Source: French to English Tester Published on: 2026-05-08
Source: The Conversation – in French– By Norman Sempijja, Associate professor, Mohammed VI Polytechnic University
Mali is in the throes ofpolitical troublessince 2012. That year was marked by a military coup and the takeover of the northern regions of this West African country by armed groups. In the following years, efforts to establish transitional governments failed. This situation led tothe ban on all partiespolitics in May 2025.
Moreover, the country has experienced waves of military interventions led by external actors such as France, the United States, and more recently, Russia. All have invested heavily in an attempt to contain the extremist threat in Mali.
But the groups linked to Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State continued toextend their influence. And at the end of April 2026, the military government was forced to postpone somecoordinated attackscarried out by separatists and jihadists throughout the country. The Minister of Defense,General Sadio Camara, was killed.
Over the past decade, foreign interventions have often misinterpreted what was happening on the ground. Extremist groups have taken advantage of issues such as land conflicts, corruption, and competition for resources to legitimize themselves, often aligning with thetensions within the community. The weakness of state institutions and security forces has allowed groups such as the Group to Support Islam and Muslims (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) to consolidate their power.
These groups have adapted by forming alliances and tailoring their discourses to local demands, giving priority to immediate issues rather than ideological objectives.
We arepolitical scientistswho have conducted research on the security situation in Mali and the Sahel. Ourrecently published articlehas shown that non-state armed groups in the Sahel, particularly in Mali, have become key power actors. They influence local governance by filling the gaps left by weak state institutions.
While external actors such as France, the United States, and Russia grantthe priority to the fight against terrorism and to the consolidation of the State, they often neglect the governance functions carried out by these non-state armed groups. These groups often provide essential services and acquire local legitimacy.
Recognizing the role of armed groups as holders of local power does not mean accepting or legitimizing their actions. However, ignoring this reality has led to policies that miss their target. When interventions focus solely on military solutions, they risk overlooking the reasons why populations interact with these groups.
Our findings challenge conventional interventions that focus solely on defeating non-state armed groups or restoring centralized state control. We argue that security solutions alone are insufficient. We advocate for a more nuanced approach that incorporates the potential of non-state armed groups in terms of governance, legitimacy, and local action. Non-state armed groups have governed territories in countries such as Colombia, Syria, and South Sudan, among others.
Armed groups as de facto authorities
In Mali, armed groups are not merely fighting forces. In many regions of the country, they play a more complex role. It is difficult to estimate the exact number of groups operating in Mali. Thelargest and most well-known, the JNIM, is a coalition of five organizations and claims more than 10,000 fighters in the country.
In the center and north of Mali, at the border with Algeria, the state is often distant, absent, or mistrusted. Armed groups fill this void. They settle disputes, enforce rules, collect taxes, and sometimes provide aminimum order.
For communities living in daily insecurity, these functions are not abstract. They have concrete effects on daily life.
Our study established that this does not necessarily mean that the population approves of these groups or supports their ideology. Many do not adhere to it. However, when there are few alternatives, people adapt. They follow the rules because they need to survive, not because they believe in them.
This distinction is important. It helps to explain why these groups are so difficult to dislodge. Their strength does not come only from weapons, but also from their deep roots in local realities.
Why Military Strategies Fail
International efforts have largely focused on combating these groups and rebuilding the authority of the Malian state. Although well-intentioned, these interventions often neglect a crucial element: what happens to the spaces left vacant by these groups?
The 2013 French intervention is an example. The French army helped the Malian army regain control of the northern part of the country in the face of the Islamist advance duringOperation Serval. The objective was to prevent extremist forces from advancing towards Bamako. This did not end the conflict. Many fighters moved to rural areas where the state was scarcely present and forged ties with local communities.
In central Mali, where cattle farming is an essential source of income, this dynamic has contributed tospread violencebetween the Fulani and Dogon communities, thus reinforcing the grievances exploited by extremist groups.
Meanwhile,attempts to strengthen State institutionshave encountered difficulties. In certain regions, security forces are seen as ineffective, even abusive.
Faced with this reality, populations often turn to all those who are able to offer them a certain level of predictability and protection, even if it is an armed group.
The involvement of external actors has also gradually fragmented.withdrawal of France, the rise of anti-Western sentiment and the arrival offorces linked to Russiahave created a landscape of interventions that is cluttered and sometimes conflictual.
The different actors have divergent agendas, and their presence does not always translate into increased security. In some cases, it can even worsen the situation by reinforcing tensions or weakening trust in already fragile institutions.
Caught between two fires, civilians make difficult choices daily. Their decisions are rarely ideological, but rather dictated by survival.
Rethinking the response
We conclude from our findings that a more realistic approach would begin by listening to local realities. It would address the gaps that allow armed groups to establish themselves. This involves improving access to justice and security, supporting local institutions, and taking grievances seriously. It also means recognizing that legitimacy is built from the ground up, not imposed from above.
The experience in Mali shows that there are clear limits to what the military force can achieve on its own. As long as interventions neglect the daily realities of governance and survival, they are unlikely to bring about lasting change. As long as this change does not occur, armed groups will remain difficult to dislodge, not only because they are capable of fighting, but also because, in many areas, they have now become an integral part of those who organize daily life.
Les auteurs ne travaillent pas pour, ne conseillent pas, ne possèdent pas d’actions dans, ni ne reçoivent de financement de la part d’aucune entreprise ou organisation susceptible de bénéficier de cet article, et n’ont divulgué aucune affiliation pertinente au-delà de leur poste académique.
–ref. Armed groups fill a political void in Mali: it is essential to address this to end the violence –https://theconversation.com/armed-groups-fill-a-political-void-in-mali-it-is-essential-to-address-it-to-end-the-violence-281885