Armed attacks in Mali: the Tuareg demands are the key to peace

Source: French to English Tester Published on: 2026-05-11

Source: The Conversation – in French– By Olayinka Ajala, Associate professor in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett University

The already precarious security situation in Mali deteriorated further at the end of April 2026. Attackswell coordinatedtargeted several cities and cost the life of the Minister of Defense, Sadio Camara, as well as several Malian soldiers.

These events are the culmination of aincrease in attacksagainst the army and the institutions of the State in Mali over the past years.

We conductresearchon insecurity and politics in West Africa and the Sahel for more than a decade. We believe that the recent attacks originate from complaints expressed by the Tuaregs, which the current military regime has not addressed. The Tuaregs are nomadic Berber communities from northern Mali.

First factor: the inability or refusal to respond to dissatisfactionof the Tuaregs. Their grievances mainly concern political autonomy, marginalization, cultural recognition, control of resources, security, and what they perceive as neglect by the State.

Second factor: the continued use of force by the army against the rebels in the northern regions, without regard for collateral damage. The Tuaregs have long contested themilitarization policiesof successive Malian governments.

Third factor: the unequal distribution of resources, which keeps the northern region in amarginalization. These notably include the resources of northern Mali such as gold deposits, salt mines, pastures, and strategic trade routes. The revenues generated from these sources remain controlled by the state center, based in the south.

Addressing economic marginalization could offer several advantages. It could alleviate the grievances of the Tuaregs, restore trust in the Malian state, and shift the motivations of the conflict, diverting it from rebellion towards political inclusion, stability, and lasting peace in northern Mali.

The situation

In April 2026, theSupport Group for Islam and Muslims (JNIM)has allied with the Tuareg rebels ofAzawad Liberation Front (FLA)to attack several cities in the country.

This echoes a similar attack that occurred in 2012, when the Tuaregs and militants affiliated withAl-Qaedahad launched an offensive against the state. The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), dominated by the Tuaregs, attempted to secede and triggered a rebellion.

The MNLA is aseparatist movement dominated by the Tuaregs. Founded in 2011, it is mainly composed of former fighters returning from Libya and Tuaregs from northern Mali. The organization had approximately10,000 fighters at its peak in 2012.

Despite their numbers, they did not have the military strength necessary to maintain control of the territory. They therefore allied themselves with the Islamists of Ansar Dine, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), andMovement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO). Shortly after repelling the Malian forces at the end of 2012, the alliance disintegrated.

The Islamist groups werebetter equipped and funded. They drove out the secular separatists from major cities such as Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal.The interventionFrench forces in 2013 helped the Malian government regain most of the lost territories.

AQMI and its allies then retreated into the mountainsand the surrounding desert areas. They have adopted guerrilla tactics, including suicide bombings and the use of landmines.

The withdrawalFrench forces in 2022 seem to have strengthened the boldness of Islamist militants.He raisedthe anti-terrorism pressure disrupted intelligence services and logistics, and created a security gap in a context of weak capacities of the Malian state. This allowed Islamist groups to expand their operations, recruit locally, and regain territorial influence.

Lessons not learned

The regimemilitary of Assimi Goïtahas not been able to respond to the demands of the Tuareg separatists. The Tuaregs have long complained about being excluded from power by the Malian state dominated by the south. Since the country’s independence in 1960,the Tuareg leaders argued thatThe structure of the Malian State does not reflect their political identity, their economic interests, and their traditions of governance. The demand for autonomy or autonomous status has been suppressed, often by force.

More recently,the worsening of drought, desertification, and climate variabilityhas devastated the livelihoods of Tuareg herders. These grievances predate the Islamist insurgency and are essential to understanding the group’s approach.

The second unaddressed question is that counterterrorism operations use force, which causes collateral damage.A recent analysisshows that anti-terrorist operations carried out in northern and central Mali have inflicted considerable damage on civilians, population displacements, and collective punishments. These have notably taken the form of arbitrary arrests and massacres.

These factors created conditions thatthe Islamist groups exploitedFor purposes of recruitment, territorial control, and legitimation.

The responsibility for this situation was attributed to the successive Malian regimes and toprevious French operations. This is one of the main reasons why French interventions have beenconsidered failures.

The third major factor of violence in Mali is related to the unequal distribution of resources. Since independence, public investments, infrastructure, social services andpolitical attention has been strongly focusedin the south of the country.

Previous peace agreementspromised decentralization, funding, and the integration of northern elites and former combatants. But their implementation has been slow, even nonexistent.

Is there a way out?

A response to the Tuareg question must be found to reduce tensions between the regions of the country. It can be said that the Tuareg actors made mistakes twice by concluding agreements with jihadist groups. But this does not in any way diminish the necessity to address the structural inequalities and long-standing grievances that underlie the Tuareg claims.

To achieve this, the Malian regime can draw inspiration from the model of the former presidentMahamadou Issoufouof Niger. Before his accession to the presidency, the Nigerien Tuaregs were also disadvantaged. When he became president in 2011,he has:

integrated the Tuareg elites and former rebels into the institutions of the State
decentralized the authority of the State by granting administrative and budgetary control at the regional level
implemented programs ofdisarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.

Issoufou also invested in theinfrastructure development, directly targeting the needs of the Tuaregs: pastoralism, education, livelihood support. This included pastoralism, education, and livelihood support. Access to water in arid pastoral areas has been improved. In addition, connectivity and road safety have been strengthened.

Responding to the Tuareg demands would thus help reduce tensions in Mali.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

–ref. Armed attacks in Mali: the claims of the Tuaregs are the key to peace –https://theconversation.com/armed-attacks-in-mali-the-claims-of-the-tuaregs-are-the-key-to-peace-282329