys, has more than 1,600 stores. This scale allows them to achieve significant purchase volumes while lowering distribution costs.

This is also why larger retailers have been purchasing regional grocers such as Longo’s and Farm Boy. It allows the smaller chains to benefit from the purchasing and logistical infrastructure of the purchaser.

Even with those advantages, large retailers achieve relatively low margins. Operating income (revenue minus direct costs and excluding things like taxes and depreciation) generally represents between four and six per cent of total revenue.

A new government-run chain operating without that infrastructure would be starting from behind, and would require substantial subsidies to achieve the promised price reductions.

Some proposals suggest public stores could only carry staples, which would reduce the cost of inventory. While that’s true, this overlooks how grocers cover overhead: by the size of the “basket” of each customer. Basket size is the total value of everything each customer buys.

Basket size is a key metric for grocers, who often price select staples below cost to draw customers into the store. Margins on those staples are already thin, meaning government stores would require greater subsidies to achieve discounts without the benefit of higher-margin secondary products.

Examples come with trade-offs

Supporters of public grocery stores point to examples in Mexico, the United States and Canadian provinces. Upon closer examination, however, these examples highlight the challenges and costs that suggest that this path is not feasible.

Mexico has operated government-run grocery stores for years. The number of stores has declined significantly in the past decade, with only approximately 50 remaining, located predominantly in the Mexico City area.

Price tracking by Profeco, the country’s federal consumer protection office, shows these stores are less than two per cent cheaper than Walmart (the dominant Mexican food retailer) and some private grocers are cheaper still. A significant informal food sector of market stalls offers additional competition. This is nowhere near the 35 to 40 per cent savings being promised in Canada.

The U.S. military commissaries offer groceries that are almost 25 per cent cheaper on average for active service members and veterans. But federal appropriations pay for labour, rent/real estate, distribution costs and other overheads.

The annual subsidy represents approximately 25 to 30 per cent of sales, meaning the U.S. government spends more than consumers actually save, with an ongoing backlog of maintenance also increasing the deficit.

There is some suggestion that the commissaries should be privatized to achieve the efficiencies of larger chains while still providing cheaper options for soldiers’ families and veterans living close to the bases.

Provincial control of alcohol and cannabis retail in Canada is sometimes raised as a parallel. However, these models are not designed to lower prices. Instead, they are designed to collect taxes and control prices. The policy direction runs opposite to what public grocery advocates are proposing, so this comparison is invalid.

What governments are already doing

Food prices are rising for reasons largely out of the control of Canadian governments, including geopolitical events (such as the wars in Ukraine and Iran) and the climate crisis. What governments can do is cushion the impact for those hit hardest.

Canada’s GST/HST rebate program already does some of this, offsetting taxes paid on goods and services to eligible households. Beginning in July, the new Groceries and Essentials Benefit will replace the GST/HST credit. The structure and eligibility rules will remain the same, but payments will increase by 25 per cent for five years.

The program is not in the range of 35 to 40 per cent, but it’s intended to offset much of the increases Canadians have experienced over the past few years. This program provides direct and targeted benefits for those feeling the most pressure from rising food prices.

There is also a federal program in place aimed at reducing the cost of staple items in remote northern communities. Nutrition North subsidizes retailers in places that experience high levels of food insecurity and alongside high transportation costs. Research suggests that the subsidy is, on average, fully passed through to consumers.

Unlike a tax rebate, the program cannot target specific consumers, but it can target certain categories of food. Milk and bread are cheaper for shoppers, for example, but frozen pizzas are not.

The most effective path forward

Building a national chain of public grocery stores would immediately raise a question of equity: how would governments decide which communities get a store and which don’t?

The cost of building thousands of stores would be prohibitive; a few dozen would leave most Canadians without access while costing governments more per transaction that consumers would save. And, because anyone could shop there, it would dilute the benefit for those who need it most.

The money would be much better spent directly supporting the Canadians who need it most. Direct payments remain the most efficient use of taxpayer money. They can be targeted to low-income households and deployed quickly.

Nutrition North-style subsidies work well in specific areas but can’t target individual households. A card or voucher system could combine both approaches by targeting and selecting eligible food products, though the administrative costs would either dilute the benefit to recipients or raise the overall price of the program.

Even so, a well-designed voucher program would almost certainly deliver more value per dollar spent than building and operating retail infrastructure from scratch.

There are ways to make food more affordable for Canadians. Government grocery stores just aren’t one of them.

Michael von Massow does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Public grocery stores won’t fix Canada’s food affordability crisis – https://theconversation.com/public-grocery-stores-wont-fix-canadas-food-affordability-crisis-279932

Source: MIL-OSI-Submissions-French

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Viet Nguyen-Tien, Research Economist, London School of Economics and Political Science

La multiplication des bornes de recharge joue un rôle crucial dans la bascule en train de s’opérer. Michael Marais/Unsplash, CC BYLa voiture électrique n’a plus besoin du prix du pétrole pour s’imposer : la baisse des coûts et les effets de réseau suffisent désormais à enclencher la transition. Mais en changeant de dépendance, elle redessine aussi les risques.

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Lorsque le détroit d’Ormuz s’est retrouvé fermé pour la première fois en mars et que le baril de pétrole a atteint 120 dollars (101 euros), une très vieille question a refait surface : est-ce enfin le moment où les véhicules électriques vont réellement décoller — ou simplement un nouveau faux départ ?

Le secteur des véhicules électriques a déjà connu ce scénario. Il a émergé après l’embargo pétrolier de 1973, avant de s’effondrer avec la baisse des prix du pétrole, puis de repartir à la hausse. Chaque vague s’est éteinte lorsque la pression extérieure s’est relâchée.

Cette fois, selon nous, la situation est différente. Dans un récent document de travail, nous soutenons que le modèle économique des véhicules électriques s’améliore désormais pour des raisons qui lui sont propres. Cela tient à l’évolution des batteries, et non au prix du pétrole. Les mêmes éléments montrent toutefois que cette transition fait émerger de nouveaux problèmes, aussi sérieux que ceux qu’elle prétend résoudre.

Pourquoi cette fois est différente

Le coût des batteries a chuté de 93 % depuis 2010. C’est ce chiffre qui change tout. Un « pack » qui coûtait plus de 1 000 dollars (850 euros) par kilowattheure en 2010 ne coûtait plus que 108 dollars (91 euros) fin 2025, sous l’effet d’une décennie d’apprentissage, d’investissements et de politiques publiques favorables.

Des travaux sur l’industrie mondiale des batteries montrent qu’à chaque doublement de la production cumulée, les coûts baissent d’environ 9 %. Davantage d’acheteurs, davantage de production, des coûts plus faibles, donc encore plus d’acheteurs.

Contrairement aux années 1970, cette dynamique n’a pas besoin d’un choc pétrolier pour se maintenir. Les voitures électriques ont atteint la parité de coût sur l’ensemble de leur durée de vie avec les véhicules thermiques dans une grande partie de l’Europe ; sur le marché de l’occasion, elles affichent désormais le coût total de possession le plus bas. Les modèles récents égalent même les voitures essence en durée de vie estimée — ce dont les premiers véhicules électriques ne pouvaient pas se prévaloir.

Les ventes mondiales ont dépassé 17 millions d’unités en 2024, l’un des processus de diffusion technologique les plus rapides de l’histoire des transports. La Norvège est presque entièrement électrifiée. Et l’Éthiopie a atteint environ 60 % de parts de marché pour les véhicules électriques en 2024, portée par une électricité hydraulique bon marché — bien devant, par exemple, les États-Unis, autour de 8 %.

Une plateforme économique, pas seulement un moteur plus performant

La raison plus profonde pour laquelle cette vague ne s’essoufflera pas n’est pas technique — elle est économique. Un véhicule électrique est une plateforme. Sa valeur augmente à mesure que l’écosystème qui l’entoure se développe, de la même manière que les smartphones sont devenus indispensables non pas tant pour leur matériel que pour tout ce qui s’y connecte.

Chaque borne de recharge installée rend le véhicule électrique suivant plus attractif. Chaque mise à jour logicielle augmente la valeur de toutes les voitures déjà en circulation. Chaque batterie recyclée alimente la chaîne d’approvisionnement qui rend la suivante moins coûteuse. C’est aussi l’une des raisons pour lesquelles d’autres technologies, comme les véhicules à hydrogène à pile à combustible, peinent à se déployer à grande échelle : la technologie existe, mais l’ensemble des conditions nécessaires n’est pas encore réuni.

Une étude menée auprès de 8 000 conducteurs à Shanghai montre que l’angoisse de l’autonomie — la peur de tomber en panne de batterie — a un coût économique réel, en raison de trajets évités inutilement. Mais ce coût diminue rapidement, non pas parce que les batteries se sont améliorées, mais parce que les réseaux de recharge se sont étendus.

Rendre visible en temps réel la disponibilité des bornes pourrait ajouter entre 6 et 8 points de part de marché d’ici à 2030. Et comme la recharge des véhicules électriques est bien plus flexible que la plupart des autres usages domestiques de l’électricité, les conducteurs peuvent se détourner des heures de pointe avec une grande facilité lorsque le prix les y incite — transformant la voiture en un véritable atout pour le réseau, capable de stocker et de restituer de l’électricité selon les besoins. Il s’agit là d’effets de réseau économiques, et non de simples caractéristiques techniques.

Remplacer une dépendance par une autre

Mettre fin à la dépendance au pétrole ne supprime pas l’exposition géopolitique. Elle la déplace.

Fin 2025, la Chine a introduit des règles imposant une autorisation gouvernementale pour les exportations contenant plus de 0,1 % de terres rares. Le levier qui provenait autrefois du contrôle des flux pétroliers repose désormais sur la maîtrise des capacités de transformation et des chaînes d’approvisionnement en composants.

Les minerais en jeu — lithium, cobalt, nickel, graphite, néodyme, pour n’en citer que quelques-uns — comportent leurs propres risques géopolitiques et, comme nous l’avons montré ailleurs, des coûts humains importants pour les communautés qui les extraient. Cela alimente un cycle prévisible de contestation sociale qui menace de freiner la transition si l’industrie ne s’engage pas en faveur d’une innovation responsable et durable.

Le cobalt a longtemps permis aux véhicules électriques de parcourir de plus longues distances avec une même charge. Et lorsque les prix ont grimpé, la recherche s’est accélérée permettant de concevoir des batteries contenant moins de cobalt, voire pas du tout. Aujourd’hui, plus de la moitié des batteries de véhicules électriques vendues dans le monde n’en contiennent pas.

Des données sur quatre décennies de brevets montrent le même mécanisme : la hausse des prix des minerais réoriente systématiquement la recherche et développement vers des technologies plus économes en ressources.

La récupération du lithium et du cobalt à partir de batteries usagées devient elle aussi économiquement viable, déplaçant une partie de la chaîne d’approvisionnement loin des sites d’extraction exposés aux risques géopolitiques. Par ailleurs, la Norvège et d’autres pays cherchent à exploiter de nouvelles ressources en minerais critiques afin de diversifier les approvisionnements.

Une transition bien réelle mais non sans risques

La crise d’Ormuz rappelle le coût d’une dépendance énergétique concentrée. La transition vers les véhicules électriques n’en a pas besoin. La courbe d’apprentissage continue de baisser, la plateforme produit des effets cumulatifs, l’économie du modèle ne cesse de s’améliorer. C’est ce qui rend cette vague différente.

Ce qu’elle ne fait pas, en revanche, c’est éliminer les risques géopolitiques. Contrairement au pétrole, où le pouvoir repose sur les flux d’énergie, les chaînes d’approvisionnement des véhicules électriques concentrent le pouvoir autour des matériaux, des capacités de transformation et des goulets d’étranglement technologiques — des chaînes d’approvisionnement fortement concentrées et porteuses de risques sérieux. La dépendance au carburant devient une dépendance aux minerais. Et cette dépendance est, elle aussi, fortement concentrée.

Les régions automobiles traditionnelles absorbent déjà des pertes d’emplois concentrées, et l’histoire montre que ces bouleversements laissent des cicatrices durables, même lorsque les effets globaux à long terme sont positifs. Pourtant, l’assemblage des véhicules électriques se révèle plus intensif en main-d’œuvre dans les pays occidentaux que prévu — nécessitant davantage de travailleurs sur les chaînes de production, et non moins, du moins dans la phase de montée en puissance. À l’inverse, en Chine, l’automatisation massive a conduit à l’émergence d’« usines sombres » où la présence humaine est si réduite que l’éclairage n’est même plus nécessaire.

Les mêmes régions aujourd’hui confrontées aux pertes pourraient en tirer des bénéfices. Mais les gains et les pertes ne concernent pas les mêmes personnes. C’est là que réside encore l’essentiel du travail à accomplir.

Viet Nguyen-Tien reçoit des financements de l’ESRC via le Centre for Economic Performance (ES/T014431/1) et le Programme on Innovation and Diffusion (ES/V009478/1), et a précédemment été financé par la Faraday Institution dans le cadre du projet ReLiB (numéros de subvention FIRG005 et FIRG006).

Gavin D. J. Harper reçoit des financements de la Faraday Institution (numéros de subvention FIRG027, FIRG057 et FIRG085). Site du projet ReLiB : https://relib.org.uk/

Robert Elliott ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

– ref. Batteries, coûts, réseaux… L’industrie automobile franchit le point de bascule et peut s’affranchir du pétrole – https://theconversation.com/batteries-couts-reseaux-lindustrie-automobile-franchit-le-point-de-bascule-et-peut-saffranchir-du-petrole-280924

Source: French to English Tester   Published on: 2026-04-20

Source: The Conversation – in French– By Vincent Pradier Goeting, Doctor in management sciences, University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne

In 2025, official development assistance experienced its sharpest contraction ever recorded. But reducing the current situation to a matter of budget volumes would miss the essential point. What international cooperation is going through is above all a political and paradigmatic crisis – a multidimensional crisis that, revealingly, affects Western NGOs first and foremost today.

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The figures published by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)In April 2026 are of rare brutality. Official development assistance (ODA) from member countries of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) fell in 2025 by 23.1% in real terms, the sharpest annual contraction ever recorded since the indicator’s creation in 1969. Volumes have returned to their 2015 level, thus wiping out ten years of progress and, with them, part of the commitments made at the time of the adoption ofthe 2030 Agenda. According to the OECD itself, a new drop of nearly 6% is anticipated for 2026.

This historic drop is largely attributable to a single political decision:dismantling of the United States Agency for International Development(USAID), engaged as early as January 2025 by the second Trump administration. According to the OECD,US ODA was cut by more than half in one year (-56.9%), which constitutes the largest reduction ever recorded by a donor country. This American decision alone accounts for three-quarters of the global decrease in ODA in 2025. It has, in turn, accelerated the downward adjustments already initiated by other major donors – Germany, United Kingdom, Japan, and France. For the first time since 1995,These four countries simultaneously reduced their ODA for two consecutive years.

France is thus participating in this movement. After a reduction of 11% in 2023 and an additional cut of 13% in 2024, the French budget allocated to international solidarity has been subject, since the beginning of 2024, to five consecutive cuts. According to theestimations of Coordination SUD, the national platform of French NGOs, French ODA could be reduced by 58% in two years – and up to 64% for the budget lines of the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs that directly fund NGOs. The goal of reaching 0.7% of gross national income in 2025, set out in theAugust 2021 law, by default of being officially abandoned, seems to become a distant horizon.

A crisis that is not only financial

It would be tempting, faced with this data, to conclude a “funding crisis” in international cooperation. However, such analysis would be insufficient. What strikes one, as one observes the succession of cuts, is the regularity with which they are politically decided, and the weakness of the resistance they encounter in the public sphere — including when, as is the case in France,66% of the population declares support for international solidarity action.

This paradox – apopular support for the very principle of solidarity, but a growing rejection of the organizations that embody it – deserves to be taken seriously. It is partly due to themanagerializationand to thebureaucratizationprogressives of a distant sector, as it became professionalized, from the militant anchorage from which it historically drew its legitimacy. It especially opens the way for what Félicien Fauryappointeda form ofnegative politicization– the one that fuels populist rhetoric by portraying NGOs as technocratic, disconnected actors, or even accomplices of a system they were supposed to be the watchdogs of.

In other words, it is not the budgetary decision itself that is in question. It is itspolitical feasibility. For decades, ODA has simultaneously fulfilledthree functionsA: a humanitarian and development role undertaken; a geopolitical role, discreet but real; and a function of democratic legitimization for donor states, particularly in the Western space. These three functions are today particularlyput in difficulty. In a growing number of countries, international solidarity is no longer seen as a valuable political good – it has become, in certain segments of the public debate, an argumentagainstthe governments that practice it.

The crisis is therefore primarily that of aframework of legitimization. It primarily affects Western NGOs, whose organizational model ishistorically backed by this framework.

NGOs caught in triple contestation

French international solidarity NGOs, whose combined resourceshad experienceda growth of 43% between 2016 and 2020,see todaytheir economic models falter, especially in thehumanitarian sector. ODA routed through civil society organizations represented 27 billion dollars (more than 22.9 billion euros) globally in 2024, or 12.9% of bilateral ODA – a figure down by 2.3%. Restructurings are multiplying, thealso layoff plans.

But the budget contraction is only one aspect of the problem. NGOsWestern– as I had analyzed in aprevious article– are caught in a triple contestation that makes their repositioning particularly delicate.

In the South, first, where some statesclaim a renewed sovereigntyon aid flows and intervention methods. The ongoing reconfigurations in West Africa, notably in Mali and Burkina Faso, are the most visible illustration of this,but the dynamic is broader. It is accompanied by a word ofincreasingly structuredof local organizations that refuse to be merely subcontractors and carry an epistemic critique of the very categories with which development has been conceived.

In the North, then, through two opposing critics who,although not symmetrical, converging in their effects. On one side, a criticismpopulistwhich contests the very principle of an international solidarity financed by public funds. On the other hand, acritiquedecolonialwhich questions the power relations that perpetuate aid and the forms ofcolonialitythat it conveys. These two critiques, from opposite directions, together contribute to the erosion of the public legitimacy of NGOs. The first, more aggressive, manifests as a direct offensive against the very associative freedoms themselves: several international solidarity NGOs – from SOS Méditerranée to La Cimade, including France Terre d’Asile –were subject to obstacles, threats of withdrawal of subsidies or attempts to exclude from public contracts, in the name of an alleged breach ofpolitical neutrality.

Inside the organizations themselves, finally, where employees challenge an inequality that has become difficult to justify: the one that separates, within the same organization, staff recruited locally in thecountry officesfrom the Souths and their counterparts in Western headquarters – in terms of salaries, career prospects, but also recognition of knowledge and experience. Since the Black Lives Matter movement in 2020 and several public scandals, there has also been a voice raised by racialized staff within the Western headquarters themselves on organizational cultures and dominant representations. This has been documented notably by the reports of Peace Direct (“Time to decolonise aid”) and thework of the British International Development Committee, this internal double critique now constitutes one of the most structured — and the most difficult to absorb — challenges faced by thesector has been confronted.

What the private sector will not be able to do

In this context, part of the institutional discourse has taken refuge in a promise: that of the private sector asnew engine of development financing. Philanthropy,blended finance, impact obligations, public-private partnerships. The underlying idea is that a hybrid financial architecture could offset the gradual withdrawal of public funding.

One thing, however, must be said clearly: the private sector will not replace ODA in volume. This is not a political hypothesis, it is an arithmetical reality.

The 32 major philanthropic foundationswho report their data to the OECDmobilized 11.7 billion dollars in 2023, or about 5% of the total ODA from DAC countries. Funds mobilized by the private sectorviaMixed financing mechanisms, although growing, are mainly concentrated on areas where an economic model is viable—that is, not on contexts of extreme fragility nor on global public goods, which remain entirely dependent on public solidarity.

Above all, these instruments operate atransformation of grammaraid. They gradually replace a logic of return on investment with a logic of rights or general interest, steer priorities towards solvable contexts, and shift the center of gravity of the decision towards actors whose goals are not (always) those of solidarity.

Towards a deterioration or a rebuilding of the sector?

What are the prospects? Three trajectories, which can be combined, seem conceivable today for the aid system.

The first is that of adegraded continuityÂ: The current model persists, on life support, more fragmented and increasingly dependent on geopolitically oriented private funding. Western NGOs survive there, but at the cost of a gradual reduction in their transformative capacity. This is, in the short term, the most likely scenario.

The second is that of ageopolitical restructuringalready partially committed. Aid flows from non-DAC countries reporting their data to the OECD rose from $1.1 billion in 2000 to $17.7 billion in 2022 – a sixteen-fold increase over two decades. China has committed $4 billion (€3.4 billion) to its South-South Cooperation Fund since 2015. South-South cooperation does not replace Western ODA in volume, but it is gradually building an alternative architecture, based on different assumed norms – non-conditionality, reciprocity, non-interference – which directly compete with those of the Western model.

The third, more demanding, would be that of apluriversal refoundationA: the emergence of a new framework of legitimization, based on the recognition of situated knowledge, the co-construction of responses, and the questioning of historical power asymmetries. It requires, on the part of Western NGOs, the ability to break free from certain certainties—certainties that their own teams, especially in intervention areas, are already questioning. It also requires public actors capable of reinvesting in a political, and not only technical, conception of international solidarity.

It is only under this condition that one can speak, not of apost-ODA worldsuffered, but from a truly reorganized cooperation system. The question, fundamentally, is no longer whether the current model can be saved in its form. It is whether, collectively, the organizations ofinternational solidarity – in the broad sense – are capable of thinking about it and building another one.

Vincent Pradier Goeting does not work for, does not advise, does not hold shares, does not receive funds from an organization that could benefit from this article, and has declared no other affiliation than his research institution.

–ref. International cooperation in crisis? Behind the budget cuts, a crisis of legitimacy –https://theconversation.com/international-cooperation-in-crisis-behind-the-budget-cuts-a-crisis-of-legitimacy-280948