April 25 Attacks in Mali: The Limits of a Security Strategy Without a Political Solution

Source: French to English Tester Published on: 2026-05-04

Source: The Conversation – in French– By Christian Abadioko Sambou, PhD in Political Science, specialist in peace & security, Cheikh Hamidou Kane Digital University

Thesimultaneous attacksFrom April 25, 2026, against several cities in Mali, they recall a persistent reality: despite five years of transition, the security situation there remains critical. By their coordination, geographical extension, and capacity to reach major urban centers such as Bamako, Kati, Sévaré, Gao, Kidal, these offensives mark a new phase of the conflict.

How, indeed, can we explain that the security situation continues to deteriorate despite a real military reinforcement?

As a researcher,Sahel specialist, I have been analyzing for several years the security dynamics in West and Central Africa, notably the conflicts and the political transformations of regimes. The evolution of conflicts in Mali constitutes a major regional and international security issue.

In recent years, the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) have experienced a significant rise in strength. Mali is now positioned among the most structured and powerful armies in the sub-region, according tothe 2026 reportfrom Global Firepower which ranks it as the second army in the sub-region, after Nigeria.

The creation ofthe Sahel States Alliance (SSA)and the progressive operationalization of a joint force, backed by theLiptako-Gourma charter, also testify to a desire to pool security capacities among Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. This dynamic has resulted in an intensification of military operations, an improvement in logistical capabilities, and a diversification of partnerships.

However, these developments are not enough to halt the dynamics of the conflict. The recent attacks reflect less a simple intensification of violence than a strategic transformation. The Group to Support Islam and Muslims (JNIM, close to al-Qaeda) and the Azawad Liberation Front (which claims the independence of northern Mali) have targeted spaces highly symbolic of power. Kidal embodies the military sovereignty claimed by the military regime after its reconquest in 2023. Kati represents the heart of Malian military power from where most military coups, including that of August 2020, were launched.

By attacking these places, the assailants directly challenge the State’s ability to sustainably stabilize the territory.

The message is twofold. Military, first: conquering is not governing. Political, second: a reconquest strategy without political compromise can favor the convergence of actors with different struggle ideologies such as independence movements and jihadist groups.

Thus, Mali is facing less an insurrection than a reconfiguration of the conflict where politics is expressed through arms. This situation calls for moving beyond a strictly security-focused interpretation: insecurity appears primarily as a symptom of a deficit in legitimacy and national cohesion.

A security deterioration

Since the coups d’état of2020and2021, the Malian transitional authorities have undertaken a sovereignist turn marked by a break with several international partners and the redefinition of security alliances.

This reorientation has notably resulted in the questioning ofthe 2015 Algiers Agreement, yet central in regulating the conflict in the North. Despite its limitations (slow implementation, mistrust between parties), this agreement constituted an essential political framework. Its challenge by the military regime in January 2024 contributed to hardening positions, notably within the Tuareg rebellion, and reactivated dynamics of confrontation.

At the same time, local security management mechanisms have been deeply weakened. In the northern regions, these mechanisms were based on forms of “hybrid security,” combining state, community, and armed actors. The increasing involvement of Russian auxiliaries in the fight against terrorist groups has disrupted these arrangements, intensifying the militarization of social relations and weakening local self-regulation capacities. This development fuels intercommunal tensions and delegitimizes state action perceived as imposed rather than negotiated.

At the regional level, the creation of the AES illustrates a desire for coordination between military regimes. But this dynamic, essentially security-oriented, does not address the structural causes of conflicts.

At the same time,the deterioration of relationswith Algeria weakens a key player in mediation. The increasing involvement of Russia, throughAfrica Corps, responds to a logic of military support without necessarily providing sustainable political solutions.

This reconfiguration nevertheless allowed Mali to regain a capacity for strategic initiative and to reduce certain forms of dependence on classical international partners such as France.

It remains that at the heart of this crisis persists a central question: that of legitimacy. The absence of a renewed electoral mandate (there has been no election since the contested legislative elections of March-April 2020), the centralization of power, and the restriction of political spaces do they not undermine the social contract? Yet, it is precisely in these contexts of a contested state that armed groups thrive, prolonging an insecurity that military response alone cannot resolve.

From a security point of view,ACLED(Armed Conflict Location & Event Data, an organization that collects data on violent conflicts and demonstrations) ranks Mali 27th among the 50 most severe conflicts in the world.

How to understand the agreement between armed groups?

The current dynamic between JNIM and the Azawad movements must be interpreted with caution. It resembles more an “opportunistic alliance” than an ideological merger. On one hand, the Azawad Liberation Front carries a politico-territorial claim centered on northern Mali. On the other, JNIM is part of a transnational jihadist project affiliated with Al-Qaeda,aiming at the establishment of Islamic governance at the regional level. This doctrinal gap suggests that the observed understanding is more of a circumstantial coordination than a lasting strategic alliance.

A similar configuration appeared in 2012 with Ansar Dine (now the JNIM led by Iyad Ag Ghali) and the MNLA of Bilal Ag Chérif. This situation led to the intervention of Operation Serval in 2013. It blurs the distinction between rebellion and jihadism, strengthens the state rhetoric equating all armed opposition with terrorism, and fosters the local entrenchment of the JNIM.

This reorganization comes in a profoundly transformed context. The end of the Algiers agreement in January 2024 eliminated an essential, though imperfect, framework for dialogue with the groups from the North.The withdrawal of the UN force in Mali, MINUSMA, end of 2023 andthe ECOWAS summit in 2024, reduce mediation capacities.

Moreover, the recapture of Kidal by the Malian army in 2023, presented as a military victory, did not resolve the underlying political issues, fueling motives of revenge.

In this context, the possible negotiation of the withdrawal of Russian forces from Kidal by armed groups raises the question of real sovereignty and highlights the limits of security outsourcing. External partners can provide military support, but do not replace a sustainable political resolution of the conflict.

The reconquest of Kidal, although strategic, has not resolved the underlying causes and has sometimes reignited intercommunal tensions and violence.

An inseparable relationship

The fight against terrorism cannot therefore be reduced to a strictly military response. It relies on a more fundamental capacity: that of the State to embody a recognized, legitimate, and inclusive political community. In the Sahelian contexts, armed terrorist groups advance not only through their operational strength but especially by exploiting governance weaknesses, perceived injustices, and social fractures. Accordingly, the most structuring response lies not solely in coercion, but in the building of an inclusive and legitimate nation-state.

Recent military operations have allowed a partial return of state presence in localities such as Gao, Kidal, and Mopti. But without credible political dialogue or transparent and inclusive elections, these security advances risk remaining fragile and insufficient to rebuild the social contract.

Furthermore, strengthening social cohesion involves rebuilding local conflict regulation mechanisms, which have long been at the heart of Sahelian balances. Without these mediations, State action risks being perceived as imposed rather than negotiated. Military operations must therefore be linked to a coherent political strategy, under penalty of producing counterproductive effects.

Prolonged conflicts evolve when a credible political offer is made. Recent dynamics in Mali illustrate a conflict that adapts and thrives on the structural weaknesses of the State. Although the transitional regime has strengthened military capabilities and asserted strategic sovereignty, these achievements remain insufficient without an inclusive political framework.

The West African region is thus at a turning point: persisting with a security approach risks fueling violence, while a political reopening, notably supported by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), could create the conditions for sustainable stabilization based on legitimate governance.

Christian Abadioko Sambou does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

–ref. Attacks of April 25 in Mali: the limits of a security strategy without a political solution –https://theconversation.com/attaques-du-25-avril-au-mali-les-limites-dune-strategie-securitaire-sans-solution-politique-281754