Source: French to English Tester Published on: 2026-04-06
Source: The Conversation – France in French (3)– By Nicolas Minvielle, Doctor of Economics, specialist in innovation and defense issues, Audencia
The processes that lead to war go through stages and patterns studied by the social sciences. Knowing and detecting the signs of escalation make it possible to mobilize other tools – diplomatic or political – for conflict resolution.
Historically, peace is more frequent than war: most rivalries between human groups – whether organizations, communities, or states – do not lead to armed confrontation. War or conflicts of all kinds are also costly, risky, and potentially destructive. Understanding why war breaks out therefore requires explaining not only why tensions exist – they are almost permanent – but especially why the mechanisms that prevent violence cease to function, making a shift to war acceptable.
First of all, the idea of a single cause of war is misleading. Armed conflicts rarely arise from an isolated event or a sudden decision. They more often result from a progressive deterioration of peace, during which a series of institutional, political, and social barriers successively break down. War then appears less as a breaking point than as the culmination of a trajectory. From this perspective, peace is not the absence of tensions; it is an unstable equilibrium.
Next, the question of justifying the war. The actors who wage it always tell their story. In other words, both the States and the armed groups invoke justificatory narratives – fight against terrorism, national defense, stabilization, or liberation. These narratives are not necessarily false, but they rarely constitute the complete explanation for the turn to violence. An analysis regarding the reasons for conflicts must therefore go beyond the declarative, to identify the deeper mechanisms that first make violence possible, and then acceptable.
Reading war as a trajectory, rather than as an event, thus allows for a better understanding of why it remains a constant possibility in human history.
A “simple” map: three main families of causes
Three main mechanisms structure this shift between peace and war, gradually making compromise impossible.
The first refers to grievances, that is to say toeconomic injusticesor political that fuel collective mobilizations. Armed conflicts emerge more easily when entire groups perceive themselvesas durably disadvantagedin access to resources, power, or recognition. When these frustrations become collective and long-lasting, theviolence can appear as a means of obtaining reparation or visibility. The Sri Lankan conflict provides an illustration of this. From the 1950s onward, several language and administrative policies marginalized the Tamil minority in access to public employment, higher education, and political representation. Thisaccumulation of inequalitiesgradually feeds the radicalization of a part of the Tamil movement and contributes to the formation of the Liberation Tigers, who will lead an armed insurrection for many years.
The second mechanism concerns the opportunities of war. Frustrations alone are not enough to produce an armed conflict; the violent option must also become materially feasible. Research shows that conflicts are more likely when opportunity costs are low – for example, in contexts of poverty or unemployment – and when sources of funding exist. Exploitable natural resources, illicit economies, or control of strategic territories can provide armed groups with the means tosupport a sustainable mobilization. The civil war ofSierra Leoneis an example with the rebels of the Revolutionary United Front who manage to finance their insurrection thanks to the control of alluvial diamond deposits. These resources allow them to buy weapons, recruit fighters, and prolong the war despite the absence of massive popular support.
The third mechanism concerns the institutional structures that frame conflict management. Societies normally have institutions—political, judicial, or administrative systems—that allow disputes to be resolved without resorting to violence. When these institutions becomeweak, biased, or incapable of guaranteeing the agreements concluded, rivalries can escalate into confrontations. The collapse of the Somali state in the early 1990s illustrates this phenomenon. After the fall of Siad Barre’s regime in 1991, rivalry between clans turned into armed conflicts, in a context where no recognized authority could impose or guarantee a lasting compromise.
At the heart of these dynamics is always the same question: who wins and who pays for the war? When certain actors can capture the benefits of the conflict—political power, control of resources, or economic rents—while externalizing its costs onto the population, escalation becomes more likely. The case of theFalklands Warillustrates this example: a junta facing internal challenges and thinking it will find a solution to its situation in the opening of the conflict.
In this perspective, and as demonstrated byBlattman, war appears when thecompromise ceases to be workable. This moment generally corresponds to the gradual collapse of the mechanisms that allow adversaries to negotiate rather than fight. The European crisis of 1914 illustrates this mechanism well: after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, several mediation attempts fail and military mobilizations follow one another, gradually reducing the space for compromise.
The biological dimension and group dynamics
Beyond economic and institutional factors, war also takes root in deeply human dynamics. Research stemming from anthropology and evolutionary psychology, particularlyMike Martin’s analysishighlight the central role of status, belonging, and leadership in collective violence behaviors.
Human societies are structured around logics of hierarchy and prestige. Leaders can mobilize these dynamics tostrengthen their positionor strengthen the cohesion of a group in the face of an external enemy. From this perspective, war can appear as a mechanism for consolidating power or restoring collective status.
Group dynamics also play a determining role. Individuals tend to favor their own group — a well-documented phenomenon in social psychology. This polarization of “us” and “them” can transform material rivalries into identity conflicts.
The “Road to War” moment
In addition to the factors mentioned, four elements potentially exacerbate the situation and facilitate the transition to war.
Strategic uncertainty constitutes a primary factor. Actors may misjudge the intentions or capabilities of their adversaries, and believe that it is necessary to go to war or that the other side will do so. The Yom Kippur War in 1973 shows how strategic uncertainty can trigger war: Israel underestimates the Egyptian and Syrian intentions,misinterprets several warning signals, and finds himself surprisedby an offensive that its decision-makers considered unlikely.
The credibility issues of the commitments of each stakeholder also play a central role. If an agreement cannot be guaranteed over time — especially when the balance of power shifts — the actors may prefer to fight immediately to avoid a future situation of weakness. The most well-known example here beingRusso-Japanese War of 1904which illustrates the problem of credibility of commitments: Japan fears that Russia will gradually strengthen its position in Manchuria to the point of rendering any future compromise meaningless, which leads Tokyo to prefer immediate war to negotiations without guarantees.
Perception errors further reinforce these dynamics: overestimation of one’s own strengths, underestimation of the adversary, or spirals of mistrust. To put it bluntly, the shift toward war occurs when actors have a poor understanding of their probability of winning (at least one of the two…). Within this framework, deceptive actions aimed at hiding capabilities or intentions complicate strategic assessment and can push toward the outbreak of a conflict.
Finally, immaterial incentives – honor, humiliation, revenge, or sacralization of the conflict – can transform a confrontation into an existential conflict. The1914 crisisillustrates, for example, the way in which national honor can lock diplomatic options:for Vienna as for Saint Petersburg, retreating would have meantto lose face, which contributed to turning a regional crisis into a general war.
Reading the trajectories of the conflict
Understanding war thus consists less in identifying a single cause than in observing the trajectories that lead to the breakdown of the compromise.
This understanding is not only a matter of historical analysis. It can also contribute to conflict prevention. Identifying warning signs — rising inequalities between groups, persistent political exclusion, weakening of institutions, or radicalization of identity narratives — sometimes allows intervention before the mechanisms of violence become irreversible.
This is precisely the objective ofearly warning systems(early warning systems) developed by manyinternational organizations. These devices try to detectweak signalsescalation – political tensions, institutional degradation, social polarization, or progressive militarization of rivalries – in order to enable diplomatic or political interventions before the conflict breaks out.
Nicolas Minvielle is a member of the steering committee of La Fabrique de la Cité, he was a facilitator of the Defense Red Team and is a retired Lieutenant Colonel at the Future Combat Command of the French Army.
Marie Roussie is a member of the Making Tomorrow Collective and the company Alt-a. She worked within the Defense Ministry’s Red Team, the research field for her thesis. Since then, she has continued the strategic and forward-looking exploration of military operational theaters with various actors.
–ref. What are the steps that precede a war? –https://theconversation.com/what-are-the-steps-that-precede-a-war-277872