Source: French to English Tester Published on: 2026-04-28
Source: The Conversation – France in French (3)– By Elise Barandon, PhD student in political science, co-editor at Rubicon, University Paris-Panthéon-Assas
The visit of James Marape, the Papua New Guinean Prime Minister, to Paris in May 2026, marked by the signing of security agreements and the opening of an embassy, illustrates the strategic rapprochement, in the context of a geopolitical reshaping of the Pacific, between France and this Oceanian state, a member of the Commonwealth and the world’s third largest island territory.
The visit of Papua New Guinean Prime Minister James Marape to Paris, scheduled for mid-May 2026, could go unnoticed. However, both in Port Moresby and in Paris, this event is by no means trivial: the awaited signing of an agreement onshipridingand the official opening of a Papua New Guinean embassy in Paris will bear witness to this. This visit fits more broadly within a context ofrecompositiongeopolitical balances in the island Pacific, notably marked by themultiplicationsecurity agreements (in particular withAustraliaand theUnited States, notably againstChinese influencein the country), and the strengthening ofsovereigntisms.
In light of analyses of strategic documents and interviews conducted in Port Moresby, several questions underlie our analysis: how can two differentiated conceptions of security produce mutually beneficial cooperation? How does France build a differentiated security relationship with a Melanesian state with regional security ambitions? The aim here is to understand the security cooperation between the two states, while aiming to reinsert island logics at the heart of the regional and international issues that underlie them, so that the dynamics of power competition do not overshadow the voices and forms ofagentivityspecific to the island Pacific States.
Papua New Guinea, a giant of the island Pacific
Long relegated tomarginsanalysis in international relations, Papua New Guinea (PNG) is nevertheless the largest island state in the region by its population (about80%inhabitants of the insular Pacific) and its territory (462,840 km2), thus allowing it to establish itself as a key player in Oceania.
PNG, formerly under German-British colonial administration, then Australian,independentsince 1975, has now become part of a dynamic of progressive empowerment in the fields of security and defense, seeking to more clearly assert its influence and ambitions on the regional stage. If, in continuity with the legacy of its foundersfounders, she long defined herself as “friend of all, enemy of none” (doctrine of universalism), this stance is now tending to evolve towards a more selective strategy, based on consolidation of“strategic partnerships”. In this context, PNG’s strategy is often interpreted as following a logic ofhedging.
At the same time, Port Moresby expresses its desire to assert itself at the regional level; it aspires to play a more active role, sometimes described as a “big brother,” within the island Pacific. These shifts have led to an increased awareness of national capacity limits, particularly in terms of internal security and defense. The personnel of the armed forces (Papua New Guinea Defence Force, or PNGDF) and the police (Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary, or RPNGC) indeed remainbelow standardsgenerally recommended at the international level. The national security landscape, for its part, is characterized by a stronghybridityÂ: in urban spaces for example, companies ofprivate securityplay a central role – the State not having the effective monopoly on security. The PNGDF is also undergoing a transformation process aimed at increasing its personnel (10,000 personnel by 2030, compared to nearly 4,000 today) and evolving itsorganizational model. This involves notably moving from a force historically structured around a “brigade model” — predominantly “ceremonial” — to a more “functional” organization articulated around three components (air, maritime, and land).
However, although strategic attention to Papua New Guinea has increased in recent years, and the milestones of ambitions have been set, the country’s security priorities remain largely under-analyzed. Indeed, PNG is characterized by exceptional geographical and cultural diversity (more than1,000To tribes) and amosaic of social structuresorganized around clans, a large part of whom live in isolated regions. Intertribal violence – sometimes described as“local terrorism”– coexist with phenomena ofcriminality(raskoll) more classical. Theporosity of the borders, both on land and at sea, encourages trafficking ofarms(notably via theIndonesian border) and ofnarcotics, while theillegal fishingconstitutes a persistent threat to the country’s resources and economic sovereignty. Added to these issues are structural problems such asinequalitiesdevelopment, tensions related toextractive industries, as well as a strongexhibitionto natural disasters. In such an environment, security cannot be reduced to its military dimension alone: it is part of a broader set of political, economic, and social dynamics that require responses that are both multidimensional and adapted to local realities. The so-called issues ofnon-traditional securityoccupy a central place in the priorities expressed locally and largely determine the country’s long-term stability.
A revitalized bilateral relationship in the field of security, and France as a balancing power
While security cooperation between PNG and France is part of a long-term relationship, it has experienced a significant resurgence in dynamism since the early 2020s. Thesignatureof an agreement relating to the status of forces (SOFA) in 2022 constituted a structuring step. The following year, taking advantage of thevisitby President Emmanuel Macron in the region, the relationship between Port Moresby and Paris has been revitalized thanks to the launch ofthe Pacific Academy, an initiative led by the armed forces in New Caledonia and French Polynesia. The aforementioned PNG foreign policy white paper also places France in its “neighborhood.”
With the help of theIndo-Pacific strategyFrench – updated in 2025 – and of theNational Security Policy 2025-2029from PNG, the French-Papuan-New Guinean cooperation has particularly increased within a few months. Thestops,the patrolsmaritime, and targeted capacity transfers such as the donation ofdronesDELAIR UX-11 maritime surveillance drones are clear examples. The PNG also takes part in French multilateral exercises (Southern Cross) that promote interoperability. In parallel, sometraining coursesare exempted from special forces training on tactical improvement (parachuting, for example), contributing to the rise of the operational level of the PNGDF. Finally, cooperation is also part of regional multilateral frameworks, such as the South Pacific Defence Ministers’ Meeting (SPDMM) or the Pacific Response Group.
These operational elements highlight a unique strategic dimension: that of a France perceived and described by our interlocutors as a security partner who is certainly discreet, but credible and often “underestimated.” In a dense partnership environment, France could be described as an “adjustment power” for PNG. Contrary to the more structuring approaches of Australia, the United States, or China – sometimes however considered “intrusive” or even“condescending”–, this discretion constitutes a resource. By offering an approach complementary to existing ones in order not to overwhelm the partner, France contributes to certain key security functions, often referred to as “niches” by interlocutors, but whose added value is recognized.
“I hear your words, so you will hear my words”?
The prospects for deepening security cooperation between France and Papua New Guinea appear numerous. The ongoing revitalization of the air component of the PNGDF, and therenovationfrom the naval base of Lombrum alongside the agreement ofshipriding(patrolling in the territorial waters and exclusive economic zones of a third-party State, by embarking an officer from the country concerned), open new fields of cooperation, likely to expand the spectrum of operational interactions. Support in emerging sectors (cybersecurity,intelligence,peacekeeping operationsof the United Nations) are also called upon to take an increasingly prominent place.
These promising prospects should not, however, overshadow a number of constraints and points of vigilance, or even friction. The upcoming electoral cycles in both countries in 2027 are likely to introduce uncertainties in the continuity of commitments, and certain internal political developments also call for caution: the question of independence ofBougainvillecould reshape regional balances and open new partnership configurations, while reviving sometensionsinherited from a conflictual past.
Fundamentally, a detailed understanding of local realities remains essential: PNG, due to its great diversity, cannot be approached as a monolithic block, and any standardized approach carries risks of inadequacy. It should also be recalled that cooperation takes place in a fragile context: tight budgets, challenges in terms of professionalization,corruption, fragilities or evenscandalsinstitutional, andoffsetsurban elites, constitute as many factors likely to affect the implementation of cooperation projects.
Finally, the question of thesaturationA partnership approach must be taken into account. In a country where cooperation offers are multiplying and where resources—both human and financial—are limited, the challenge is not so much to accumulate initiatives as to rationalize them. While it is a useful and appreciated partner, France remains structurally a secondary actor in PNG’s security ecosystem.
Ultimately, the consolidation of a lasting partnership is based on fundamental principles ofreciprocity, oflisteningand ofrespectlocal priorities, echoingwantoklocal. In this regard, a proverb in Tok Pisin (local pidgin) accurately sums up the spirit in which this relationship can unfold:I will hear your word, but you will hear my word” (‘If you listen to me, I will listen to you.’)
Elise Barandon is a reserve officer (French Navy) at the Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy (DGRIS) and a doctoral associate at the Strategic Research Institute of the Military School (IRSEM).
–ref. A historic visit to Paris: Papua New Guinea, a key player in the security game in Oceania –https://theconversation.com/a-historic-visit-in-paris-papua-new-guinea-key-player-in-the-security-game-in-oceania-280561