Category: MIL-OSI

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Donald Heflin, Executive Director of the Edward R. Murrow Center and Senior Fellow of Diplomatic Practice, The Fletcher School, Tufts University

After the largest buildup of U.S. warships and aircraft in the Middle East in decades, American and Israeli military forces launched a massive assault on Iran on Feb. 28, 2026.

President Donald Trump has called the attacks “major combat operations” and has urged regime change in Tehran. Iranian media reported Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was killed in the strikes.

To better understand what this means for the U.S. and Iran, Alfonso Serrano, a U.S. politics editor at The Conversation, interviewed Donald Heflin, a veteran diplomat who now teaches at Tufts University’s Fletcher School.

Widespread attacks have been reported across Iran, following weeks of U.S. military buildup in the region. What does the scale of the attacks tell you?

I think that Trump and his administration are going for regime change with these massive strikes and with all the ships and some troops in the area. I think there will probably be a couple more days’ worth of strikes. They’ll start off with the time-honored strategy of attacking what’s known as command and control, the nerve centers for controlling Iran’s military. From media reporting, we already know that the residence of Khamenei was attacked.

What is the U.S. strategic end game here?

Regime change is going to be difficult. We heard Trump today call for the Iranian people to bring the government down. In the first place, that’s difficult. It’s hard for people with no arms in their hands to bring down a very tightly controlled regime that has a lot of arms.

The second point is that U.S. history in that area of the world is not good with this. You may recall that during the Gulf War of 1990-1991, the U.S. basically encouraged the Iraqi people to rise up, and then made its own decision not to attack Baghdad, to stop short. And that has not been forgotten in Iraq or surrounding countries. I would be surprised if we saw a popular uprising in Iran that really had a chance of bringing the regime down.

Do you see the possibility of U.S. troops on the ground to bring about regime change?

I will stick my neck out here and say that’s not going to happen. I mean, there may be some small special forces sent in. That’ll be kept quiet for a while. But as far as large numbers of U.S. troops, no, I don’t think it’s going to happen.

Two reasons. First off, any president would feel that was extremely risky. Iran’s a big country with a big military. The risks you would be taking are large amounts of casualties, and you may not succeed in what you’re trying to do.

But Trump, in particular, despite the military strike against Iran and the one against Venezuela, is not a big fan of big military interventions and war. He’s a guy who will send in fighter planes and small special forces units, but not 10,000 or 20,000 troops.

And the reason for that is, throughout his career, he does well with a little bit of chaos. He doesn’t mind creating a little bit of chaos and figuring out a way to make a profit on the other side of that. War is too much chaos. It’s really hard to predict what the outcome is going to be, what all the ramifications are going to be. Throughout his first term and the first year of his second term, he has shown no inclination to send ground troops anywhere.

Speaking of President Trump, what are the risks he faces?

One risk is going on right now, which is that the Iranians may get lucky or smart and manage to attack a really good target and kill a lot of people, like something in Jerusalem or Tel Aviv or a U.S. military base.

The second risk is that the attacks don’t work, that the supreme leader and whoever else is considered the political leadership of Iran survives, and the U.S. winds up with egg on its face.

The third risk is that it works to a certain extent. You take out the top people, but then who steps into their shoes? I mean, go back and look at Venezuela. Most people would have thought that who was going to wind up winning at the end of that was the head of the opposition. But it wound up being the vice president of the old regime, Delcy Rodríguez.

I can see a similar scenario in Iran. The regime has enough depth to survive the death of several of its leaders. The thing to watch will be who winds up in the top jobs, hardliners or realists. But the only institution in Iran strong enough to succeed them is the army, the Revolutionary Guards in particular. Would that be an improvement for the U.S.? It depends on what their attitude was. The same attitude that the vice president of Venezuela has been taking, which is, “Look, this is a fact of life. We better negotiate with the Americans and figure out some way forward we can both live with.”

But these guys are pretty hardcore revolutionaries. I mean, Iran has been under revolutionary leadership for 47 years. All these guys are true believers. I don’t know if we’ll be able to work with them.

Any last thoughts?

I think the timing is interesting. If you go back to last year, Trump, after being in office a little and watching the situation between Israel and Gaza, was given an opening, when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu attacked Qatar.

A lot of conservative Mideast regimes, who didn’t have a huge problem with Israel, essentially said “That’s going too far.” And Trump was able to use that as an excuse. He was able to essentially say, “Okay, you’ve gone too far. You’re really taking risk with world peace. Everybody’s gonna sit at the table.”

I think the same thing’s happening here. I believe many countries would love to see regime change in Iran. But you can’t go into the country and say, “We don’t like the political leadership being elected. We’re going to get rid of them for you.” What often happens in that situation is people begin to rally around the flag. They begin to rally around the government when the bombs start falling.

But in the last few months, we’ve seen a huge human rights crackdown in Iran. We may never know the number of people the Iranian regime killed in the last few months, but 10,000 to 15,000 protesters seems a minimum.

That’s the excuse Trump can use. You can sell it to the Iranian people and say, “Look, they’re killing you in the streets. Forget about your problems with Israel and the U.S. and everything. They’re real, but you’re getting killed in the streets, and that’s why we’re intervening.” It’s a bit of a fig leaf.

Now, as I said earlier, the problem with this is if your next line is, “You know, we’re going to really soften this regime up with bombs; now it’s your time to go out in the streets and bring the regime down.” I may eat these words, but I don’t think that’s going to happen. The regime is just too strong for it to be brought down by bare hands.

This article was updated on Feb 28, 2026, to include confirmation of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s death.

Donald Heflin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Despite massive US attack and death of Ayatollah, regime change in Iran is unlikely – https://theconversation.com/despite-massive-us-attack-and-death-of-ayatollah-regime-change-in-iran-is-unlikely-277180

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Andrew Thomas, Lecturer in Middle East Studies, Deakin University

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader for 36 years, has been killed in US and Israeli airstrikes on his country, Iranian state media reported.

As one of Iran’s longest-serving leaders, Khamenei was almost as ubiquitous in Iranian society as his predecessor, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who founded the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979.

And despite the fact Khomeini authored the Iranian Revolution, some say Khamenei was actually the most powerful leader modern Iran has had.

In more than three decades as supreme leader, Khamenei amassed unprecedented power over domestic politics and cracked down ever more harshly on internal dissent. In recent years, he prioritised his survival – and that of his regime – above all else. His government brutally put down a popular uprising in December 2025–January 2026 that killed thousands.

Ultimately, though, Khamenei will not be remembered by most Iranians as a strong leader. Nor will he be revered. Instead, his legacy will be the profound weakness his regime brought the Islamic Republic on all fronts.

Khamenei’s rise through the ranks

Khamenei was born in the city of Marshad in northeastern Iran in 1939. As a boy, he began to form his political and religious world view by studying at Islamic seminaries in Najaf and Qom. At 13, he started to embrace ideas relating to revolutionary Islam. These included the teachings of cleric Navab Safavi, who often called for political violence against the rule of the shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

Khamenei met Khomeini in 1958 and immediately embraced his philosophy, often referred to as “Khomeinism”.

This world view was informed by anti-colonial sentiment, Shia Islam and elements of social engineering through state planning, particularly when it came to preserving a “just” Islamic society. Khomeinism stipulates that a system of earthly laws alone cannot create a just society – Iran must draw its legitimacy from “God Almighty”.

The concept of velayat-e faqih, also known as guardianship of the jurist, is central to Khomeinism. It dictates that the supreme leader should be endowed with “all the authorities that the Prophet and infallible Imams were entitled”.

Essentially, this means Iran was to be ruled by a single scholar of Shia Islam. This is where Khomeini, and later Khamenei, would draw their sweeping power and control.

From 1962, Khamenei began almost two decades of revolutionary activity against Pahlavi (the shah) on behalf of Khomeini, who was exiled in 1964. Khamenei was arrested by the shah’s secret police in 1971 and tortured, according to his memoirs.

When the shah was overthrown in the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Khomeini returned from exile to become the new supreme leader.

Khamenei was selected to join the Revolutionary Council, which ruled alongside the provisional government. He then became deputy defence minister and assisted in organising the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). This military institution – initially created to protect the revolution and supreme leader – would become one of the most powerful political forces in Iran.

After surviving an assassination attempt in 1981, Khamenei was elected president of Iran in 1982 and again in 1985. He held the presidency during the majority of the Iran–Iraq war – a conflict that devastated both countries in both human and economic cost.

Although subordinate to the supreme leader, Khamenei wielded significant power compared to later presidents, given the revolution was still very young and the Iraq war posed a great threat to the regime. But he remained in lock-step with Khomeini’s wishes. He also managed to build a close relationship with the IRGC that would go far beyond his presidency.

A surprising choice for supreme leader

Khomeini died in June 1989 after a period of deteriorating health, with no clear successor.

Khomeini had initially supported Grand Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri to be his successor. However, Montazeri had become increasingly critical of the supreme leader’s authority and human rights violations in the country. He resigned in 1988 and was put under house arrest until his death in 2009.

Khamenei had the political credentials to lead. He was also a steadfast support of Khomeinism. However, he was seen a surprising choice for supreme leader when he was elected by the Assembly of Experts, a group of Islamic clerics.

In fact, his appointment sparked a significant amount of controversy and criticism. Some Islamic scholars believed he lacked the clerical rank of grand ayatollah, which was required under the constitution to ascend to the position. These critics believed the Iranian people would not respect the word of “a mere human being” without a proper connection to God.

A referendum was held in July 1989 to change the constitution to allow for a supreme leader who has shown “Islamic scholarship”. It passed overwhelmingly and Khamenei became an ayatollah.

Khamenei’s position had been consolidated on paper, but despite being president since 1982, he did not enjoy the same popularity as Khomeini within both the clerical elite and general public.

The constitutional amendments, however, had given Khamenei significantly more power to intervene in political affairs. In fact, he had far more power as supreme leader than Khomeini ever enjoyed.

This included the ability to determine general policies, appoint and dismiss members of the Council of Guardians, and order public referendums. He also had enough power to silence dissent with relative ease.

Consolidating power over the decades

Khamenei worked with his presidents to varying degrees, though he exercised his power to undermine legislation when he disagreed with it.

For example, he largely backed the economic agenda of President Hashemi Rafsanjani (who served from 1989 to 1997), but he often stood in the way of Mohammad Khatami (1997–2005) and Hassan Rouhani (2013–21). Both had attempted to reform Iran’s political system and foster a better relationship with the West.

Khamenei’s most famous intervention in domestic politics occurred after the first term of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005–13). After Ahmadinejad claimed victory in the disputed 2009 presidential election, thousands of Iranians took to the streets in one of the largest protest movements since the revolution. Khamenei backed the election result and cracked down harshly on the protesters. Dozens were killed (perhaps more), while thousands were arbitrarily arrested.

Khamenei later clashed with Ahmadinejad and warned him against seeking the presidency again in 2017. Ahmadinejad defied him, but was later barred from running.

After the death of hardline President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash in 2024, Khameini continued his manoeuvring behind the scenes. After the reformist Masoud Pezeshkian won the presidency, Khameini immediately blocked him from negotiating with the United States over sanctions relief and used his influence to thwart his economic reform agenda.

And when protests again broke out at the end of 2025 over the struggling economy, Khamenei again ordered them to be crushed by any means necessary.

A tarnished legacy

Thanks to the powers vested in him in the constitution, Khamenei also had extraordinary control over Iran’s foreign policy.

Like his mentor, Khomeini, he staunchly supported the regime’s resistance to what it considered “Western imperialism”. He was also a key architect of Iran’s regional proxy strategy, funding militant groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis and others to carry out Iran’s military objectives.

Khamenei had, at times, been amenable to cooperation with the West – namely negotiating with the US over Iran’s nuclear enrichment program.

During the first Trump administration, however, Khamenei returned to a staunchly anti-Western posture. His government railed against Trump’s scuttling of the 2015 nuclear deal, the reimposed economic sanctions on Iran’s energy sector and the assassination of the head of the IRGC’s Quds force, Qassem Soleimani.

After Trump returned to office in 2025, Iran grew even weaker. And Khamenei’s anti-Western posture began to look increasingly hollow. Iran’s defeat in the 12-day war with Israel in 2025 shredded whatever legitimacy his regime had left.

In the months that followed, Khamenei ruled over a population increasingly resentful of the Iranian political system and its leadership. In the 2025–26 protests, some openly chanted for Khamenei’s death.

When Khomenei died in 1989, his state funeral was attended by millions. Mourners pulled him out of his coffin and scrambled for sacred mementos.

Though Khameini served longer, Iranians will likely not show the same grief for him.

Andrew Thomas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei ruled Iran with defiance and brutality for 36 years. For many Iranians, he will not be revered – https://theconversation.com/ayatollah-ali-khamenei-ruled-iran-with-defiance-and-brutality-for-36-years-for-many-iranians-he-will-not-be-revered-259268

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Sarah Schiffling, Deputy Director of the HUMLOG (Humanitarian Logistics and Supply Chain Management Research) Institute, Hanken School of Economics

The reported sinking of several Iranian warships by US missiles in the Gulf of Oman serves as a reminder of the maritime aspect of the conflict which began February 28 with a barrage of Israeli and American missiles targeting Iran. Two other vessels, believed to be tankers, have also been reported as having been hit by missiles, of an as yet undetermined source, in the vicinity of the Strait of Hormuz, underlining the importance of this vital shipping lane – which is likely to play an key part in all sides’ calculations.

Full details have yet to emerge of the incidents. But there are already signs that the strait will become a major focus of concern because of the huge implications should the conflict disrupt maritime traffic through this the narrow outlet of the Persian Gulf. Ships crossing the Strait of Hormuz carry around one-fifth of global oil supplies. That’s about 20 million barrels per day. This makes the strait the most critical energy chokepoint.

There are a small number of strategic passageways, or chokepoints on which global trade depends and which are vulnerable to disruption. Any disruption reverberates instantly through global markets and supply chains. With conflict raging in Iran and attacks across the Middle East, traders, governments and businesses will be watching oil prices closely as the markets open.

After Israel and the US launched attacks on Iran on February 28, prompting retaliatory strikes across the region from Iran, Tehran broadcast to vessels in the region claiming that the Strait of Hormuz was closed.

Although the shipping lanes are only about two miles wide, actually physically closing them would be difficult to achieve. The most decisive action Tehran could take would be to mine the shipping lanes. With the large US naval presence in the area, this would be very difficult for Iran to achieve.

But a formal blockade is not necessary to stop traffic. When perceived threat levels rise, ships stay away. Big shipping companies such as Hapag Lloyd and CMA CGA have already suspended transit through the strait and advised their ships to proceed to shelter.

Vessel tracking already shows reduced movements in the Strait of Hormuz. Ships are waiting to enter or exit the Persian Gulf or diverting away from the region. An advisory from the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) Centre has warned of the “increased risk of miscalculation or misidentification, particularly in proximity to military units”.

Several ports have suspended operations after debris from an intercepted missile sparked a fire at Dubai’s Jebel Ali Port. While other ports continue to operate, the risk and uncertainty are disrupting shipping in the region.

Supply chain disruption

Hormuz is dominated by oil tankers and liquid natural gas carriers, so disruption directly hits global energy supplies. In addition, a lesser-known dependency is that one-third of the world’s fertiliser trade passes through the strait. Both energy and agricultural supply chains have already been destabilised by the Ukraine war. Further price rises could have far-reaching consequences.

The main destinations for oil and gas flowing through Hormuz are China, India, Japan, and South Korea. India, which imports about half of its crude oil through the strait, has activated contingency plans to safeguard energy supplies.

But apart from amassing strategic national stockpiles to weather immediate disruptions, there may be limited alternatives for countries dependent on getting their energy supplies through the strait. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have some pipelines for both oil and gas that can bypass the Hormuz. There is an estimated spare capacity of 2.6 million barrels per day for these pipelines. But that’s a fraction of what is normally shipped through the strait.

Oil and gas are traded globally. So even countries whose energy needs are not met by imports from the Persian Gulf will be affected by price increases. Oil prices are expected to increase to up to US$100 (£74) per barrel when markets open on Monday. Opec has agreed to modestly boost oil output in a bid to stabilise markets. But the group of oil producing countries has limited options as key members are affected by the fallout of the attacks on Iran.

Energy price increases will hit consumers directly when filling up their cars or heating their homes. They also affect companies across a wide range of industries. This has the potential to cause further supply chain disruptions.

Supply chains rely on predictability. The persistent geopolitical uncertainty has complicated operations worldwide. Limited alternatives make the de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz all the more impactful. The longer the disruption persists, the more significant and structural the economic damage will become.

Potential for escalation

There is still a potential for a catastrophic escalation in the Strait of Hormuz. The sinking of a tanker would have dramatic consequences for the environment and would likely halt navigation for an extended period of time.

But prolonged instability may also prove destructive for the global economy.
Previously, Iran closing the strait was seen as unlikely considering the global backlash and economic harm to Iran itself. But with regime change now the stated goal of the US-Israeli attacks, the cost of holding the world economy hostage might seem justified to the rulers in Tehran.

Sarah Schiffling does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Strait of Hormuz: if the Iran conflict shuts world’s most important oil chokepoint, global economic chaos could follow – https://theconversation.com/strait-of-hormuz-if-the-iran-conflict-shuts-worlds-most-important-oil-chokepoint-global-economic-chaos-could-follow-277199

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Saira Bano, Assistant Professor in Political Science, Thompson Rivers University

Prime Minister Mark Carney’s visit to India marks the most consequential step in years to rebuild Canada–India relations after the diplomatic rupture in 2023 over allegations linking Indian agents to the killing of a Canadian Sikh activist.

The visit signals a deliberate shift from crisis management to economic statecraft.

In Mumbai, Carney announced that Canada aims to conclude a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with India by the end of this year, with the goal of doubling two-way trade by 2030. The message was pragmatic: the two countries may not always agree, but engagement must continue.

From rupture to reset

Canada-India relations deteriorated sharply in September 2023, leading to diplomatic expulsions, reduced staffing and suspended trade negotiations. For much of the past two years, the relationship was defined by security tensions and mutual distrust.

The first signs of stabilization came at the 2025 G7 Summit in Kananaskis, Alta., when Carney’s invitation to Prime Minister Narendra Modi signalled a diplomatic breakthrough. High commissioners were reinstated and ministerial channels reopened. Carney’s India visit suggests the reset is moving from symbolism to implementation.

The logic is clear. Canada’s heavy trade dependence on the United States has become riskier amid tariff threats and political volatility. Diversification is no longer aspirational; it’s strategic.

India, as one of the world’s fastest growing major economies and an increasingly central figure in global supply chains, offers scale and long-term opportunity.

Energy as the anchor

Energy emerged as the central pillar of Carney’s two-day visit. Canada and India have relaunched the Ministerial Energy Dialogue and are advancing discussions on uranium supply, conventional energy trade and clean energy co-operation.

India’s energy demand continues to rise as economic growth accelerates. It remains heavily import-dependent on crude oil and natural gas while also seeking to expand low-carbon baseload power. Canada, meanwhile, is looking to reduce its overwhelming reliance on the U.S. market.

With expanded export capacity through the Trans Mountain pipeline and growing LNG infrastructure, Canada is better positioned to reach Indo-Pacific markets than at any point in recent decades.

While Canada will not displace other suppliers, it can become part of India’s diversification portfolio. Long-term uranium agreements, in particular, would embed trust through decades of commercial interdependence. Nuclear co-operation offers durability that few other sectors can match.

Critical minerals, structural alignment

Beyond fuels, critical minerals represent a deeper strategic opportunity. Canada’s Critical Minerals Strategy aligns closely with India’s National Critical Minerals Mission in terms of lithium, nickel, cobalt, rare earth elements and downstream supply chains.

For Canada, the goal is not simply exporting raw resources, but building integrated value chains through processing partnerships, recycling and technology collaboration. For India, secure access to minerals is essential for electric vehicles, semiconductors, defence industrial supply chains and clean energy technologies, particularly as it seeks to reduce dependence on China-dominated processing networks.

Progress in critical minerals would move the relationship beyond symbolic diplomacy toward structural alignment.

Although CEPA negotiations have stalled in the past, both countries now face stronger incentives to revive them amid global trade turbulence and diversification pressures.

Progress on energy and minerals can help build domestic support for stability while wider trade talks continue.

Innovation, security

Carney’s visit also emphasized people-to-people and innovation ties. Foreign Affairs Minister Anita Anand launched a new Canada–India Talent and Innovation Strategy, including 13 new university partnerships spanning artificial intelligence, hydrogen research, digital agriculture and health sciences.

Education has long anchored Canada–India relations. Embedding research collaboration and talent mobility strengthens long term institutional linkages that outlast political cycles. Artificial intelligence co-operation, in particular, aligns Canada’s strengths in responsible AI governance with India’s scale in digital infrastructure and AI deployment.

Despite economic progress, however, security concerns between India and Canada remain unresolved. The diplomatic fallout of 2023 continues to affect trust.

During the visit, Anand faced repeated questions about foreign interference and transnational repression. She emphasized that public safety concerns must be addressed through direct engagement rather than disengagement.

Recent reports of ongoing threats and warnings to Sikh activists in Canada show that underlying tensions persist, even as both governments seek to prevent them from defining the entire relationship.

Ottawa’s tone appears more measured, but the conflicting narratives between the two countries remains evident.

The road ahead

Carney’s challenge is now therefore twofold: advance economic co-operation while preventing unresolved security disputes from derailing the broader reset of the Canada-India relationship.

Improved ties with India also align with Carney’s broader foreign policy vision, articulated in Davos, that middle powers must co-operate more closely in response to fractures in the global order.

India’s inclusion in a broader Indo-Pacific tour alongside Australia and Japan underscores that this engagement is part of a wider strategic recalibration.

Stabilizing relations with India is therefore not simply a bilateral exercise. It’s about positioning Canada more credibly in the Indo-Pacific region and strengthening co-ordination among democratic middle powers navigating geopolitical uncertainty.

The significance of Carney’s visit lies less in rhetoric and more in trajectory. By setting a target for a trade agreement, advancing energy and uranium co-operation, deepening critical minerals alignment and expanding academic partnerships, Ottawa is attempting to anchor the relationship in long-term interdependence.

The reset is not complete. Security tensions still cast a shadow. But the visit suggests that both governments are willing to compartmentalize disputes and focus on areas of shared economic and strategic interest.

Saira Bano does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Mark Carney’s visit to India hits the reset button on the Canada–India relationship – https://theconversation.com/mark-carneys-visit-to-india-hits-the-reset-button-on-the-canada-india-relationship-277015

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By James Horncastle, Assistant Professor and Edward and Emily McWhinney Professor in International Relations, Simon Fraser University

Israel and the United States have launched combat operations against Iran via Operation Epic Fury. The air campaign appears aimed at three targets: Iran’s military bases and command structure, its air defences and strategic missile sites and its leadership.

Early strikes were successful in killing Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamanei and several key members of the leadership.

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Read more:
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei ruled Iran with defiance and brutality for 36 years. For many Iranians, he will not be revered

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The strikes themselves are likely to be successful from a strictly military standpoint. Israeli and American forces are quickly establishing air superiority over Iran and disabling Iran’s anti-air capabilities.

These attacks occur at a moment when Iran is weakened both domestically and internationally.

The Iranian regime is still recovering from the December and January protests that were the greatest challenge to the Iranian government since the 1979 Iranian Revolution.

Internationally, key members of Iran’s “ring of fire,” like the Houthis in Yemen and Hezbollah in Lebanon, are in a vulnerable position. Furthermore, the domestic unrest have emboldened people around the world to challenge the Iranian regime’s legitimacy.

Nevertheless, the U.S. and Israel are unlikely to be successful in their stated goal of regime change. Historically, air power alone is insufficient. Furthermore, even if they succeed in regime change, they may create an even more volatile geopolitical situation.

Escalating tensions

The tensions between the U.S.-Israel and Iran are nothing new. Their foundations go back to the birth of the Islamic Republic.

There’s been a significant escalation of tensions, however, over the past few years. The Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas attack against Israeli citizens and Iran’s role in supporting Hamas and other paramilitary groups opposed to the Israeli state resulted in Israel launching extensive strikes against Iranian assets in the region.

These strikes culminated in last year’s Twelve Day War between Israel and Iran, with the U.S. playing an auxilliary role. American and Israeli strikes inflicted significant damage on Iranian infrastructure. But they didn’t achieve the American goal of eliminating Iran’s nuclear program, despite President Donald Trump’s claims to the contrary.

Iranian protests

Against this backdrop of rising tensions between Israel/the United States and Iran, the economic situation in Iran deteriorated, resulting in shopkeepers and merchants in Tehran going on strike. These protests served as a spark for what became the largest public demonstrations against the Iranian regime that it had encountered since the birth of the Islamic Republic.

This latest uprising by the Iranian people presented an opportunity for the U.S. and Israel. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has never backed down from his goal of regime change in Iran. Trump actively encouraged the protesters to fight for regime change.

The protesters, however, needed material support that only the U.S. could provide. But with American military assets in the Caribbean challenging Venezuela, there were insufficient forces available.

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Read more:
‘Woman, Life, Freedom’ hasn’t faded in Iran — it’s being actively eliminated

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The result was that the U.S. was not able to intervene, and the Iranian regime succeeded in quashing the protests. Total deaths from the government’s crackdown are estimated to be in the thousands.

The U.S., having missed its ideal opportunity for regime change due to its fixation on Venezuela earlier in the year, nevertheless went through with pursuing its goal on Feb. 28.

An uncertain end

The problem now faced by Israel and the U.S. s the stated goal of regime change and the long-term stability of Iran. Not only is regime change uncertain due to the limitations of a strictly air campaign, but it could also create a scenario where more radicalized forces come to power.

This comes from the fact that, while the Iranian regime is often equated with prominent figures like the Ayatollah, it operates as more than a system centred on a single individual.

Unlike other authoritarian countries where key individuals or families have power, Iran is a complex state with a complex governance structure. At its heart is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Far from merely a military unit or secret police, the IRGC is a vast institution integrated within the security, economy and governance of Iran.

This is where the difference between “regime change” and “regime building” comes to light. Removing key leaders may destabilize Iran and change who wields power, but that usually means power is then consolidated by people already in place. That’s not the citizens Iran, who Trump urged to rise up, but the vast infrastructure of the IRGC.

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Read more:
Trump and Netanyahu want regime change, but Iran’s regime was built for survival. A long war is now likely

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Conflict could spread

This outcome is more likely given the instability of Iran over the past few weeks. If the regime were stable, Iranian political and military leaders wouldn’t view the current attacks as posing a threat to their control. But under the current volatile domestic circumstances, these leaders are likely to respond more forcefully and broadly because they believe their own future — and lives — are at stake.

The IRGC isn’t likely to be a more conciliatory or ideologically permissive interlocutor. In fact, the opposite is probably true.

Faced with the threat of further American and Israeli attacks and nascent discontent at home, the IRGC may move quickly to further lock down its own power and respond aggressively. This power struggle could not only result in significant Iranian deaths, but cause the war to spread throughout Middle East.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. U.S.-Israeli strikes against Iran may succeed on a military basis, but at what political cost? – https://theconversation.com/u-s-israeli-strikes-against-iran-may-succeed-on-a-military-basis-but-at-what-political-cost-277182

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Victoria MacBeath, PhD Candidate, Art History, Concordia University

The Ontario government recently announced massive cuts to Ontario Student Assistance Program (OSAP) funding, decreasing the maximum funding from 85 per cent to 25 per cent.

Student response to this has been largely negative. Speaking to the media, Ontario Premier Doug Ford said that he received “thousands of calls” from students expressing concerns. Ford’s response: telling them to invest in education that leads to in-demand jobs.

At a February news conference responding to OSAP cuts, Ford relayed that he told frustrated students: “You’re picking basket-weaving courses, and there’s not too many baskets being sold out there.” He said, instead, students should invest in their future through their program decisions — insinuating that craft curriculums hold no value in the job market. Ford mentioned trades, STEM and health-care fields as ones that would provide post-graduation employment.

As a researcher that engages with scholars specialized in the history of craft practices in Canada, alongside teaching art history courses that highlight the social, political and economic importance of fibre arts, Ford’s response is troubling and unsurprising.

Basket-weavers push back

Ford’s rhetoric demonstrates a misunderstanding of Canada’s cultural sector, basket weaving and the purpose of higher education.

In response to Ford’s comments, basket-weavers and craft organizations across the country noted the lucrative nature of their practice alongside the widely applicable skills learned through craft education.

Basket-maker Spencer Lunham Jr., of the Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point First Nation, for example, told CBC that he sells a couple hundred baskets per year for around $150 to $3,000 each.

The prosperity of Canada’s cultural sector is backed by data from the Canadian chamber of Commerce, whose business data lab reported in October 2025 that the arts and culture sector’s GDP has grown nearly eight per cent, outpacing an overall economic growth of four per cent. In addition, the sector supports “13 jobs for every million in output, which is more than oil and gas, manufacturing or agriculture.”

Ontario is one of the provinces to see the highest economic impact from the sector, according to the report.

Winner of Sobey Art Award

Ford’s emphasis on the uselessness of craft practices is also challenged by recent winners of the Sobey Art Award, one of the most prestigious art awards in the country.

Many of the recent winners incorporate craft or craft-like practices into their work. This includes the 2017 winner of the award, Ursula Johnson,
an artist from the Eskasoni First Nation, in Cape Breton, Nova Scotia, who has an innovative basket-making practice. It seems that, at the very least, gallerists are buying baskets.

Johnson’s practice in particular highlights that — despite craft’s common framing as traditional, overly indulgent and frozen in time — basket-weaving is an innovative, adaptive and in-demand field.

As curator Heather Anderson argues in her 2021 writing on Johnson’s work: the artist utilizes weaving practices to highlight Canada’s ongoing role in colonization, and to question the contemporary museum’s implication in it.

Craft and technological innovation

Craft practices have always been at the centre of technological innovation.

Some scholars contend that the inventor of the computer, Charles Babbage, was likely inspired by the Jacquard loom: a weaving machine whose invention had a profound impact on the industrial revolution in Europe.

Other writers, like journalist Brian Merchant, have recently argued that those opposed to artificial intelligence can take inspiration from the first rebellions against big tech: the 19th century Luddites who opposed the mass industrialization of weaving practices.

From AI to the clothes we wear, weaving has shaped the contemporary global economy.

While weaving can be lucrative, members of the Toronto Guild of Spinners and Weavers noted that basket-weaving courses do not emphasize their monetary value, but rather their educational value.

Purpose of learning

This is where Ford’s real misunderstanding of education is revealed: the purpose of learning is not simply to remember and regurgitate facts, it is to problem solve, to expand our horizons and to think critically. These skills can be developed in basket-weaving courses just as well as math courses.

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Read more:
Ada Lovelace’s skills with language, music and needlepoint contributed to her pioneering work in computing

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Johnson, for example, says that her grandmother taught her that the maker does not manipulate the wood they use to weave, but instead the wood guides the maker. Basket weaving teaches us to listen, to collaborate and build from a strong foundation and work our way up.

College admissions expert and counsellor Scott White, writing for Forbes Magazine, wrote in 2025 that “we need a system that prioritizes critical thinking, emotional intelligence and practical skills over rote memorization.”

He and many others who are invested in supporting young people and helping our systems change to support our society through turbulent times note that current education systems still reflects outdated ideas about the future of workers: of those in factories, rather than creative thinkers.

Pipeline to a job?

The Ford government’s approach to higher education seems to be the same — funding a system that put us on a pipeline to a job and where programs that demand critical and creative thinking are undervalued, and also, underfunded: Recent reports note that funding for Ontario’s post-secondary sector is low compared to support in other provinces.

Author Ursula K. Le Guin argued in 1986 that rather than a weapon for killing, the first human tool was likely a container: a basket or a woven net. She writes that the basket — and craft practices — are not supplemental to human survival: rather, they enable it.

Craft practices allow us to carry our culture, our belongings and our sustenance. If we focus only on the money-making schemes in society, then we lose a part of ourselves.

This is the real power of craft education: when we engage hands-on craft, we learn about our past and build problem-solving skills.

Victoria MacBeath receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for craft history research.

– ref. Actually, Doug Ford, basket-weaving is innovative and in-demand – https://theconversation.com/actually-doug-ford-basket-weaving-is-innovative-and-in-demand-276496

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Stephen L Archer, Director of Translational Institute of Medicine (TIME), Queen’s University, Ontario

Last October, my daughter Elizabeth and I stood at Londorossi gate (elevation 2,250 metres), the western entrance to Mount Kilimanjaro National Park in Tanzania, ready to begin the nine-day Lemosho route up Mount Kilimanjaro. Climbing “Kili” would fulfil a dream I’ve had since working as a medical student in Kenya. Elizabeth’s dream was to ensure her dad came back in one piece.

Unlike Mount Everest, Kilimanjaro is a hike, not a technical climb requiring ropes or crampons. However, as a cardiologist and researcher in oxygen sensing, I knew that our key challenge would be the lack of oxygen — a condition called hypoxia.

Altitude and oxygen

Hypoxia occurs at altitude. At sea level, gravity creates barometric pressure, which compresses nitrogen and oxygen, accounting for Earth’s oxygen-rich atmosphere. However, gravity diminishes with distance from the planet’s centre. At altitude, the low barometric pressure causes gases to expand, meaning there are fewer molecules of oxygen per volume of air.

Mount Kilimanjaro, one of the world’s seven summits, is Africa’s highest point at 5,895 metres and the world’s tallest free-standing mountain. At its summit, barometric pressure falls 50 per cent compared to sea level (around 50 kiloPascals compared to 101 kiloPascals), so although oxygen still makes up 21 per cent of air, there are only half as many oxygen molecules in each breath.

Venture above 2,400 metres and you may develop acute mountain sickness (AMS) as a result of hypoxia. At altitudes of around 4,000 to 6,000 metres, the chances of developing AMS are 50/50.

Fortunately the risk of the more life-threatening hypoxia-related conditions — like high-altitude pulmonary edema (HAPE) or high-altitude cerebral edema (HACE) — is lower.

Acute mountain sickness is defined by a constellation of symptoms, including headache, nausea and vomiting, loss of appetite and dizziness.

HAPE and HACE are different than acute mountain sickness. HAPE is driven by excessive hypoxic constriction of the lung’s arteries (called pulmonary arteries). The pressure in these arteries rises, flooding the lung’s airways with bloody fluid, causing severe shortness of breath, bloody sputum and low blood oxygen.

Even more severe is HACE (hypoxic brain swelling), which shows up as severe headache, disorientation and imbalance. While one may endure acute mountain sickness with minor medical assistance, both HAPE and HACE require immediate medical intervention and rapid descent. However, distinguishing acute mountain sickness from early HAPE or HACE and choosing to descend is not always easy, particularly as climbers are often motivated to summit. Careful monitoring by impartial, safety-focused guides with twice daily oximetry is important. Oximetry measures oxygen in blood using a probe placed on the finger.

By the time we reached Barafu base camp (4,673 metres), our oxygen saturations had dropped from over 95 per cent at sea level to 87 per cent and 83 per cent. Those with oxygen saturations below 80 per cent at base camp are advised not to proceed to the summit.

Once the decision to descend due to low oxygen saturation is made, the choices are to walk down (if able), to be wheeled down on a stretcher or to take a helicopter, which is expensive and not without its own risks.

Aspiring climbers should be aware of three factors relating to hypoxia that can reduce their risk of altitude sicknesses and make climbing safer:

1. How the body detects hypoxia

Your body has oxygen sensors to detect hypoxia. These sensors are mitochondria, tiny intracellular powerhouses that trigger adaptive responses to boost oxygen uptake and delivery to vital organs.

In the carotid body — a tiny sensor in the carotid artery — and in the lung’s pulmonary arteries, mitochondria produce signalling molecules (called oxygen radicals) that trigger responses. These responses include neurotransmitter release, contraction of lung blood vessels and changes in gene expression.

The carotid body samples blood headed to the brain and, if it is acidic or hypoxic, signals the brain to increase the depth and rate of breathing. This is a helpful response because it increases ventilation, bringing more oxygen into your body.

A similar sensor in the lung’s pulmonary arteries constricts those arteries in response to hypoxic air (hypoxic pulmonary vasoconstriction, or HPV). HPV is helpful when lung hypoxia involves only a segment of lung, as in pneumonia. But at altitude, where the entire lung is filled with hypoxic air, HPV raises the pressure in the pulmonary arteries, which promotes fluid leakage from blood vessels into the airways, causing HAPE.

2. Acclimatization is key to surviving hypoxia

Slow ascent gives oxygen sensors time to condition climbers to function in the rarified air at altitudes like Kilimanjaro. The first adaptation, carotid body activation, happens quickly: breathing increases within minutes of hypoxic exposure.

Hours later, gene and protein expression changes. This is due to activation of transcription factors that control genes’ on and off switches. One such transcription factor that is activated by hypoxia, named HIF-1, regulates the hormone erythropoietin. More erythropoietin means more production of hemoglobin and red blood cells which increases the blood’s oxygen-carrying capacity.

Third, with a slow climb and sustained hypoxia, HPV gradually lessens, preventing pulmonary hypertension and HAPE. Our guides were very familiar with the necessity of acclimatization, and cheered us on with the refrain “Pole pole,” Swahili for “slowly slowly.”

Going slowly reduces the risk of developing acute mountain sickness. Like the parable of the tortoise and the hare, it more often strikes fit young people, whose bravado and strength allow rapid ascent, rather than slow-moving seniors. In addition to going “pole pole,” one can improve the chances of summiting by choosing a longer route (on Kilimanjaro, ideally a six- or seven-day ascent, like the Lemosho route) and following a “climb high, sleep low” philosophy: Hike to a higher altitude each day and then descend to your campsite.

Dr. Peter Hackett, an experienced mountaineer, documented the importance of acclimatization in a 1976 study.

Of 278 unacclimatized hikers ascending to 4,243 metres en route to Everest base camp, he found that 53 per cent developed acute mountain sickness; fewer experienced HAPE (2.5 per cent) or HACE (1.8 per cent). Acute mountain sickness was commonest among younger climbers and those who began their hike at 2,800 metres (after flying in), rather than those who hiked to the starting point at that altitude. Among those who did not acclimatize, acute mountain sickness incidence was reduced by taking acetazolamide, a drug that enhances breathing and suppresses HPV.

A more recent study further illustrates the dangers of rapid ascent, finding that 2.5 per cent of hikers trekking to 5,500 metres over four to six days developed HAPE, compared to 15.5 per cent of those airlifted directly to 5,500 metres.

3. Medications can help

Certain medicines do prevent and/or treat high altitude illnesses, increasing the chances of a safe climb by enhancing breathing and suppressing HPV (acetazolamide, brand name Diamox), suppressing HPV (sildenafil, brand name Viagra; and calcium channel blockers like nifedipine) and preventing inflammation (ibuprofen, brand name Motrin; and dexamethasone).

Our own Kilimanjaro medicine kit included three prescription medications (acetazolamide, sildenafil and dexamethasone) and one over-the-counter medicine (ibuprofen).

I’d like to stress that this article is not intended as medical advice. See your physician for fitness confirmation and prescriptions (and try any medicine pre-climb to check for allergies or side-effects) prior to climbing. Most of the medications recommended by the Wilderness Medicine Society’s 2024 Clinical Practice Guidelines for the Prevention, Diagnosis, and Treatment of Acute Altitude Illness require a prescription.

Lest you think that using medications is a cheat, trust me: The climb will be challenging despite pharmacological assistance. Elizabeth and I safely summited. Emerging happy but tired through the Mweka gate (1,680 metres), we felt gratitude to our guides, respect for the mountain and pride in realizing our dreams together.

This article was co-authored by Elizabeth Archer MFA, of Chicago, Illinois. She is a Canadian-Ukrainian playwright.

Stephen L Archer receives funding from CIHR

– ref. The hidden enemy on Mount Kilimanjaro: Safely dealing with low oxygen at high altitude – https://theconversation.com/the-hidden-enemy-on-mount-kilimanjaro-safely-dealing-with-low-oxygen-at-high-altitude-271716

This is a simulated failure row used to test Failures/Retry/Forget/Raw UI.

This is a simulated failure row used to test Failures/Retry/Forget/Raw UI.

This is a simulated failure row used to test Failures/Retry/Forget/Raw UI.