Source: The Conversation – in French– By Amélie Chalivet, PhD Candidate and Lecturer in International Relations, University of Quebec in Montreal (UQAM)
In May 2025, a briefoutbreak of violencebetweenIndia and Pakistanbrings Kashmir back to the center of international attention.
The American president Donald Trump seizes the opportunity to announce aceasefirewhich Washington presents as “mediated”. For New Delhi,it is a diplomatic setback.
To understand this reaction, it is important to take into account both the history of the Indo-Pakistani conflict and the specificities of the American approach under Donald Trump.
Kashmir and the issue of internationalization
Since the Partition of British India in 1947, which created two autonomous states, India and Pakistan, Kashmir (a Himalayan region at the junction of the two countries) has been a central issue and a source of tensions. The two countries have waged a war over this issue since 1947. OneUN mediation, at India’s request, then made it possible to reach a ceasefire in 1948.
In 1972, theSimla agreementsmark a break with this policy of external mediation, specifying that disputes will henceforth be resolved through direct bilateral negotiations. Since that date, and even more so since 2019, the Indian government has sought to reject the idea that a third party, whether a State or the United Nations, could intervene in negotiations regarding Kashmir. The Simla agreements have since been used as a shield against interference by great powers.
On August 5, 2019, Narendra Modi’s Indian government nevertheless repealedArticle 370 of the Constitution. This Article granted the former State of Jammu and Kashmir a special status and a certain level of autonomy, anchored in the Constitution since its accession to India in 1947. The repeal of the Article results in the transformation of Jammu and Kashmir into two territories (Jammu and Kashmir on one side, and Ladakh on the other) directly administered by the central government, in a context ofstrengtheningof state control.
Kashmir has long been treated as an international conflict, which legitimized, for example, the involvement of the UN. By removing the special status of Jammu and Kashmir, New Delhi sought to reframe it as a matter strictly under Indian authority.
Pakistan has done the opposite and has sought to internationalize this issue even more by regularly referring to Kashmir in itsspeech at the United Nationsand inthreatening to suspendthe Simla accords. It is in this context of fundamental opposition on the question of external mediation that the events of May 2025 come into play.
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The Four-Day War and the American mediation
Following a violent four-day conflict that took place in a thick media fog, hostilities between the two States ended on May 10, 2025, with theannouncementof a ceasefire by the American president. He attributes this success to his own intervention and diplomatic skill.
Beyond this announcement, Donald Trump proposes to act as a mediator between the two countries within the framework of negotiations on the specific subject of Kashmir, invoking a conflict“a thousand years old”that it would be capable of resolving. However, from the Indian perspective, this mention of international negotiations concerning Kashmir breaks acomplete tabooand calls into question its sovereignty over this territory.
Mediation has frequently served as an exit route for governments unable to de-escalate a conflict. The attitude of the American president, who insists on his personal role and multiplies public statements, has nevertheless helped create a significantfeeling of discomfortIn New Delhi. Indeed, this mediation was particularlybad receivedin India, perceived as imposed and as part of an attempt at internationalization.
In official speeches, New Delhi hasinsistedon the fact that the de-escalation had been decided bilaterally, that “the exact date, time, and wording of the agreement” had been determined by the Director Generals of Military Operations of both countries. TheIndian leaderscontinued to deny American involvement throughout the year, while Trump would have mentioned his role as a “peacemaker” in South Asiamore than sixty times. For his part, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif openly thanked the American president for his involvement and his“proactive role”in the region.
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Alongside this complete divergence of narratives, a rapprochement between the United States and Pakistan has taken place, as illustrated by the invitation of the Pakistani Chief of Staff,Asim Munir, at the White House in June 2025. This visit was accompanied by asupportPakistani to Trump’s candidacy for the Nobel Peace Prize, then, more recently, to highlighting Pakistan’s role in thenegotiationsrelated to the conflict in the Middle East.
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The issue of mediation put into perspective
Historical comparison reveals a constant: international mediation is never neutral. In 1966 (before the Simla Agreement), Soviet mediation in Tashkent helped restore thestate existing before the warFollowing the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965 and gave the USSR the opportunity“to assert its role as a leader in the region”.
Following the Kargil war in 1999, the United States hasdemanded the Pakistani withdrawalwithout positioning themselves as official mediators, a stance thenperceived positivelyby New Delhi.
Since then, India’s conception of its own status on the international stage has evolved. For New Delhi, the mediation of 2025 involves a“rehyphenation”(rallying by a hyphen) which places it on an equal footing with Islamabad. This development is thus perceived by India as a challenge to its status, which sees itself rather as the rival to China in the region.
Furthermore, the form of mediation mattered: a discreet mediation can allow the parties to “save face,” but a performative and media-covered mediation, like the one the Trump administration congratulated itself for conducting in 2025, reduces India to a passive actor. By proposing a negotiation around a conflict“of a thousand years”and by claiming the Nobel Peace Prize for this role of mediator, the United States, through Trump’s voice, was perceived by New Delhi as denying the country’s ability to manage its own crises.
This mediation is therefore not neutral and reveals a structural asymmetry as well as a limited mutual understanding between the two partners. While the Indo-American partnership is far from broken, this discomfort related to the 2025 mediation weighs on relations between the two states, as they attempt to finalize a trade agreement following the tariffs imposed by Washington. This encourages India to continue diversifying its partnerships, with the European Union and Canada among the primary ones.
Amélie Chalivet does not work for, advise, own shares in, receive funds from any organization that could benefit from this article, and has declared no other affiliation than her research institution.
–ref. India-Pakistan Conflict: Trump’s Impromptu Mediation Embarrasses New Delhi –https://theconversation.com/india-pakistan-conflict-trumps-unsolicited-mediation-embarrasses-new-delhi-278286