AM Edition: Top 10 Law and Security Articles on LiveNews.co.nz for April 21, 2026: AM – Full Text

Source: French to English Tester   Published on: 2026-04-20

Source: The Conversation – in French– By Hugo Spring-Ragain, PhD student in economics / mathematical economics, Center for Diplomatic and Strategic Studies (CEDS)

Artificial intelligence does not so much destroy jobs as it profoundly changes the skills required to perform them. From this confusion between jobs and skills, errors may arise in policies supporting ongoing transformations.

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Each major technological wave has produced its share of contradictory predictions about employment. Artificial intelligence (AI) is no exception. But before knowing how many jobs AI will create or destroy, we need to agree on what it actually automates. The answer requires distinguishing three notions that public debate regularly confuses: employment, skill, and task.

The great waves of automation have followed a remarkably stable logic over two centuries: steam, electricity, and industrial robotics have displaced repetitive physical tasks and spared non-routine cognitive work. This empirical regularity has beenformalized by Autor, Levy, and Murnanesince 2003 under the name “task polarization hypothesis.”

A persistent illusion

Automation erodes intermediate jobs, those of skilled blue-collar workers and office employees performing routine tasks, but spares the two extremes. On one hand, non-routine manual tasks, such as plumbing or caregiving, on the other, non-routine cognitive tasks, such as analysis, consulting, or expert writing. The latter constituted the core of skilled tertiary professions, and the conviction was firmly established that they would remain out of reach.

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Also to read:
Why AI is forcing companies to rethink the value of work

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This conviction was based on a conceptual confusion that must be cleared up first and foremost. It was not the job of a lawyer or financial analyst that was protected, but a set of specific tasks that made up this job and which had until now resisted automation. The distinction between these three levels is fundamental.

A job designates a position held within an organization, with a contract, a salary, and a job description. A skill is a cognitive or technical ability that can be applied in various professional contexts. A task is a specific, definable action, for which it is possible to assess whether or not it can be automated at a given cost. It is at this third level that the ongoing transformation truly takes place, and it is precisely this level that the public debate ignores.

Rupture in the long history of industrial capitalism

Generative AI represents a breakthrough in this long history. For the first time since industrialization, qualified cognitive tasks such as writing, document analysis, synthesis, and production of first drafts are directly exposed.Eloundou, Manning, Mishkin and Rockestimate that about 80% of the active U.S. workforce could see at least 10% of their tasks affected by large language models, and that this exposure increases with salary level. This is the exact opposite pattern observed in all previous waves.

The analytical framework developed byAcemoglu and Restrepoallows to go further. Their model distinguishes two opposing effects produced by any wave of automation:

• The displacement effect, first: workers lose tasks to the benefit of the machine, which mechanically reduces the demand for labor and weighs on the wages of the affected groups;

• The reintegration effect, then: automation produces new tasks where human value is decisive, generating compensatory demand.

The long history of industrial capitalism can be read as a succession of these two effects, the second generally ending up compensating for the first.

The case of translation allows us to see very concretely how displacement and reintegration combine. Generative AI can produce a first draft in another language in a few seconds, which shifts part of the work previously done by human translators to the machine. But this automation simultaneously reintegrates other tasks or enhances their importance, such as checking for misunderstandings, adapting to the cultural context, harmonizing terminology, quality control, and final validation.

Potential imbalance

What is worrying with generative AI is the potential imbalance between these two dynamics. The shift is happening at a speed that labor markets and training institutions struggle to absorb, while reintegration still largely remains to be built.

However, the most important phenomenon is not sectoral, but it is internal to the professions themselves. In its“Employment Outlook”, the OECDhighlights that the professions most exposed to generative AI are precisely those with a high cognitive density: finance, law, consulting, higher education. Unlike previous waves that affected rural areas and industrial regions, the exposure is now stronger in large metropolitan areas and among highly skilled workers, an unprecedented geographical and social reversal.

Redistribute tasks

This reversal concretely takes place at the level of the task.

In the same position of financial analyst or legal advisor, some tasks are shifting to AI (producing an executive summary, generating an initial contract analysis, synthesizing a literature review), while others are mechanically gaining value: defining the relevant analytical framework, assessing the quality of automated reasoning, detecting factual errors in an output, assuming legal or ethical responsibility for a decision. These are not jobs that disappear. They are bundles of tasks that are redistributed between humans and machines, transforming from within what an employer expects from a qualified employee.

This redistribution of tasks has a direct impact on the skills that will truly be valued in the coming years, and it overturns some of the usual assumptions about professional training.

Train workers to use AI instrumentally, to master a tool, to writepromptsEffective, mastering an interface is useful in the short term, but it is insufficient if the skill truly required tomorrow is not to produce with AI, but to supervise and critique what it produces.

A training challenge

However, effectively supervising an AI output requires exactly what short and technical trainings struggle to develop: a solid general knowledge that allows detecting a fundamental error, an argumentative ability to evaluate the coherence of a reasoning, a knowledge of cognitive biases to identify the blind spots of an automated analysis. These are skills thateducational sciences group under the term metacompetencesTo learn to learn, to exercise critical judgment, to mobilize knowledge in unprecedented situations.

The paradox then becomes the following. As AI automates routine knowledge tasks, it precisely values what generalist training and humanities courses have long cultivated and what debates on employability have tended to disregard in favor of more immediately measurable technical skills.

Not out of nostalgia for the humanities, but out of pure economic logic. If the machine produces the text, the analysis and the synthesis, the marginal value of the human lies in their ability to judge whether this text is true, whether this analysis is relevant in light of the real context, whether this synthesis serves the pursued objective.

Hugo Spring-Ragain does not work for, advise, own shares in, or receive funds from any organization that could benefit from this article, and has declared no other affiliations than his research institution.

–ref. Generative AI, the first cognitive revolution in the history of work –https://theconversation.com/lia-generative-premiere-revolution-cognitive-de-lhistoire-du-travail-279911

Source: French to English Tester   Published on: 2026-04-20

Source: The Conversation – in French– By Fabrice Lollia, Doctor in information and communication sciences, associate researcher at the DICEN Ile de France laboratory, Gustave Eiffel University

The “StravaLeaks” case shows that, in a world saturated with connected objects and location data, ordinary digital traces have become a central security issue for sensitive environments. Simple movement data from a jog, recorded and shared by a public application, were able to be used to locate ships or military bases.

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A jog, apparently, has nothing sensitive. Yet, in March 2026, an activity recorded on Strava by a French soldier made it possible to locate in near real time theaircraft carrierCharles de Gaullein the Eastern Mediterranean. Since 2018, theStrava global heatmapA – an aggregated visualization of public activities recorded by its users – had already revealed somemilitary bases and sensitive sites, and more recent investigations have shown that the sporting practices of bodyguards can reveal movement habits ofHeads of State.

The problem does not stem from sophisticated hacking, but from the ordinary use of a connected watch, a public account, and GPS tracking accessible online. This case illustrates how today’s security no longer limits itself to physical protection but also includes controlling the digital traces produced by our most ordinary behaviors.

When an application goes beyond its initial use

Strava is an application designed to track and share sports performances. Its primary use concerns leisure, digital sociability, and self-monitoring, not the documentation of sensitive activities. Yet this is where the ambivalence of this type of tool lies because, although not designed with security in mind, they can have very concrete effects on it.

As tracking technologies become part of daily use, they cease to appear as control devices. They become familiar tools, associated with comfort or the optimization of practices. From then on, a race, a repeated route, a starting or ending point, or an activity recorded at sea can reveal much more than just a sporting practice. A performance data point can become an indication of a routine, a presence, or a travel habit.

The Strava case is not isolated, moreover.At Heathrow Airport(London), in 2014, connected toilets were tested to anonymously measure their usage, improve cleaning, and better allocate maintenance resources. The example may seem remote, but it shows that, beyond explicitly security-related tools, connected devices also discreetly collectdigital traceson user behavior. In this sense, vulnerability no longer arises solely from an attack or a voluntary leak, but alsoof ordinary uses whose visibility effects are often underestimated.

Security is no longer determined only on the field

For a long time, security was thought of according to an essentially physical model. It was necessary to protect a person, secure a movement, control a perimeter, anticipate a threat. This logic is still relevant but, in the digital age, it is no longer sufficient.

In an environment saturated with connected objects, platforms, and location data, vulnerability can now arise at the periphery of the protection system. It no longer necessarily results from an intrusion or malicious action. It can come from a poorly configured use, an unexamined digital routine, or a tool used without awareness of its visibility effects.

The security of a political leader, a business executive, a diplomat, or a sensitive site therefore also depends on the digital traces produced by their human and technical environment: assistants, drivers, escorts, collaborators, military personnel, connected objects, tracking applications, or sharing networks. Protecting a “sensitive person,” a personality, today is no longer just about protecting their body or their itinerary. It is also about protecting the informational ecosystem that surrounds them.

This evolution reflects security increasingly reinforced by technologyviathe sensors, the data, and the monitoring tools. But the addition of technology does not eliminate vulnerability. That is precisely the problem of atechnosolutionist readingwhich overestimates human-machine complementarity. On the contrary, it reminds us that technology is only effective when it is combined with human analysis, field experience, and a deep understanding of the context. Certainly, technology therefore enhances vigilance, but it does not replace judgment, training, or a culture of risk.

The observed vulnerability is also organizational, cultural, and human. It arises from a form of mismatch between the banality of digital practices (running with a connected watch, for example) and the sensitivity of the environments in which they take place (being in a classified secret-defense location). The same tool can be perceived as a comfort or performance device while producing significant exposure effects.

Training thus becomes as important as equipping because it is not just about forbidding certain uses, but rather about making people understand how a digital trace, by definition invisible, can, through aggregation and cross-referencing, become sensitive information. Security is therefore no longer about controlling tools, but about the intelligence of practices.

Reintegrate the human at the center of security doctrine

One of the main lessons from these cases is that no technology protects on its own. An app, a connected watch, or a geolocation device are neither good nor bad in themselves.As research shows, it all depends on the context in which they are used, the rules that surround them, and the ability of the actors to understand their effects. This is why the response cannot be purely “technical”.

It also requires a usage doctrine, appropriate training, and a shared safety culture. Conversely, traceability can also enhance protection, but it does not replace human analysis, context assessment, or traditional safety methods.

In other words, the security of sensitive environments relies on a complementarity between the tool and the human. It is not enough to deploy devices; users must also understand what they produce, what they expose, and the possible consequences of their uses between potential surveillance and asurveillance, that is to say a more discreet form of capturing traces integrated into ordinary gestures and sometimes barely perceived by those who participate in them.

In the Strava case, the issue is therefore not just about better configuring an application. It is about building a culture of digital risk, capable of integrating the most ordinary actions into security considerations.

What research teaches us in connection with these cases is that the real lesson of these affairs may be here: in a connected world, the threat does not only lie in what one tries to hide, but also in what one produces without thinking.

These so-called “StravaLeaks” cases show that digital traceability, far from being a mere convenience of use, can become a security issue when it is part of a sensitive environment. Protecting today is no longer just about locking down a perimeter or escorting a personality. It is also about learning to manage the traces produced by the most ordinary uses.

Fabrice Lollia does not work for, advise, hold shares in, or receive funds from any organization that could benefit from this article, and has declared no other affiliation than his research institution.

–ref. « StravaLeaks »: when digital traces become a security issue –https://theconversation.com/stravaleaks-when-digital-traces-become-a-security-issue-279942

Source: French to English Tester   Published on: 2026-04-20

Source: The Conversation – in French– By Vincent Pradier Goeting, Doctor in management sciences, University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne

In 2025, official development assistance experienced its sharpest contraction ever recorded. But reducing the current situation to a matter of budget volumes would miss the essential point. What international cooperation is going through is above all a political and paradigmatic crisis – a multidimensional crisis that, revealingly, affects Western NGOs first and foremost today.

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The figures published by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)In April 2026 are of rare brutality. Official development assistance (ODA) from member countries of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) fell in 2025 by 23.1% in real terms, the sharpest annual contraction ever recorded since the indicator’s creation in 1969. Volumes have returned to their 2015 level, thus wiping out ten years of progress and, with them, part of the commitments made at the time of the adoption ofthe 2030 Agenda. According to the OECD itself, a new drop of nearly 6% is anticipated for 2026.

This historic drop is largely attributable to a single political decision:dismantling of the United States Agency for International Development(USAID), engaged as early as January 2025 by the second Trump administration. According to the OECD,US ODA was cut by more than half in one year (-56.9%), which constitutes the largest reduction ever recorded by a donor country. This American decision alone accounts for three-quarters of the global decrease in ODA in 2025. It has, in turn, accelerated the downward adjustments already initiated by other major donors – Germany, United Kingdom, Japan, and France. For the first time since 1995,These four countries simultaneously reduced their ODA for two consecutive years.

France is thus participating in this movement. After a reduction of 11% in 2023 and an additional cut of 13% in 2024, the French budget allocated to international solidarity has been subject, since the beginning of 2024, to five consecutive cuts. According to theestimations of Coordination SUD, the national platform of French NGOs, French ODA could be reduced by 58% in two years – and up to 64% for the budget lines of the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs that directly fund NGOs. The goal of reaching 0.7% of gross national income in 2025, set out in theAugust 2021 law, by default of being officially abandoned, seems to become a distant horizon.

A crisis that is not only financial

It would be tempting, faced with this data, to conclude a “funding crisis” in international cooperation. However, such analysis would be insufficient. What strikes one, as one observes the succession of cuts, is the regularity with which they are politically decided, and the weakness of the resistance they encounter in the public sphere — including when, as is the case in France,66% of the population declares support for international solidarity action.

This paradox – apopular support for the very principle of solidarity, but a growing rejection of the organizations that embody it – deserves to be taken seriously. It is partly due to themanagerializationand to thebureaucratizationprogressives of a distant sector, as it became professionalized, from the militant anchorage from which it historically drew its legitimacy. It especially opens the way for what Félicien Fauryappointeda form ofnegative politicization– the one that fuels populist rhetoric by portraying NGOs as technocratic, disconnected actors, or even accomplices of a system they were supposed to be the watchdogs of.

In other words, it is not the budgetary decision itself that is in question. It is itspolitical feasibility. For decades, ODA has simultaneously fulfilledthree functionsA: a humanitarian and development role undertaken; a geopolitical role, discreet but real; and a function of democratic legitimization for donor states, particularly in the Western space. These three functions are today particularlyput in difficulty. In a growing number of countries, international solidarity is no longer seen as a valuable political good – it has become, in certain segments of the public debate, an argumentagainstthe governments that practice it.

The crisis is therefore primarily that of aframework of legitimization. It primarily affects Western NGOs, whose organizational model ishistorically backed by this framework.

NGOs caught in triple contestation

French international solidarity NGOs, whose combined resourceshad experienceda growth of 43% between 2016 and 2020,see todaytheir economic models falter, especially in thehumanitarian sector. ODA routed through civil society organizations represented 27 billion dollars (more than 22.9 billion euros) globally in 2024, or 12.9% of bilateral ODA – a figure down by 2.3%. Restructurings are multiplying, thealso layoff plans.

But the budget contraction is only one aspect of the problem. NGOsWestern– as I had analyzed in aprevious article– are caught in a triple contestation that makes their repositioning particularly delicate.

In the South, first, where some statesclaim a renewed sovereigntyon aid flows and intervention methods. The ongoing reconfigurations in West Africa, notably in Mali and Burkina Faso, are the most visible illustration of this,but the dynamic is broader. It is accompanied by a word ofincreasingly structuredof local organizations that refuse to be merely subcontractors and carry an epistemic critique of the very categories with which development has been conceived.

In the North, then, through two opposing critics who,although not symmetrical, converging in their effects. On one side, a criticismpopulistwhich contests the very principle of an international solidarity financed by public funds. On the other hand, acritiquedecolonialwhich questions the power relations that perpetuate aid and the forms ofcolonialitythat it conveys. These two critiques, from opposite directions, together contribute to the erosion of the public legitimacy of NGOs. The first, more aggressive, manifests as a direct offensive against the very associative freedoms themselves: several international solidarity NGOs – from SOS Méditerranée to La Cimade, including France Terre d’Asile –were subject to obstacles, threats of withdrawal of subsidies or attempts to exclude from public contracts, in the name of an alleged breach ofpolitical neutrality.

Inside the organizations themselves, finally, where employees challenge an inequality that has become difficult to justify: the one that separates, within the same organization, staff recruited locally in thecountry officesfrom the Souths and their counterparts in Western headquarters – in terms of salaries, career prospects, but also recognition of knowledge and experience. Since the Black Lives Matter movement in 2020 and several public scandals, there has also been a voice raised by racialized staff within the Western headquarters themselves on organizational cultures and dominant representations. This has been documented notably by the reports of Peace Direct (“Time to decolonise aid”) and thework of the British International Development Committee, this internal double critique now constitutes one of the most structured — and the most difficult to absorb — challenges faced by thesector has been confronted.

What the private sector will not be able to do

In this context, part of the institutional discourse has taken refuge in a promise: that of the private sector asnew engine of development financing. Philanthropy,blended finance, impact obligations, public-private partnerships. The underlying idea is that a hybrid financial architecture could offset the gradual withdrawal of public funding.

One thing, however, must be said clearly: the private sector will not replace ODA in volume. This is not a political hypothesis, it is an arithmetical reality.

The 32 major philanthropic foundationswho report their data to the OECDmobilized 11.7 billion dollars in 2023, or about 5% of the total ODA from DAC countries. Funds mobilized by the private sectorviaMixed financing mechanisms, although growing, are mainly concentrated on areas where an economic model is viable—that is, not on contexts of extreme fragility nor on global public goods, which remain entirely dependent on public solidarity.

Above all, these instruments operate atransformation of grammaraid. They gradually replace a logic of return on investment with a logic of rights or general interest, steer priorities towards solvable contexts, and shift the center of gravity of the decision towards actors whose goals are not (always) those of solidarity.

Towards a deterioration or a rebuilding of the sector?

What are the prospects? Three trajectories, which can be combined, seem conceivable today for the aid system.

The first is that of adegraded continuityÂ: The current model persists, on life support, more fragmented and increasingly dependent on geopolitically oriented private funding. Western NGOs survive there, but at the cost of a gradual reduction in their transformative capacity. This is, in the short term, the most likely scenario.

The second is that of ageopolitical restructuringalready partially committed. Aid flows from non-DAC countries reporting their data to the OECD rose from $1.1 billion in 2000 to $17.7 billion in 2022 – a sixteen-fold increase over two decades. China has committed $4 billion (€3.4 billion) to its South-South Cooperation Fund since 2015. South-South cooperation does not replace Western ODA in volume, but it is gradually building an alternative architecture, based on different assumed norms – non-conditionality, reciprocity, non-interference – which directly compete with those of the Western model.

The third, more demanding, would be that of apluriversal refoundationA: the emergence of a new framework of legitimization, based on the recognition of situated knowledge, the co-construction of responses, and the questioning of historical power asymmetries. It requires, on the part of Western NGOs, the ability to break free from certain certainties—certainties that their own teams, especially in intervention areas, are already questioning. It also requires public actors capable of reinvesting in a political, and not only technical, conception of international solidarity.

It is only under this condition that one can speak, not of apost-ODA worldsuffered, but from a truly reorganized cooperation system. The question, fundamentally, is no longer whether the current model can be saved in its form. It is whether, collectively, the organizations ofinternational solidarity – in the broad sense – are capable of thinking about it and building another one.

Vincent Pradier Goeting does not work for, does not advise, does not hold shares, does not receive funds from an organization that could benefit from this article, and has declared no other affiliation than his research institution.

–ref. International cooperation in crisis? Behind the budget cuts, a crisis of legitimacy –https://theconversation.com/international-cooperation-in-crisis-behind-the-budget-cuts-a-crisis-of-legitimacy-280948

Source: French to English Tester   Published on: 2026-04-20

Source: The Conversation – France (in French)– By Thomas Blonski, Assistant Professor in Strategy and Entrepreneurship, ICN Business School

Long considered an investment or a branding tool, art now occupies a more strategic place within companies. From collecting to residency, the artist is gradually becoming a full organizational partner. This is how a new collaborative economy is taking shape.

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At the turn of the 2000s, many Western companies began buying works of art. Tax incentives, image improvement, asset diversification: “art as an investment” seemed natural. Twenty years later, a more discreet evolution is underway. Companies no longer invest only in works, but also in artists.

From aSurvey based on 23 interviewsconducted with leaders, artists, and intermediaries (galleries, specialized organizations), we sought to understand this gradual shift: how does one move from purchasing a work to organizing an artist residency, and then to creativity training programs?

From the work to the partnership

The sponsorship laws adopted at the beginning of the 21st century^eThe century played a triggering role. In France, it is theAillagon law of 2003, with equivalents atUnited Kingdom(2000), inGermany(2000), but also inItaly(2000) and other European countries. The tax benefits encouraged companies that had no direct connection with the art world to build collections, support exhibitions, or finance institutions.

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Also to read:
Contemporary art, a language and a method for thinking about an improbable future

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In this context, artistic investment is conceived according to a dual logic. On one hand, it is an asset: some studies show that art can serve as a tool for asset diversification for a company, even if some researchers, such asMandelas well asLindenberg and Oosterlinck, show that returns are uncertain and difficult to anticipate. On the other hand, the work produces a symbolic effect, as it strengthens the brand image, signals a cultural commitment, and positions the company in a universe of prestige.

But very quickly, a realization becomes clear to the leaders interviewed: buying a work and hanging it in an entrance hall is not enough. “Level zero is putting a work on the wall,” sums up an intermediary. “If we do that, we might as well go further.”

A logic of “while we’re at it”

This “might as well go further” is at the heart of the observed dynamic. We have called it the logic of “while we’re at it” (might as well). Since the company invests in art, it might as well exploit all its potential opportunistically.

After its initial investment in sponsorship, the company indeed discovers that it now has access to a network: artists, gallery owners, exhibition curators, collectors. The relationships formed around the purchase of an artwork open up other possibilities. Why not create a contemporary art prize? Why not organize an artist residency within the headquarters?

Beyond heritage

This is how they multiply, including in sectors far removed from the cultural world, such as, for example,the automobile,real estate,or even wines and spirits), business awards, partnerships with museum institutions, or residency programs.

The objective is no longer solely patrimonial. It becomes relational and symbolic: gaining legitimacy in the “art worlds,” according to the sociologist’s expressionHoward Becker, and strengthen the brand’s cultural credibility.

Art as an organizational experience

A second shift then takes place. In contact with the artists, companies discover something other than artworks: ways of working. Residencies, initially designed as image or sponsorship operations, become spaces of interaction between artists and employees. Workshops are organized, collaborative projects are born. Teams are confronted with uncertainty, experimentation, with forms of creation that escape managerial routines.

Some leaders explicitly describe this shift. The artist is no longer just the one who produces a work, but the one who can convey an approach to work, creativity, or problem-solving.

At this stage, new forms of intermediation are emerging. To the traditional galleries are added hybrid structures, for exampleMona Lisa FactorywhereViarte, capable of translating artistic language into organizational objectives, such as creativity, team cohesion, or innovation. The initial investment in art then transforms into an organizational investment in the artist.

From buyer to actor

What this trajectory reveals is a sequence of rationalities. Initially, the logic is primarily financial: benefiting from a favorable tax framework and, possibly, from an asset appreciation. Very quickly, a symbolic rationality is added, since art confers prestige, distinction, a form of symbolic capital. Finally, an organizational rationality emerges: the aesthetic experience is converted into collective learning, managerial resource, and an internal transformation tool.

This process is neither linear nor planned from the outset. It is progressive and cumulative. Each step paves the way for the next. Because the company bought a work, it met an artist; because it met an artist, it imagined a residency; because it organized a residency, it considered a training program.

Build reputation

This evolution is not neutral for artists. Receiving a corporate award, undertaking a residency, or participating in a training program adds an additional line to a résumé. Companies thus become full-fledged actors in artistic trajectories, alongside galleries, museums, and public institutions.

They contribute to the construction of reputation and the circulation of artists. In some cases, contractual collaborations with companies are even perceived as more transparent and more financially secure than certain relationships within the art world.

Less an achievement, the “art as investment” appears as an entry point into this universe. What begins as an asset purchase is transformed, through successive adjustments, into an organizational partnership.

A new collaborative economy

This dynamic contributes to the emergence of a specific collaborative economy, linking artists, companies, and specialized intermediaries. It blurs the traditional boundaries between patronage, the art market, and management.

One question remains open: how far can this logic go? By constantly integrating the artist into the organization, does the risk of reducing art to a mere managerial tool really exist? Or, conversely, do these collaborations genuinely help to redefine the relationships between creation and business?

Far from the image of simple instrumentalization, this research shows that the relationship between companies and artists has become denser, more reflective, and more structuring than it was at the beginning of the 2000s. The artwork is no longer just hung on the wall. It opens the door to another way of thinking about the organization.

The authors do not work for, do not advise, do not hold shares, do not receive funds from any organization that could benefit from this article, and have declared no other affiliation than their research institution.

–ref. Investing in art… then in artists: the new collaborations of companies –https://theconversation.com/investing-in-art-then-in-artists-the-new-collaborations-of-companies-277303