Source: French to English Tester Published on: 2026-03-29
Source: The Conversation – France in French (3)– By Xavier Carpentier-Tanguy, Indo-Pacific, Geopolitics of the marine worlds, networks and actors of influence, public diplomacy, Sciences Po
The seas and oceans worldwide are primarily passageways for commercial and military ships, and as such become areas of conflict whose control is essential from both a strategic and economic point of view.
While Iran has restricted access to the Strait of Hormuz, causing a surge in insurance premiums and a sudden slowdown in oil and gas flows, the vulnerability of the world economy comes to light. The cross strikes, threats of “armed escorts,” and accelerated militarization of the Persian Gulf make this passage a laboratory of 21st-century conflicts.
This crisis does not arise out of nowhere: it continues a long history of power struggles over straits, canals, and inland seas. From Panama to Hormuz, through the Red Sea and the Arctic region, the same logics of controlling flows are at work.
From the Panama Canal to the Strait of Hormuz
Since 2025, the United States has intensified its strategic engagement to control maritime spaces and critical transit points, through a series of targeted military and diplomatic operations. In Latin America, this stance resulted in a direct intervention in Venezuela in January 2026, where a “large-scale attack” targeted military and port infrastructures, notably the Generalissimo Francisco de Miranda airbase and the port of La Guaira, the main maritime access to Caracas. This operation, namedAbsolute Resolve, enabled the capture of President Nicolás Maduro, accused of drug trafficking and regional destabilization, and confirmed the American intent to secure Caribbean routes and counter Chinese and Russian influence in the region.
As early as the 1980s, the United States had already established its presence in Central America, with operations such asUrgent Fury Ʌ Grenade in 1983, aiming to protect American nationals and tolimit Cuban influence. In December 1989, theOperation Just Causein Panama marked a turning point: nearly 27,000 American soldiers were deployed to overthrow General Manuel Noriega, a former ally who had become an obstacle to regional stability and tomastery of the Panama Canal, a strategic transit point for global trade.
More recently, American ambitions have extended to the Arctic. Let’s recall that the Trump administrationalready mentioned his willingness to acquire Greenland in 2019, willstrongly reaffirmed for a year. This initiative reveals the growing importance of polar maritime routes in a context of melting ice. This desire for control continued in 2025-2026 with the strengthening of patrols and military infrastructure in the region, aiming to secure access to the Northwest Passage and counter Russian and Chinese ambitions.
In February 2026, the United States launched Operation “Epic Fury“against Iran, a large-scale military campaign aimed at neutralizing Iranian ballistic and naval capabilities, as well as preventing any rapid reconstitution of these forces. Launched on February 28, 2026, this operation mobilized massive air strikes, drones, and joint-force coordination, confirming the American will to control the strategic spaces of the Middle East and secure energy and commercial flows — a will that was further reinforced by theclosure by Tehran of the Strait of Hormuz.
European involvement
Faced with this escalation,Europe reacted with determination. Several EU member states have deployed significant naval forces to secure Cyprus and the strategic maritime routes to Suez and Hormuz. Italy has deployed the frigateMartinengonear Cyprus alongside the Spanish frigateChristopher Columbus, while the Netherlands prepared the frigateHNLMS Evertsenfor regional operations. Germany has sent the frigateFGS North Rhine-Westphaliain the Cyprus area, and Greece has mobilized its new frigateKimon, equipped with a long-range air defense system, as well as the class frigateHydra Psara. The United Kingdom has announced the dispatch of the air defense destroyerHMS DragonIn Cyprus, equipped with the missile systemSea Viper, as well as helicopters equipped with anti-drone capabilities. France, finally, has ordered the deployment of its aircraft carrierCharles de Gaulle, which was still in the Baltic, with its embarked air assets and its escort of frigates to the Mediterranean.
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The French deployment off the coast regarding the war in Iran: legal framework and modes of action
This coordinated European mobilization aims to protect the British bases atCyprus, hit by Iranian drones, and to secure vital energy routes while traffic in the Strait of Hormuz remains a critical issue, disrupting the global supply of oil and gas.
In March 2026, the pressure exerted on Iran is part of this strategic continuity: it illustrates a doctrine of securing energy, commercial, and digital flows, now concentrated in pivotal areas such as the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, the western Mediterranean, and theUpper North.
The Strait of Hormuz, through which transit between20 and 25% of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas, remains the central bottleneck of the global economy. Its geography offers Tehran a structural lever to disrupt freedom of navigation. Themaritime intelligence analyses of 2024show that the contraction of traffic in this area results from indirect Iranian deterrence and the impact of insurance premiums, even in the absence of widespread mining. Unlike Gibraltar or Suez, ships passing through Hormuz reach directly the coasts of the Gulf, where petrochemical infrastructures, LNG terminals, and desalination units are concentrated, having become strategic targets.
Also to read:
From the Strait of Hormuz to Europe: understanding the speed of the spread of energy insecurity
The evolution of naval combat over the last decades
The American operation“Praying Mantis” in 1988, triggered after the mining of the USSSamuel B. Roberts, marked a turning point in maritime tensions between Washington and Tehran.
InThe confrontation at sea, Nicolas Mazzucchi demonstrates that the ocean is now as much a theater of confrontation as a mere space of circulation. In response, Iran has developed asymmetric capabilities, deploying a « naval dust » of hundreds of fast boats, supported by coastal missiles and drones. This architecture guarantees a permanent threat on maritime routes and ensures resilience against conventional strikes, while allowing targeted or massive retaliations against regional infrastructures.
Admiral Nicolas Vaujour, in his analyses on technological superiority – presented in his bookWars at sea–, emphasizes the imperative for modern navies to adapt to these new threats. The European industry responds to this challenge with sovereign solutions, such as the solutionOrange Drone Guardianlaunched in 2026, which strengthens the detection of intrusive drones and the protection of sensitive sites.
The vulnerability of alternative routes confirms that avoidance is not a viable solution. The drone attack against the Saudi port of Yanbu and theHouthi campaign in the Red Sea in autumn 2023have demonstrated that an actor linked to Tehran can paralyze up to 15% of global trade.
Also to read:
The return of naval blockades in the Black Sea and the Red Sea: towards the dismemberment of a common space?
In [Winning at sea], Thibault Lavernhe and François-Olivier Corman describe the current era as the “fifth age” of naval combat, where sensor saturation and the real-time coordination of attacks redefine the survival conditions of ships. The suspension of Houthi attacks in 2026 suggests a “strategic patience”: the militias keep this leverage for a future escalation, depending on regional power dynamics.
Because Tehran now extends its targets to digital infrastructures, with reported strikesagainst data centers in the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. This hybrid war aims to paralyze the global digital economy. The flow, whatever its nature, has strategic value. Preventing or reducing it is to weaken the opponent and influence possible negotiations.
In the Western Mediterranean, Algeria has strengthened its submarine fleetKiloarmed with missilesKalibr, signaling the capacity indication of a possible lockdown of the Strait of Gibraltar under aanti-access/area denial (A2/AD) bubble. This dissemination of contestation strategies of maritime spaces is also confirmed in the Upper North, where the exerciseNATO’s Cold Response 2026emphasizes mastery of the electromagnetic spectrum to neutralize enemy sensors before any kinetic engagement.
Access Denials (A2/AD) and Sovereignty Bubbles: Legal Issues and Limits of International Law
Anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategies and sovereignty bubbles are redefining geopolitical balances at sea, but raise major legal questions regarding theUnited Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, 1982). This treaty, ratified by 169 States, establishes the freedom of navigation on the high seas (Article 87) and strictly regulates the rights of coastal States in their territorial waters (Article 2) and exclusive economic zones (Article 56).
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The French EEZ, a lever of power for Paris in the Washington-Beijing duel
However, A2/AD practices, such as those deployed by Beijing in the South China Sea or by Iran in the Persian Gulf, exploit the gray areas of international law to restrict access to strategic spaces.
The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), in the casePhilippines vs. China(2016), aremindedthat maritime claims must respect the limits set by UNCLOS, notably regarding the delimitation of EEZs and innocent passage (Articles 19 and 24). A2/AD bubbles, by combining surface-to-air missiles, drones, and electronic warfare, test these principles: they can be interpreted as a violation of customary law if they arbitrarily restrict freedom of navigation, except in the case of a proven and proportionate threat. Jurists such asMyron H. NordquistandYu Minyou (Wuhan University)highlight that these strategies reveal the shortcomings of UNCLOS in the face of new technologies (drones, cyberattacks) and unilateral actions, calling for a strengthening of dispute resolution mechanisms (Part XV of UNCLOS) and the development of complementary customary norms.
In this context, where maritime flows—energy, commercial, and digital—become both challenges and weapons, the ability of States to ensure their continued control becomes a strategic imperative. It is this demand for control and resilience of flows in the face of disruptions that is echoed in the adapted motto.She is tossed by the waves but does not sink(which could be translated as “Crossed by flows, but never hindered”): we have stepped fully into the era of polemorhea – ofpolemos(the war) andrheos(the flow).
Xavier Carpentier-Tanguy does not work for, advise, own shares in, or receive funds from any organization that could benefit from this article, and has declared no affiliation other than his research institution.
–ref. « Fluxuat nec mergitur »: geopolitics of contemporary maritime flows and conflicts –https://theconversation.com/fluxuat-nec-mergitur-geopolitique-des-flux-et-conflits-maritimes-contemporains-278964