Source: French to English Tester Published on: 2026-04-24
Source: The Conversation – in French– By Lamine Savané, PhD political science, ATER, CEPEL (UMR 5112) CNRS, Montpellier, Postdoctoral researcher PAPA, University of Ségou
Long spared by jihadist groups, the schools in the village of Dia in Tenenkou in the Mopti region, have finallywere closedunder the pressure of armed groups, notably the Katibat Macina, affiliated with JNIM, the main jihadist group active in this region. This closure would be anecdotal if it only affected the Mopti region. However, almost all regions of Mali are affected by this closure of schools.
As researchers in political science and education, we recently published a study in a collective volume onThe African school facing security crises. This research is based on surveys conducted mainly in the regions of Ségou (Farako district) and Mopti (Ténénkou district) from 2022 to 2025.
We wanted to understand, among other questions, why the school was one of the first institutions that jihadist groups targeted whenever they wanted to extend their influence in a locality. Beyond the school, jihadist groups also target all basic social services, whether they are public administrations, police stations, or weekly markets.
Fragilities of the educational system well before the crisis
In Mali, as in other neighboring countries,more than one million children are not enrolled in school, for reasons unrelated to the security crisis. It remainssignificant disparities between children in rural areas and those in the urban world. Their access to school being strongly determined by their place of residence, children living in rural areas are often forced to walk several kilometers to reach the nearest primary school. There is also an urban/rural disparity in terms of qualified teachers,the villages serving as assignment locations for beginners.
All these difficulties will worsen with the security crisis, especially since rural areas are more susceptible to the influence of jihadist groups. The overall figures on school closures have continued to increase across the entire Malian territory since the beginning of the crisis in 2012. According tothe dataProvided by Cluster Education on Mali, in January 2026, 2343 schools out of a total of 10,766 were non-functional, affecting 702,900 out-of-school children.
This school closure rate represents 22% of schools in Mali. In the Ségou region, 24% of schools are not operational, while this rate rises to 35% in the Mopti region, behind Ménaka (52%).
The impact of the security crisis on schools
The closure of schools does not only affect the students: teachers are also concerned. According to the same source, there are 14,058 teachers on technical unemployment. However, the main threat to schools comes essentially from jihadist groups. These are mainly areas where there is a withdrawal of the state (administrations, justice, security forces). The administration is only partially present in these localities under pressure from jihadist groups. The populations have difficulty accessing basic social services.
All these difficulties that the school was encountering will be exacerbated by the security crisis. Indeed, the jihadist groups constitutethe primary actors of insecurity. They are responsible for numerous attacks, whether directed against the Malian Armed Forces (FAMA), other non-state armed groups, state representatives, communities, or the civilian population that generally resists them. The closure of schools is the main indicator of jihadist presence. The longer schools remain open, the more it proves that jihadist influence is diminished.
Conversely, the closure of schools is a manifestation of increased jihadist presence. Schools are a preferred target of jihadist groups because of the critical thinking they foster. In areas under jihadist influence, schools are often vandalized or even burned as a warning. Teachers who want to resist by continuing to teachare threatenedby the jihadists.
Several teachers were arrested before being released, sometimes following mediations. Faced with these real risks, some eventually give up their posts. All jihadist movements agree on this point, their opposition to the “Republican” or “formal” school. The instruction is crystal clear: no “formal school” in areas under their influence. This is what an NGO agent in the Mopti region explains to us. Originally from the area, he was able to see the impact of insecurity on schools. This insecurity primarily stems from jihadists:
Regarding the schools, in several cases, they were ransacked, all the doors and windows were removed. The jihadists took everything that could be carried away, such as desks and benches. Nothing remains of the school, and the question of a possible reopening is not on the agenda (interview, May 2023, Ténenkou).
Schools as a whole are attacked by jihadist movements. In this regard, the etymology of the Nigerian terrorist movement Boko Haram is illustrative. Its name literally means in the Hausa language that the “book” or the Western school, implying “Western civilization,” is haram, that is, forbidden by religion. In Boko Haram’s phraseology, the embezzlement of public funds by Nigerian elites, bad governance, injustice, the depravity of morals, all the ills of Nigerian society have one and only cause: the Western school.
Jihadist movements blame republican schools forto spread the teaching of the unbelievers (Westerners)that they consider contrary to their vision of Salafist Islam against the values of Salafist Islam. The jihadists therefore impose that these schools become Quranic schools or that teaching be conducted in Arabic. The populations are rather encouraged to send their children to Quranic schools.
School dropout and vulnerability
The consequence of this pressure from jihadists is the deprivation of more than 702,900 children of their right to education, thus compromising their future. Teachers in these areas, intimidated or even threatened — several of them having been arrested before being released in Farako — end up abandoning their posts, fearing for their lives. On the other hand, the populations are rather encouraged to send their children to Quranic schools. The objective is clear: it is the end of any school presence in these zones.
Theyattackphysically the teachers, retrieve their belongings, burn the teaching materials, and in some cases, take the food intended for the students. One of the direct consequences of this ban is the deprivation of thousands of Malian children from their right to education, thus compromising their future. As a result, these uneducated children may constitute a large pool of future recruitment for these various jihadist organizations.
Mopti and Ségou affected
In the Mopti and Ségou regions, schools for the most part began to be affected starting in 2017, with exceptions like in the Ténénkou district where closures have been observed since 2012, involving the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), a Tuareg separatist group that has since become the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA). But many of these schools in Ségou and Mopti closed their doors in 2018. The closures mainly concerned the Mopti region, the original stronghold of the Katibat Macina. Already at that time, most schools in rural communities were/were closed.
From 2019 onwards, functional schools were mainly found in the administrative centers of the circles in the Mopti region, such as Mopti city, Ténenkou, Youwarou. Some teachers therefore took refuge in the regional capitals following threats from jihadist groups.
The figures regarding school closures are significant in the Mopti region. Out of the 829 schools in the region, 289 are closed due to the jihadist threat, which results in a closure rate of35 %. These closures affect more than 86,700 children who are left out of school, and 1,734 teachers who leave the rural municipalities.
The strategies observable in the field
Despite the high number of non-functional schools, some remain open. Two main strategies emerge in practice: securing schools and community engagement. Securing schools is what has been called the “top-down” strategy, meaning the one deployed by state authorities. This strategy involves deploying military detachments in cities to restore the presence of the State.
The military presence reassures the school staff and allows them to work calmly. The cities characterized by a strong military presence are the least affected by school closures. In Tenenkou town and in Dioura, schools operate normally due to the deterrent military presence.
It wasthe case in Diondjoriwhose blockade was lifted in November 2023 – andAt Diafarabébefore these two municipalities became the subject of a blockade.
The second strategy from the “bottom” concerns community engagement. This “bottom-up” strategy benefits both from popular imaginations that confer a specific status on certain localities, and also from contacts with jihadist groups.
The village of Dia, the administrative center of the commune of Diaka, was illustrative of this strategy. Without the presence of military forces and dozo self-defense groups, local community dynamics managed to maintain the functioning of the schools. It was about the primacy of peaceful coexistence as a mode of governance of society.
With the recent closure of schools in Dia, it marks the limit of the “bottom-up” strategy that invites us to analyze jihadist groups through the lens of their ideological matrix resistant to any criticism.
Les auteurs ne travaillent pas pour, ne consultent pas, ne détiennent pas d’actions et ne reçoivent aucun financement de la part d’une entreprise ou organisation susceptible de bénéficier de cet article, et n’ont révélé aucune affiliation pertinente au-delà de leur fonction académique.
–ref. Mali: why jihadists are closing schools –https://theconversation.com/mali-why-jihadists-close-schools-280023