Source: French to English Tester Published on: 2026-05-03
Source: The Conversation – in French– By Jordy Bony, Doctor and Professor of Law at EM Lyon, EM Lyon Business School
While, intuitively, we think of funeral ceremonies as moments that concern only the close circle and belong to intimacy, the law considers that the playing of music in this context must give rise to the payment of authors’ rights. A complex legal question that arises at a time of great vulnerability and deserves to be better understood.
Between personalized tribute and regulatory frameworkdecision rendered on January 31, 2024 by the Judicial Court of Parisinvites to reconsider the practices of the funeral sector by ruling that the broadcasting of music during funeral ceremonies constitutes an act of communication to the public within the meaning of the Intellectual Property Code, which results in the remuneration of authors through the Society of Authors, Composers and Music Publishers (Sacem).
This development, however, raises several questions regarding the reconciliation between respect for copyright and the sensitive and intimate nature of funerals.
This is an opportunity to review the legal foundations of copyright law, the specific case of funeral ceremonies, and the questions that all this raises for the legal future of this sector.
Legal foundations of copyright law
Copyright law encompasses the rights held by an author over their intellectual works, that is to say original creations, such as literary, visual arts, photographic, software, or musical works. In musical matters, copyright protects both the composer and the lyricist, that is to say the author of the text.
In order to be protected, however, these works of the mind must present an “original” character. In other words, the work must bear the imprint of the author’s personality or reflect an intellectual contribution or a creative effort. Case law has gradually made it possible to define this element of originality more clearly. In particular, inthe Painer ruling of 1 December 2011, the Court of Justice of the European Unionstrengthens the recognition of the author’s creative personality, affirming that the originality of a work is defined as the reflection of their personality manifested through free and creative choices.
Moreover, the originality of a musical work possesses elements that are unique to it, notably its nature. According to the Court of Cassation, indeed,The originality of the musical work is appreciated by listening to the entirety of the work, considering its constituent elements which are the melody, harmony, and rhythm..
More generally, copyright is based on a set of principles, clearly stated in the Intellectual Property Code, which define the framework for the protection of artistic and literary works, including musical works, recordings, and reproductions, notably,Article L. 111-1grants the exclusive right to the author by the mere fact of creation, the protection of the work does not require any formalities. Consequently, no constitutive deposit is, in theory, necessary to acquire this exclusive right over its music.
Despite this principle, in case of a dispute regarding paternity, the author must be able to provide proof of the creation date of the work. To this end, he may file aSoleau envelopewith the National Institute of Industrial Property (Inpi) in order to timestamp the creation or deposit the work with a notary, a bailiff, or to call upon a authors’ society.
This exclusive right of the author, which is theoretically enforceable against all, includes patrimonial attributes, namely rights over the exploitation of the work, but also moral rights, notably the right to the authorship of the work, its disclosure, and its respect.
While moral rights are perpetual and inalienable, property rights have a limited duration lasting the lifetime of the author and extending seventy years after their death. Among these property rights is the right of performance and communication to the public of musical works, defined in the articlesL. 122-1andL. 122-2of the Intellectual Property Code.
These provisions notably require that any broadcast of a work outside the strictly private circle, understood as a group composed of a limited number of close ones, must be subject to prior authorization and especially to remuneration of the author. This is where the problem lies concerning funeral ceremonies. Are they not organized in a private setting, with a small group of close ones?
The specific case of funeral ceremonies
This is where the subject becomes delicate. On the surface, funerals pertain to the intimate: they bring together family, close friends, and some acquaintances in a moment of reflection. Many would therefore be tempted to see the playing of a song as an act naturally belonging to the private sphere. However, in copyright law, this intuition is not sufficient. The Intellectual Property Code cited above does not cover every situation simply “private” in the usual sense, but only private and free performances carried out exclusively within a family circle. This exception is to be interpreted strictly.
It is precisely on this point that the decision issued by the Paris judicial court on January 31, 2024, was made. Seized with a dispute notably opposing Sacem to federations in the funeral sector, the court judged that the broadcasting of music during funeral ceremonies did constitute “a communication to the public.” Therefore, it dismissed the argument that these broadcasts would automatically fall within the family circle. In other words, the solemn, emotional, or even familial nature of a funeral ceremony is not sufficient, by itself, to exempt it from copyright law.
This may seem quite logical: the qualification of “communication to the public” is based on objective criteria, notably relating to the nature of the dissemination and the circle of people who have access to it. However, the solemn, emotional, or even familial character of a funeral ceremony does not, in itself, exempt this dissemination from copyright law.
From a very pragmatic point of view, however, the solution may seem counter-intuitive. In common language, funerals are often perceived as a private event. But the law reasons differently. What matters is not only the intimacy felt by the participants, but also the context in which the music is broadcast. When a musical work is integrated into a ceremony organized by a funeral operator, as part of a service provision, with technical means of broadcasting made available to several people, judges may see it as an act of communication to the public. The ceremony remains a personal moment for the relatives, without necessarily, from a legal standpoint, falling within the family circle.
It is important to emphasize one key point: the question is not about whether a bereaved family will have to pay copyright fees for each selected piece. In practice, the debate mainly concerns funeral operators, that is, professionals who organize the ceremony and ensure the playing of music as part of their activity. It is at this level that the relationship with Sacem is established and that the issue of authors’ remuneration arises. This clarification matters because it shows that the controversy targets the legal framework of a professional service incorporating protected works rather than families. One last reassuring point: this barely affects the bill.Indeed, the fee costs between 1.6 and 3 euros per ceremony to the operators.
It remains that the solution causes an understandable discomfort. Funerals are neither a show nor just another commercial service. Music often plays a strong symbolic role there: it accompanies mourning, recalls the personality of the deceased, and contributes to the uniqueness of the tribute. That is why, for some, submitting these broadcasts to copyright law may seem like an intrusion of the patrimonial logic into a moment of great human vulnerability.
Conversely, one can also argue that there is, in principle, no reason to deprive authors of remuneration solely because their works are used in a funeral context. The real issue is therefore less about sharply opposing families to rights holders than about finding a balance between the dignity of the ceremonies and respect for intellectual property rules.
In any case, all this led to the signing of asectoral agreement in 2025between SACEM and the funeral operators. This agreement has made it possible to reduce costs and simplify the reporting procedures for professionals. In practical terms, it therefore constitutes a useful response. However, it does not by itself resolve the fundamental question. The reduction of fees and the administrative organization of the system neither erase the debate on the legal qualification of ceremonies, nor the symbolic discomfort caused by the application of copyright law at a time of mourning.
The compromise eases the practice, without necessarily closing the reflection, which can moreover extend beyond the funeral sector alone.
Rethinking the relationships between funerary practices and established legal categories
From then on, several questions can be asked to better envision the future and anticipate disputes.
First, is the notion of “family circle” still suited to contemporary mourning rituals? The disputes concerning the music played during funerals may reveal the limits of this old legal notion. By refusing to automatically assimilate funeral ceremonies to this exception, the judicial court of Paris recalled that copyright law maintains a narrow conception of private performance. But this strictness raises questions: do contemporary forms of mourning, often more open, more personalized, and sometimes organized by funeral service providers, still fall within the classic categories of intellectual property law?
More broadly, this comes down to asking how far a funeral ceremony can be equated with a service like any other. The judges’ reasoning partly rests on the fact that the musical broadcast is part of a service organized by a professional. This logic is legally coherent, but it raises a broader question: should the funeral ceremony be analyzed as a simple service with a musical background or as such a particular social and human ritual that it calls for distinct treatment? In other words, the current legal classification may reflect the economic functioning of the sector, without fully embracing the social uniqueness of funerals. The aforementioned 2025 sectoral compromise, for example, does not answer this question.
Finally, this case shows how certain categories of law can seem counterintuitive to the general public. In everyday language, funerals are seen as an intimate moment; in copyright law, that is not enough to fall within the family circle. The gap between these two perceptions explains much of the emotion stirred by the subject. Perhaps, beyond the fundamental debate, it is necessary to better explain the logic ofpositive lawA: not to silence criticism, but to allow it to be formulated on more precise and better understood grounds.
The authors do not work for, advise, own shares in, or receive funds from any organization that could benefit from this article, and have declared no affiliation other than their research institution.
–ref. At funerals too, music has a price –https://theconversation.com/at-funerals-music-also-has-a-price-280080