Source: French to English Tester Published on: 2026-05-04
Source: The Conversation – in French– By Barthélemy Courmont, Director of the Master’s in History — International Relations, Catholic Institute of Lille (ICL)
The only relative respect that Donald Trump has for the long-term alliances contracted by the United States fuels concern in Taiwan: if the People’s Republic of China, increasingly powerful militarily, decides to invade the island, will it be able to count on Washington’s support? And even without a direct invasion, might it not be sacrificed if the President of the United States decides to make one of those big “deals” with Beijing that he so much likes?
It goes without saying that a confrontation between China and Taiwan would, even before the involvement of other actors, have profound impacts on international security and the economy. It is therefore essential to take a clear-headed and careful look at the current tensions in the Taiwan Strait. However, these tensions cannot be understood without taking into account Washington’s positioning, in a triangular relationship that American political scientist Richard Bush has described as“knot”.
It is appropriate today to question this knot. On one hand, because of the evolution of the interdependent power balance, which now places Beijing in a very advantageous position. On the other hand, because of the strategic missteps of Washington and an American foreign policy that shows worrying signs of decline.
The Chinese clamp tightens
Since 2016, there have been increasing Chinese military provocations involving naval and air capabilities, with multiple incursions into Taiwan’s airspace and territorial waters. Added to this is a threatening discourse: several Chinese military officials have notably insisted on preparations for an invasion. Xi Jinping, more measured, has reminded that unification must be achieved through peaceful means… however, without excluding the possibility of resorting to force, and thus invasion. Although the tensions in the strait are not new and must be analyzed with caution, they have very clearly escalated over the past few years.
The first factor of tension is political. After the election in January 2024 of(William) Lai Ching-te, known for its meticulous defense of the island’s sovereignty, Beijing has continued its pressures and kept attacking Taiwan by all legal means at its disposal, notably through international organizations, includingTaiwan is barred from access under the “one China” principle, or by torpedoing Taipei’s diplomatic efforts with its few partners. The Taiwanese president has thus recently had toto give up a trip to Eswatini(formerly Swaziland, in southern Africa) due to the temporary cancellation of flight authorizations by several countries located along the route.
The second factor is military. Once unable to plan an invasion of Taiwan, China is now in a position of strength. While Taipei has official support, the People’s Republic knows it has a strategic advantage that allows it to give substance to its aggressive rhetoric.At the twentieth national congress of the Chinese Communist PartyIn October 2022, Xi Jinping even announced a strengthening of the military apparatus to equip his country with a “world-class army” by 2027. More recently, on the occasion of the National People’s Assembly, the usual phrase of “peaceful reunification” was replaced by that of“firm reunification”in the report on the budget of Prime Minister Li Qiang.
A military escalation in the Taiwan Strait could lead to a devastating conflict for the region and would have very heavy consequences for the global economy. Indeed,this strait is a major communication route for international trade. The halt of exports and imports from Taiwan would disrupt logistic supply chains and the activity of numerous economic centers in the region, Europe, and the rest of the world. This dependence on Taiwan has strengthened over the past years,Thanks to the development of exports of high-tech products, particularly semiconductors.
Behind Beijing’s aggressive rhetoric and the risks of military escalation, the Strait relationship nevertheless continues to offer certain guarantees of maintenance ofstatus quo.
China is aware of the fact that an invasion of Taiwan would expose it to very serious consequences, military first (Taiwan’s response capabilities against Chinese cities, the possibility of American but also Japanese involvement), diplomatic next (risk of isolation and sanctions), economic finally, when consideringthe importance of economic and commercial links between the two shores of the strait. By embarking on a risky invasion of Taiwan, Beijing would thus be taking an enormous risk, to the point that theThe question of “the aftermath” is being raised in Chinese decision-making circles.
Washington, a reliable partner?
The close relationship is triangular: it involves the support of the United States for Taiwan, notably under theTaiwan Relations Actadopted by the American Congress in 1979 and some“Six assurances”data given in 1982 to Taiwan by Ronald Reagan. These commit Washington not to set a date for the cessation of arms deliveries to Taiwan; not to consult Beijing on arms sales to Taiwan; not to act as a mediator between Taipei and Beijing; not to revise the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act; not to change its position on the issue of Taiwan’s sovereignty; and not to exert pressure on Taipei to open negotiations with Beijing.
This link was particularly at the center of attention in 1996 when, on the sidelines of the first presidential election in Taiwan, Washington deployed several warships in the strait to respond to Chinese provocations. A decade later, American support for Taiwan was contested on the occasion of the adoption by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) of aanti-secession lawindicating that any declaration of independence by Taiwan would lead to the use of force. Washington had indicated that its support would not necessarily be effective if the “provocation” came from Taipei.
Since then, the Sino-American relationship has become more complex, and Washington sees Taipei as a thorn in Beijing’s side. But Taiwan fears that China will take advantage of a leadership vacuum in Washington to launch an assault. The credibility of the United States is thus being reassessed in Taiwan. The American withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, the reversal on Ukraine and, more generally, the relative but real decline of U.S. influence in the world and their refusal to engage alongside traditional partners are perceived in Taipei assigns indicating that it is necessary to reconsider the relationship with Washington. The Taiwanese thus fear being “abandoned” by the American partner and becoming the subject of a“big bargaining”between Washington and Beijing.
The foreign policy deployed by the Trump administration heightens Taipei’s concerns. The ongoing conflict in the Middle East makes the Taiwanese fear a new credibility crisis for Washington, which not only struggles to define a coherent foreign policy, but also faces immense logistical challenges, particularly regarding ammunition.
It is in this context that the reactivation of the strategic partnership with Washington is favored in Taipei. Taiwan buys arms from the United States, without however having the guarantee that they will be delivered on time and that the American army would come to its aid in the event of a Chinese aggression.
During a meeting with American parliamentarians in Taipei on April 7, 2026, theTaiwanese president recalledthat the national defense budget will exceed 3% of the country’s GDP this year and will reach 5% by 2030. He also indicated that the government has proposed a special defense budget of 40 billion dollars (34 billion euros) over eight years in order to strengthen asymmetric combat capabilities and to cooperate with leading military-industrial countries such as the United States.
During their meeting in Washington on March 19, 2026, Donald Trump and Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae committed themselves to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. They also supported the peaceful resolution of disputes through dialogue, and opposed any attempt at unilateral modification of thestatus quo, including by force or coercion,what Taiwan has welcomed.
But, at the same time, the occupant of the White House favors a unilateral approach and without any consultation with his traditional allies on the Iran issue, where he has chosen the path of force rather than that of diplomacy. This raises questions for the Taiwanese about the credibility of the official American discourse, and serves as a reminder that the concerns of Washington’s partners in East Asia are very close to those of the European allies.
This also fuels fears of an act of aggression by the PRC, which not only feels in a position of strength but above all believes it can attack the island without worrying about an American response. Finally, it prompts reflection on a regional security reconfiguration and thus imposes an unreserved dialogue between Taipei and Washington, beyond the usual statements and without avoiding contentious issues.
This dialogue is more essential than ever, just as it is now mandatory for Taipei to seek other partners in case Washington defaults. But from Japan to Australia, including the Philippines and even the European Union, would the potential candidates be more reliable than Washington?
This text benefited from the support of the Taiwan Fellowship 2026 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Republic of China (Taiwan).
–ref. Face à Pékin, Taïwan peut-il encore compter sur la protection de Washington ? –https://theconversation.com/face-a-pekin-ta-wan-peut-il-encore-compter-sur-la-protection-de-washington-281916