Source: French to English Tester Published on: 2026-05-07
Source: The Conversation – in French– By Brendon Novel, PhD candidate in political science, University of Montreal
In a region strategic for global trade, ideological enemies could cooperate today. The Houthi insurgents in Yemen and the Somali group Al-Shabaab, the most powerful Al-Qaeda branch in the world, are reportedly exchanging logistical and military resources according to several UN and U.S. intelligence reports, although there is no question of a formal alliance.
Theseexchangesparticularly concern military technologies, including drones, which could increase Al-Shabaab’s capability to operate well beyond Somali territory, in an area already marked by severe security tensions.
The Ansar Allah movement (whose supporters are the “Houthis”) controls part of northern Yemen and has military capabilities enabling it to disrupt navigation in the Red Sea. Al-Shabab, for its part, controls large portions of Somali territory and conducts an armed insurgency against the central government.
As part of my doctoral research in political science at the University of Montreal, I became interested in security issues in the Horn of Africa, and more broadly in the Red Sea basin, which constitutes one of the main trade routes between Asia and Europe via the Suez Canal.
Opportunistic links
Thefirst mentions of cooperationbetween the two groups date back to 2024. The UN panel of experts on Yemen is the first to have warned of aexpanding arms traffickingbetween the Somali and Yemeni coasts, both plagued by conflicts since 1991 and 2014 respectively. This same panel was also concerned about aincreasing cooperationbetween the two organizations, both operationally and logistically.
Houthi cadres have indeed reportedly gone to Somalia to establish direct links there. It is also likely that connections have been made by individuals outside the two groups, but integrated intocriminal networks linked to them. Smuggling flows of all kinds — including arms — have indeed long thrived along the coasts of the Horn of Africa and Yemen.
At first glance, it may seem counterintuitive that these two organizations cooperate. The Houthis follow Zaydi Shiite doctrine, while Al-Shabaab belongs to a rigorist branch of Sunni Islam that is particularly anti-Shiite.
The existence ofcircumstantial material interestsbetween two ideologically opposed forces is, however, nothing unprecedented. The Houthi movement seeks to gain regional influence and diversify its sources of income, while Al-Shabaab aims to enrich its military arsenal.
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Al-Shabaab in search of drones
Still according to the UN, Al-Shabaab militants are believed to have been trained in Yemen in drone technologies and in the manufacture of sophisticated explosive devices. Through this, Al-Shabaab seeks to make its attacks more effective and deadly against the Somali government forces and their international supporters.
In doing so, the Houthis would have alreadyprovided armed dronesto the Somali militants who alsorequested guided missiles. Widely used during Houthi attacks on ships in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden between 2023 and 2025, this equipment would give Al-Shabaab an even greater disruptive capability, in Somalia and beyond.
Until now, the organization has been using drones mainly for surveillance and intelligence activities. The acquisition of offensive drones would give its militants an additional leverage against an already struggling Somali army.
An almost continuous territorial expansion
Since its emergence in the mid-2000s, Al-Shabaab has established itself as the most powerful branch of Al-Qaeda in the world. The organization today controls large portions of Somali territory, in the central and southern parts of the country. Its strength is primarily based on the military, political, and economic failures of the Somali government and its foreign supporters.
Al-Shabaab is indeed thrivingon the failure of the Somali state reconstruction process according to a federal model. The organization particularly exploits the rivalries — sometimes violent — between the federal army and the regional forces seeking autonomy. Its militants take advantage of these increasingly significant discordances, while the central authority in Mogadishu, the capital, strives to centralize the country’s power and economic resources.
Like the Somali army, the international forces engaged alongside them since the mid-2000s — notably those of the African Union — are challenged by Al-Shabaab.
The United States is also struggling. In 2025, the number of U.S. strikes in Somalia has notnever been so important. While they have helped weaken the Islamic State group in the north of the country (also suspected of links with the Houthis), they have barely affected Al-Shabab’s territorial control.
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Risks of increased regional instability
After Operation Hilaac (“lightning”), carried out with the support of Washington against the Islamic State in the autonomous province of Puntland in the north, a new operation, Onkod (“thunder”), is being prepared against Al-Shabab in a coastal region to the west of Puntland. The militants of the organization are therefore strengthening their positions there. Their actions — for the moment limited — could then spill over into the Gulf of Aden, which sees nearly 30% of the world’s container traffic.
Between 2023 and 2025 already, this maritime passage underwent a period of great instability due to Houthi attacks in the Red Sea insupport for the Palestinian people. These operations have mobilized the attention and resources of the international forces present in the region, contributing to aresurgence of piracy attacks from the Somali coasts. If these attacks have decreased today, areturn of the instability is not excluded.
A more marked presence of Al-Shabaab in northern Somalia could contribute to this. At the same time, theHouthis could also contribute to the instability of this maritime area, in a context of open war between Iran, the United States, and Israel since February. The global economy, already exposed to disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz, would then be all the more weakened.
Brendon Novel does not work for, advise, own shares in, receive funds from any organization that could benefit from this article, and has declared no other affiliations than his research institution.
–ref. Yemen–Somalia: the worrying cooperation between ideological enemies threatens global trade –https://theconversation.com/yemen-somalia-the-worrying-cooperation-between-ideological-enemies-threatens-global-trade-278176